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SIMPLIFYING AND RATIONALIZING THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX LAW APPLICABLE TO TRANSFERS IN
DIVORCE
Deborah A. Geier*
Sometimes the complexity in our tax law is defended as a necessary evil to
conform the law to the underlying theory informing it. Some also say that, since
ours is a complex economy and society, our tax system is necessarily complex,
and those engaged in complex transactions can afford to pay for the complex tax
advice necessary to navigate successfully through the system. Or so the sayings
go.
One area of the tax law, however, remains needlessly complex, not because of
any coherent underlying theory but because of history and a series of political
compromises. Moreover, the "transaction" at issue is not one engaged in only by
the savvy, well-advised, and well-to-do. The "transaction" at issue is divorce.
While the tax law applicable to transfers in divorce was, on average, improved
(in my view) in 1984, several fundamental incoherencies and unnecessary complexities continue to plague this area, and more recent ambiguities, dealing
chiefly with redemptions of stock in closely held corporations and other transfers under the assignment-of-income doctrine, have arisen.'
One of the biggest sources of complexity in the current regime is the continuing desire (though futile, in my view) to differentiate cash "alimony" from cash
"child support"2 from cash "property settlements"3 in order to apply different tax

*Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. 0 Deborah
A. Geier 2002. This article was written in my capacity as an "academic advisor" to the Joint
Committee on Taxation in connection with a study of the overall state of the tax system, including
recommendations with respect to possible simplification proposals, that Congress mandated in section 8022(3)(B). The opinions expressed here are, however, completely my own and should not be
attributed to the Joint Committee on Taxation.
'All citations to the Code are to the 1986 Code, as amended, unless citation to an earlier Code is
made explicit with an earlier date in parentheses.
2
The specifics of current law will be discussed in more detail later in this article. Briefly stated,
cash payments satisfying the federal definition of "alimony" in section 71 (b) (regardless of what the
payments are called for state law purposes) are includable in gross income by the recipient and
deductible by the payor directly from gross income (unhampered by the inability to itemize deductions). See I.R.C. §§ 71, 215, and 62(a)(10). Thus, the tax burden on these cash payments is, at least
nominally, bome by the recipient. Cash payments constituting "child support" within the meaning of
section 7 1(c) are neither includable by the recipient nor deductible by the payor. See I.R.C. § 7 1(c).
Thus, the tax burden on these cash payments is, at least nominally, borne by the payor.
3
Cash payments not satisfying the requirements of section 71 (b) are neither includable nor deductible. Notice that payments subject to the inclusion/deduction scheme may not actually constitute
"alimony" under state law, so long as the payment satisfies the federal tax definition of "alimony" in
section 71(b). That is to say, a cash payment constituting a property settlement under state law or
upon examination of the particular facts can nevertheless qualify as an includable/deductible payment so long as the federal requirements for "alimony" are satisfied. For example, payments qualifying as tax alimony (and thus subject to the inclusion/deduction system) can be intended to compensate
the recipient for her share of.vested or inchoate property rights that either go to the payor on the
divorce (such as a piece of real estate that was co-owned by the spouses prior to the divorce) or are
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rules to each transfers, depending on the label that has been applied. My bottomline recommendation is that such labels be discarded and that the parties be
explicitly empowered to determine whether cash transfers-whether denominated alimony, child support, a property settlement, an "equitable distribution"
for state law purposes, or otherwise-are includable by the recipient and deductible by the payor, or excludable by the recipient and not deductible by the payor,
with simple and clear default rules for taxpayers who fail to make their wishes
known in their divorce, separation, or support instrument Well-advised taxpayers already have significant freedom to decide who, between them, should be
taxed on cash transfers incident to divorce, because they can structure their cash
transfers in a form that will implement their agreement. Poorly-advised or unadvised taxpayers do not have the same flexibility, because they are unaware of the
various transactional elections effectively available to them if they had cast their
cash payments in the proper form.
The reason underlying the different tax treatment applicable to alimony and
child support has never been adequately articulated, though it is often difficult to
distinguish between the two. The reason underlying the different tax treatment
applicable to alimony and many cash property settlements can, in contrast, be
articulated as a theoretical matter, but, as Professor Malman noted in 1986,
"there is no administratively practical way for the tax system to draw the alimony/property distinction." 5 Payments that would be characterized as "alimony"
for tax purposes may constitute "child support" or a "property settlement" under
state law, and vice versa. Moreover, an increasing number of states are abandoning such labels altogether. Under "equitable distribution regimes," for example,
the cash payment stream can be intended simply to settle all claims for support
and property compensation between the parties. Continuing to make the determination of who should be taxed on cash transfers in divorce turn on what label
is used to identify the payment, and then having unique tax definitions for those
labels that often deviate from state law definitions, causes confusion among
taxpayers and traps for the unwary, as case law litigation clearly shows.6
The great fear that has driven Congress in the past is that divorcing parties
will engage in inappropriate "income-shifting" if left to decide for themselves
who should be taxed on cash transfers, with the joint income of the divorced
couple being taxed at a lower overall rate than would have occurred absent the
divorce, to the detriment of the Treasury.7 In response, I would argue that such
extinguished on the divorce (such as dower and curtesy rights or statutory share provisions created
under some state intestacy laws). In contrast, cash payments that do not satisfy the federal definition
of "alimony" or "child support" are considered tax-neutral "property settlements" by default, even if
they are considered support payments by the parties themselves or under state law.
4
Cf Marci Kelly, Calling a Spade a Club: The Failure of Matrimonial Tax Reform, 44 TAX LAW.
787,
811-12 (1991) (reaching the same conclusion).
5
Laurie L. Malman, Unfinished Reform: The Tax Consequences of Divorce, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
363, 367 (1986).
6
See infra notes 176-238 and accompanying text (surveying some cases).
7
Cf Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On Public Policy Grounds, A Limited Tax Credit for Child Support
and Alimony, I I AM. J. TAX POL'Y 321, 321 (1994) (also referring to the "abuse of income-shifting"
in this context).
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tax arbitrage is built into the current system already, that people do not get
divorced in order to engage in income-shifting for tax purposes, and that the
income-shifting that can occur is likely a good and defensible outcome on public
policy grounds in most situations in which it can occur. Such income-shifting
encourages the higher-bracket spouse to transfer funds to the lower-bracket spouse
(presumably the more needy spouse), often leaving the lower-bracket spouse
with more after-tax income than she would otherwise have if income-shifting
were disallowed.8 Unlike other situations in which income-shifting is deemed to
be inappropriate, such as in the intact family or in the case of a closely held
corporation, divorce is not a transaction that can be entered into lightly, and
often, in order to shift income to another in a lower tax bracket and thus reduce
overall taxes on a routine basis while retaining effective control over the shifted
income. Indeed, "[f]ollowing divorce, the chances of filing bankruptcy triple."9
To the extent that some additional income-shifting would occur under the proposed simplifications that does not already occur under the current rules, so be
it. Even if I am wrong that it would be a salutary result in most cases, it is a
small price to pay for the huge simplification gains-and, I believe, the added
respect for the tax system by the unfortunate parties who have to deal with these
complex provisions-that would occur.
Moreover, as Professor Malman has noted, there is reason to believe that not
much aggregate tax would be lost to the Treasury in any event, since every
deduction is accompanied by an equal-amount inclusion.' Only the rate-bracket
differential between the parties, if any, results in a revenue loss, and this loss is
self-limiting. As the amount paid to the payee increases, the payee ascends to
higher tax brackets until further income-shifting does not produce a revenue
loss. Moreover, in the context of a payor in a significantly higher tax bracket
than the payee-which is the very context where it would seem that incomeshifting would be at its most extreme and therefore result in the most lost
revenue-any divorce "bonus" is more illusory than real. This is because the
combination of one high-income spouse and one low-income spouse already
receives a significant marriage bonus under current law if the couple files a joint
return," and this marriage bonus is lost on the divorce. 2 Even with income-

8

See infra note 252 and accompanying text (providing example). As Professor Hjorth put it:
I am not unduly concerned by the specter of a "divorce bonus." For every case of taxes
reduced by reason of divorce there is probably at least one case of reduced ability to pay
caused by the divorce. Divorce is not something that is welcomed by most persons affected by it. It is a time of trauma, adjustment, and, often, financial difficulty for the
spouses and their children.

Roland L. Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes, and the 1984 Tax Reform Act: An InadequateResponse to an
Old Problem, 61 WASH. L. REv. 151, 190 (1986).
9
David Cay Johnston, Bankruptcy Borne of Misfortune, Not Excess, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2000,
§ 3, at 7.
10Malman, supra note 5,at 410-12.
"Joint filing can generate a "marriage penalty on two-earner couples," with the married couple
paying more in tax than they would if they were able to file separately under the rate schedule for
unmarried individuals. The marriage penalty is at its peak when each spouse earns the same amount
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shifting, the parties are not better off taxwise by much, if any, in the aggregate
under the more onerous schedule for single filers that must apply to them after
the divorce.
As mentioned above, our current system for taxing transfers in divorce is the
result of history and political compromise as much as grand theory. Part I below
will rec6unt this history, for it is difficult to understand how we got to where we
are today without a working knowledge of this history. Part I will also introduce
the various ways to think about these transfers, as it is difficult to discuss how
the law evolved without an introduction to these thoughts at the same time. Part
II will continue the discussion of what works in the current system, what is
fundamentally flawed, and what should be done about it and why. Part III will
examine two inextricably related problems that need addressing.
I. THE HISTORY
A. Priorto 1942
The early statute did not address how to treat cash payments (or in-kind
property transfers) between divorcing spouses. Hence, it devolved upon the
Supreme Court to determine the status of such payments and transfers. The
Court tackled cash payments in 1917 in Gould v. Gould 3 and in-kind property
transfers in 1962 in United States v. Davis, 4 discussed in Part I.B.2. below.
The parties in Gould divorced in 1909, and the divorce court ordered Mr.
Gould to pay Mrs. Gould $3,000 each month for the rest of her life "for her
support and maintenance."' 5 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether
Mrs. Gould had to include these payments in her gross income. The Court first
quoted the predecessor to section 61 as follows:

of income. On the other hand, joint filing can generate a "marriage bonus," with the joint-return tax
lower than would arise under separate filing using the individual rate schedule, if one spouse earns
significantly more income than the other. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994) (recounting this history and advocating abandonment of the
joint return in favor of individual filing for all).
More married couples obtain a benefit from the marriage bonus than are subject to the marriage
penalty. About 51% of married couples enjoy a marriage bonus, whereas about 42% of married
couples incur a marriage penalty. In 1996, those enjoying a marriage bonus paid, as a group, $33
billion less in taxes than they would have paid if single, while those incurring the marriage penalty
paid, as a group, $29 billion more in taxes than they would have paid if single. Thus, $4 billion of
net revenue that would have been collected by the Treasury if all individuals filed separately was
lost. See For Better Or Worse: Marriage and the Federal Income Tax, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET

OFFICE
(June 1997).
2

1 JoSEPH M. DODGE, ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 191 n.l I

(2d

ed. 1999). The situation in which income-shifting in divorce under an inclusion/deduction system
can lose the most revenue is when a high-earning spouse makes payments to a low-eaming spouse
after divorce, which is precisely the situation where the divorced couple will lose their prior marriage bonus, since after the divorce they must file using the rate schedule for individuals in order for
the payments to be eligible for the inclusion/deduction system that generates the income-shifting.
See I.R.C. § 71(e).
13245 U.S. 151 (1917).
14370 U.S. 65 (1962).
11245 U.S. at 152.
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B. That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter
allowed, the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and
income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of
whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or
personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal
property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any
lawful business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever, including the income from but not the value
of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent .... 16
The Court then wrote four paragraphs, which comprised the opinion's entire
reasoning. Because of their brevity, I quote them in full:
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to
extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language
used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically
pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the
Government, and in favor of the citizen. [Here, the Court cited three cases in
which a tariff was imposed on an item specifically listed in a tariff statute, and
the issue was whether the item sought to be taxed by the government qualified
as the item listed in the statute as taxable.]
As appears from the above quotations, the new income upon which subdivision
I directs that an annual tax shall be assessed, levied, collected and paid is
defined in division B. The use of the word itself in the definition of "income"
causes some obscurity, but we are unable to assert that alimony paid to a
divorced wife under a decree of court falls fairly within any of the terms
employed.
In Audubon v. Shufeldt . . . . we said: "Alimony does not arise from any
business transaction, but from the relation of marriage. It is not founded on
contract, express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to
support the wife. The general obligation to support is made specific by the
decree of the court of appropriate jurisdiction . . . . Permanent alimony is
regarded rather as a portion of the husband's estate to which the wife is equitably entitled, than as strictly a debt; alimony from time to time may be regarded
as a portion of his current income or earnings; .... "
The net income of the divorced husband subject to taxation was not decreased
by payment of alimony under the court's order; and, on the other hand, the sum
received by the wife on account thereof cannot be regarded as income arising
or accruing to her within the enactment. 7
As made clear in the first quoted paragraph, one major ground relied upon by
the Court was a rule of statutory interpretation borrowed from tariff law that
revenue statutes are to be narrowly construed. No such canon of statutory interpretation survives today with respect to the income tax.
6
1d. at
7

152-53.
'l1d. at 153-54.
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Moving to the exegesis of the terms of the statute itself, the Court concluded
that alimony must not have been contemplated by Congress as coming within
the ambit of the provision, apparently because alimony is not similar to the items
specifically listed in the statute as taxable. This canon of statutory construction
sometimes goes by the Latin name of ejusdem generis, meaning "of the same
kind." Precisely the same reasoning, accepted by the Gould Court, was again
used by a taxpayer in 1955 in arguing that punitive damages are not includable
in gross income because they are not like the items specifically listed as taxable. 8 Rejecting the argument premised on the notion of ejusdem generis, the
Glenshaw Glass Court instead stressed the catchall language at the end of the
section-"income derived from any source whatever"-in concluding that punitive damages were includable in gross income by the recipient. The Glenshaw
Glass Court stated that this catchall language required inclusion of all "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion."' 9 (Indeed, it is an interesting exercise to think about whether
the Gould Court might have decided differently if the case had arisen in the later
era, after Glenshaw Glass.)
Notice that this form of analysis focuses on whether alimony comes within
some notion of "income." If the analysis is viewed this way, each party is
analyzed independently, and a payment of alimony could conceivably be taxable
to both the payor and the recipient. For example, if we view the matter from the
recipient's side alone, and if alimony is considered within the Glenshaw Glass
notion of "income" as an undeniable accession to wealth, etc., then it would be
includable by the recipient. At the same time, the payor earning wages from
which the alimony was paid would have to include the wages in gross income,
since compensation for services rendered is specifically listed as "income" in
section 61 (a)(1). Moreover, the payor would arguably be denied a deduction for
the payment under a strict definition of "income" in the familiar Schanz-HaigSimons sense, under which only outlays incurred to produce includable income
are properly deductible (with personal consumption outlays being nondeductible, and thus taxed).20 Since the payment of alimony is not an outlay incurred

"5Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
9
1d. at 431.
2
1ln general, a tax on "income" reaches amounts saved and amounts spent on personal consumption. Amounts saved are taxed since the Code generally disallows outlays constituting "capital
expenditures," such as the purchase of an asset. I.R.C. § 263. That is to say, outlays that result
merely in a change in the form in which wealth is held, rather than a diminution in wealth, are not
deductible. Current "expenses" are the opposite of a "capital expenditure" in that current expenses
represent a real diminution in wealth in the year spent. If an expense is incurred in income-producing
activity, then the expense is generally deductible. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 212. If, on the other hand,
the expense is spent on personal consumption, it is generally nondeductible. See I.R.C. § 262(a). The
only personal consumption expenses that are deductible are those that Congress has specifically
allowed, usually as an incentive to engage in certain desirable behavior. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 170
(charitable contribution deduction), 163(h)(3) (home mortgage interest deduction).
The reason why expenses incurred to produce includable income (as opposed to expenses incurred
to buy personal consumption) should be deductible under an income tax is to avoid double taxation
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 55, No. 2
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directly to produce the payor's wages, it would be nondeductible (and thus
remain in the tax base of the payor). Thus, the payment would be taxed twice, as
amounts paid by an employee from his wages to his housecleaner are taxed
twice (once to the employee and once to the housecleaner). In the housecleaner
example, the amounts constitute wages to both, and the payment to the
housecleaner would clearly be a nondeductible personal expense of the payor.
The only way to differentiate the alimony payment from the housecleaner payment would be to argue that alimony does not really purchase any personal
consumption for the payor and thus should be removed from his tax base via a
deduction. This means of analysis would define personal consumption not by
looking to whether the payment directly contributed to income production of
some kind-which defines personal consumption by default 21-but rather by
looking to what is actually purchased with the payment and determining whether
it affirmatively qualifies as "personal consumption."22
Perhaps we do not have to resolve that definitional dilemma, however, for
there is another way to view this issue, which was also hinted at by the Gould
Court and which is, I think, the more appropriate way to think about the payment. Rather than analyzing the tax consequences to each of these taxpayers
independently of the other, i.e., determining whether the receipt qualifies as
"income" to the recipient and whether the payment qualifies as a deductible one
to the payor under an "income" analysis because it does not purchase discretionary personal consumption, we could view both taxpayers together. In an intact
marriage, by analogy, amounts earned by one spouse and paid to another are
ignored for tax purposes (i.e., they are neither includable by the recipient nor
deductible by the payor), whether or not the couple files a joint return or files
separate returns using the rate schedule for married couples filing separately.23

of the same dollars to the same taxpayer. You can think of it in the following way: If incomeproducing expenses were not allowed as deductions, then those expenses would create basis (previously taxed dollars). That basis should offset any includable income produced by that outlay, which
would result in inclusion of only the "net" receipt in income. But the tax system does not work this
way. Instead, section 61 requires the inclusion of every dollar of "gross" receipts. In order, therefore,
to prevent the double taxation of those gross receipts to the extent of the outlays incurred to produce
them, those outlays must be deductible. See generally Dodge, et al., supra note 12, at 30-33, 39-55.
2
This is the method currently used in the Code. Amounts can be deducted only if they are
specifically described in a section containing the words, "there shall be allowed as a deduction ....
"
and, as described supra note 20, most of such provisions allow deduction only for income-producing
expenses.
22
One example of this mode of analysis would be to argue that certain types of mandatory
payments should not be considered as purchasing personal consumption and thus should be deductible. Payments of certain state and local taxes can be analyzed this way, as can alimony and child
support.
See generally Joseph M. Dodge, THE Looic OF TAX 123 (1989).
23
See I.R.C. § I (describing the various filing statuses and their related rate schedules). Some
couples file separately in order to lower significant state income taxes that use a progressive rate
schedule. Filing separately might allow the couple to use the lowest state rate brackets twice, which
can more than offset the increased federal tax burden that may arise from using the more onerous
schedule (compared to the rate schedule applicable to single taxpayers) applicable to married couples
filing separately.
Moreover, if each member of the couple earns approximately half of the couple's aggregate
income, the aggregate federal tax should be roughly the same, regardless of whether they file a joint
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 55, No. 2
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Therefore, the amounts are taxed only once between the two.24 We could reason
that the amounts should continue to be taxed only once, even though the family
is no longer intact, because of the clear and direct relationship of the payments
to the former legal relationship of the parties (or the continuing legal relationship, in the case of a paternity payment to support a child after a divorce or
otherwise outside of marriage). These payments would not have been made but
for the prior legal relationship. Unless. the government wishes to discourage
divorce affirmatively via the tax laws (a very unwise choice, in my view), there
does not seem to be a persuasive reason to tax such payments more onerously
outside marriage (by taxing them twice) than within it (by taxing them once).
Viewed this way, the question is not whether the amount conceptually constitutes "income" to both but rather who should be taxed on what is concededly
income to someone? That is to say, the question can be viewed not as "what is
income?" but rather as "to whom should the income be taxed?" There are two
alternative answers to this form of the question: The income could be taxed to
the recipient by requiring the recipient to include it and allowing the payor to
deduct it. Conversely, it could be taxed to the payor by allowing the recipient to
exclude it and disallowing the payor a deduction. In either scenario, the government becomes a mere stakeholder in the matter: The amounts will be taxed to
someone (once); the only question is which taxpayer's marginal rates should
apply?
The Gould opinion obliquely picked up on this perspective when it stressed
that "[t]he net income of the divorced husband subject to taxation was not
decreased by payment of alimony under the court's order; and, on the other
hand, the sum received by the wife on account thereof cannot be regarded as
income arising or accruing to her within the enactment."25 The thought was
written as a single sentence, with a semi-colon connecting the two independent
clauses. This form seems to imply a causal link, i.e., that another reason why the
amount was not includable by Mrs. Gould was precisely because it was not
deductible by Mr. Gould. The Court's implication was that the amount should
not be taxed to both parties, and since the Court cannot create nonstatutory
deductions, it exercised its power to define the contours of "gross income" to
ensure that the amount was not taxed twice by holding that the recipient need
return or file separately, since the joint return mechanism produces a tax "exactly twice the tax that
would be due if the [rate schedule for married filing separately] were applied to 50% of the couple's
aggregate taxable income." Dodge, et al., supra note 12, at 188. Another reason that some married
couples file separately is to enable one to deduct more medical expenses, personal casualty losses, or
miscellaneous itemized deductions, all of which are deductible only to the extent that they exceed
certain percentages of adjusted gross income, than he or she would otherwise be able to deduct. See
I.R.C. §§ 67, 165(c)(3) & (h), 213. Finally, filing separately allows the couple to avoid joint and
several liability. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).
24
This conforms the treatment of support payments within the intact family to the treatment of
gifts within a family, which are also excludable by the recipient and not deductible by the donor.
I.R.C. §§ 102, 162. Mandatory and legally enforceable support payments would not otherwise qualify
as "gifts," which are generally defined for income tax purposes as transfers made out of "detached
and disinterested generosity." See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 283 (1960).
25
Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 154 (1917).
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not include the payments in gross income.26 The Court would presumably have
come to the same conclusion with respect to child support, if any had been at
issue.
With respect to support payments, the one-tax approach has continued to this
day. The issues in this area have been how to decide whom to tax between the
two and how to differentiate support payments (alimony and child support) from
property settlements, a question that first arose with the 1942 legislation.
B. From 1942 to 1984
1. Support Payments
In the midst of World War II, the highest federal income tax marginal rate
under the regular tax and a special surtax exceeded 90% in order to finance the
war effort. Under such a rate structure, a payor of nondeductible alimony of any
significant size could have little left upon which to live once he27 paid his
alimony and then the tax on his income, including the alimony. The legislative
history underlying the Revenue Act of 194228 reflected this concern:
The existing law does not tax alimony payments to the wife who receives them,
nor does it allow the husband to take any .deduction on account of alimony
payments made by him. He is fully taxable on his entire net income even
though a large portion of his income goes to his wife as alimony or as separate
maintenance payments. The increased surtax rates would intensify this hardship
and in many cases the husband would not have sufficient income left after
paying alimony to meet his income tax obligations.

26

1n order to take a deduction, a taxpayer must find a section that contains the words "there shall

be allowed as a deduction" and satisfy each of the requirements specified there. He must also survive
the gauntlet of provisions that take away "otherwise allowable deductions." No court, the Supreme
Court included, has any power to create a deduction. Only Congress can do that. On the other hand,
because present-day section 61 contains the circular definition that gross income means "income
from whatever source derived," the Supreme Court has long exercised its power to construe the
contours of "gross income" by creating common law regarding what constitutes gross income. See,
e.g., infra notes 260-318 and accompanying text for the cases developing the assignment-of-income
doctrine. See generally Deborah A. Geier, Some Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531 (2000) (discussing the interplay between the Court's
power to craft the contours of gross income and its inability to create deductions in the context of the
treatment of attorneys fees and costs that, though deductible, are subject to deduction restrictions that
could be avoided if the plaintiffs could exclude from gross income the portion of taxable litigation
awards to the extent paid to their attorneys).
"We all know that payors of alimony can include both males and females. See, e.g., Liesl
Schillinger, Divorce Him, Support Him?, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDoN), Dec. 14, 1997, at5 (characterizing "the phenomenon of men seeking alimony" as "becoming rife in the United States" and, more
objectively, reporting that "[t]he number of male clients in the [United States] claiming financial
support from high-earning exes has doubled in the last five years"). While I know that use of the
word "he" as the payor of alimony can perpetuate stereotypes, I think that repeated usage of the
terms "he or she" makes for distracting prose, and thus I have chosen to risk the alienation of some
readers in the quest for less stilted-sounding sentences.
28
Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120, 56 Stat. 816 (1942) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. §§ 22(k), 23(u) (1942)).
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The bill would correct this situation by taxing alimony and separate maintenance payments to the wife receiving them, and by relieving the husband from
tax upon that portion of such payments which constitutes income to him under
present law. This treatment is provided only in cases of divorce or legal separation and applies only where the alimony or separate maintenance obligation is
discharged in periodic payments. Moreover, the portion of such payments going to the support of minor children of the husband does not constitute income
to the wife nor a deduction to the husband. The same is true with regard to
payments in discharge of lump sum obligations, even though made in installments.29
Therefore, as described briefly above, the Revenue Act of 1942 switched the
answer to the question, "who should be taxed on the amounts paid out as alimony?," from the payor to the recipient by requiring inclusion of alimony by the
recipient and allowing a deduction to the payor. But the Act and its legislative
history were quite clear that this inclusion/deduction system should not apply to
child support or amounts paid to compensate for the transfer of a property
interest. Child support and property settlements, in other words, remained excludable by the recipient and nondeductible by the payor, as under pre-1942 law.
I shall discuss child support first and then property settlements.
The legislative history is silent with respect to why Congress chose to shift
the tax incidence to the recipient only with respect to alimony and not child
support. Yet, we can perhaps guess the predominant thinking of the time. In this
more traditional era-when it was, indeed, only husbands who paid alimony and
child supporta 0 -it might have been thought that, while shifting the tax obligation with respect to alimony would help to alleviate the immediate and quite
practical problem of a husband being unable to satisfy both his alimony and tax
liability if alimony were not deductible, shifting the tax obligation with respect
to the man's children would be going too far. A man's financial obligation to his
children-including the obligation to pay the income tax on amounts spent to
support them-might have been considered to be stronger than that to his exwife.
In any event, this new distinction between alimony and child support necessarily required line-drawing for the first time. The statute did so by providing
that the recipient's gross income inclusion:
shall not apply to that part of any such periodic payment which the terms of the
decree or written instrument fix, in terms of an amount of money or a portion of
the payment, as a sum which\is payable for the support of minor children of
such husband. In case any such periodic payment is less than the amount
specified in the decree or written instrument, for the purpose of applying the
preceding sentence, such payment, to the extent of such sum payable for such

support, shall be considered a payment for such support.3

29

H.R. REP. No. 77-2333 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 409.
Cf supra note 27.
I.R.C. § 22(k) (1942).

30

3
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In other words, an amount "fixed" in the governing documents for child
support would not fall under the inclusion/deduction system, and if a payor
made only a partial payment, the child support payment would be considered
paid first. For example, assume that a husband was ordered to pay $10,000 per
year to his ex-wife for the support of her and their minor children, $6,000 of
which was explicitly fixed as child support. If the husband paid only $8,000 in a
year, $6,000 would be considered nondeductible child support and $2,000 would
be considered deductible alimony (so long as the remaining qualifications for
deductible "alimony," described shortly below, were met).
What does it mean for an amount to be "fixed" for child support within the
meaning of the statute? Suppose, for example, that John and Mary had three
minor children when they divorced, that their mutually negotiated divorce agreement (which the relevant court approved) provided for a "family support payment" of, say, $12,000 per year, but that the payment would be reduced by
one-sixth each time a minor child married, became emancipated, or died. In
other words, by the time all three minor children married, became emancipated,
or died, the annual payments would be reduced to $6,000. Was any amount
"fixed" for child support during the years of the children's minority in this
agreement?
On the one hand, the agreement did not overtly fix any amount for child
support in the literal sense, though the "substance" of the document seems to
indicate that, prior to the time any of the three children married, became emancipated, or died, $6,000 of the payments was really disguised child support. The
reduction in amounts payable upon conditions relating to the children's emancipation, etc., was, after all, captured in language in the agreement itself, and thus
the agreement could be said to have adequately "fixed" $6,000 of the payments
as child support.
Much litigation ensued in order to determine what the term "fixed" meant in
this provision-an example of how the different labels and their different tax
treatments inevitably cause litigation.32 A split among the circuit courts developed and finally went to the Supreme Court for resolution in Commissioner v.
Lester,33 the facts of which are essentially identical to those recited above. The
Court quoted both the Senate Finance Report as well as a report of the Office of
the Legislative Counsel to the Senate Finance Committee in concluding that no
part of an unallocated "family support payment" should be considered "fixed" as
child support, even if a portion is scheduled to be reduced on the happening of
events related to the children.
"If, however, the periodic payments ... are received by the wife for
the support and maintenance of herself and minor children of the
husband without such specific designation of the portion for the sup32
See, e.g., Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1959); Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250
F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957); Lester v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1156 (1959), rev'd, 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1960).

33366 U.S.

299 (1961).
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port of such children, then the whole of-such amounts is includable in
the income of the wife as provided in section 22(k) .
S. Rep. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 86.
As finally enacted in 1942, the Congress used the word "fix" instead of the
term "specifically designated," but the change was explained in the Senate
hearings as "a little more streamlined language." Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Finance on H.R. 7387, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 43. As the Office of
the Legislative Counsel reported to the Senate Committee:
"If an amount is specified in the decree of divorce attributable to the
support of minor children, that amount is not income to the wife ....
If, however, that amount paid the wife includes the support of children, but no amount is specified for the support of minor children, the
entire amount goes into the income of the wife .... Ibid.
This language leaves no room for doubt. The agreement must expressly "fix" a
sum certain or percentage of the payment for child support before any of the
payment is excluded from the wife's income. The statutory requirement is strict
and carefully worded. It does not say that "a sufficiently clear purpose" on the
part of the parties is sufficient to shift the tax. It says that the "written instrument" must "fix" that "portion of the payment" which is to go to the support of
the children. Otherwise, the wife must pay tax on the whole payment. We are
obliged to enforce this mandate of the Congress.34
Therefore, the entire $12,000 annual payment during the children's years of
minority was includable by the wife and deductible by the husband as alimony.
Thus, a divorce decree that required a husband to pay $100 weekly for the
support of his ex-wife and $50 for the support of their two children would
produce only a $100 weekly income inclusion for the wife and a corresponding
deduction for the husband, since the remaining $50 would be considered "fixed"
for child support and not eligible for the inclusion/deduction system. If the
decree provided instead for a payment of $150 per week for the support of the
ex-wife and the children, no part of it would be considered excludable/nondeductible child support. Similarly, none of the $150 payment would be considered child support if the decree also provided that the payments would be reduced
by $25 per week upon the death, marriage, or majority of either of the children.
To American tax lawyers accustomed to hearing that "substance" and not
"form" governs the characterization of tax transactions, it might seem odd that,
while the 1.942 Code announced that Congress had decided-for whatever reason-to treat child support differently from alimony, the law allowed what was,
34

1d. I have always wondered whether Justice Scalia would have written a dissent in Lester, since
the majority relies so explicitly on legislative history, a tool that Justice Scalia finds illegitimate. See
generally Deborah A. Geier, Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445, 447-55 (1993); see
also Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("[Ours is] a Government of laws not of committee reports."). If Justice Scalia would
interpret the word "fix" broadly enough to cover terms explicitly requiring reduction of payments on
the happening of an event linked to the child's leaving the payee's home (such as marriage, death, or
emancipation), then the legislative history to the contrary would have been meaningless to him.
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for all intents and purposes, disguised child support to escape characterization as
"child support." Yet, what the so-called Lester Rule accomplished. was the delegation to the divorcing parties of the authority to decide who, between them,
should pay the tax on the amounts used to support the children. If they clearly
"fixed" the amount as child support in their agreement, then the payor would
pay tax on the payments; if the amount was not explicitly "fixed" but the amount
paid was reduced upon the child's marriage, death, or emancipation, then the
recipient would shoulder the burden. The Lester Court recognized this when it
said:
As we read [section] 22(k), the Congress was in effect giving the husband and
wife the power to shift a portion of the tax burden from the wife to the husband
by the use of a simple provision in the settlement agreement which fixed the
specific portion of the periodic payment made to the wife as payable for the
support of the children.35
You might think that I support the outcome of the Lester Rule, since I made
plain in the Introduction that I will, in Part II, explicitly argue that the parties
should be able to decide for themselves who, between them, should shoulder the
burden of paying tax on cash transfers. But the approach embodied in the Lester
Rule suffers from a fundamental defect. The election was not explicit; it required
the advice of a skilled tax practitioner to alert the parties to this planning device.
Ill-advised (or unadvised) parties unlucky enough to call child support "child
support" in their agreement were unable to shift the tax burden to the payee
under the Lester Rule, even if they wished to (and the reasons they might wish
to will be detailed later). Under the Lester Rule, in other words, parties were
empowered to decide who should bear the tax burden only if they were aware of
the magic formula. If it is true that Congress intended, as indicated by the quoted
legislative history, that the parties be able to decide for themselves who, between them, should shoulder the burden of paying tax on amounts paid out as
child support, the election should have been made explicit. Effectively burying
the election in Committee Reports and then in a Supreme Court opinion discussing what it means to "fix" an amount for child support was not defensible. Then,
as now, too many people divorced without tax counsel. Even many family
lawyers who were involved in divorce settlements were often not well-versed in
tax law and were therefore unlikely to know about the de facto election. Under
the Lester Rule the de facto election was, in short, a huge trap for the unwary.
There will always be parties who are unwary of the law, but the law should
strive as much as possible to keep the traps to a minimum, particularly in an
area, such as divorce, where people often go it alone (i.e., without good tax
counsel).
In sum, if Congress were serious about taxing child support differently from
alimony in 1942, then the term "fix" should not have been interpreted as it was
by the Lester Court. Substance should have controlled over form. If, on the other

31366 U.S. at 304.
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hand, the Lester Rule outcome was deemed desirable because it would allow the
parties to decide for themselves who should bear the burden of tax on these cash
payments, then the election should have been made much more explicit on the
face of the statute and not made contingent on including the right magic words
in the divorce settlement.
Amounts "fixed" as child support were not the only payments that fell outside
the recipient inclusion/payor deduction system enacted in 1942. Congress intended that payments for the recipient's interest in property should not fall
within the inclusion/deduction system as well and, like child support payments,
should be tax neutral (i.e., neither deductible by the payor nor includable by the
payee). While we were hard-pressed to come up with a reason why Congress
chose to treat child support payments as falling outside the new inclusion/deduction system in 1942, it is much easier to identify the thinking behind the distinction between alimony and cash property settlements.
As a simple example, assume that John and Mary owned Blackacre, worth
$100,000, as joint tenants when they divorced. John wished to own 100% of
Blackacre outright, and he thus agreed to pay Mary $50,000 for her share of the
property, either out of his own previously earned funds or in installments from
his future earnings. In each of these scenarios, this $50,000 payment should not
(as a matter of theory, at least) fall within the inclusion/deduction scheme, if we
respect the payment as a purchase of property. Viewed from John's perspective
alone, an outlay made to purchase property is properly a nondeductible "capital
expenditure."36 Allowing John a deduction for his outlay to purchase property
violates the fundamental structure of a tax on "income," effectively garnering
John consumption-tax treatment instead.37 Another way to view it (again, from
John's perspective) would be to say that if John were allowed to deduct his
purchase price of $50,000 for Mary's interest in Blackacre, the Treasury would
actually be funding a portion of his purchase price (equal to John's tax savings).
On the other hand, we must remember that Mary would be fully taxed on the
cash receipt if John gets to deduct it, so the revenue loss to the Treasury by
treating this payment under the inclusion/deduction scheme (rather than as a tax
neutral payment) would equal only the difference (if any) between John's marginal rate bracket (the tax lost to the Treasury) and Mary's (the tax gained).
Viewed from Mary's perspective, if this payment were respected as a payment for her share of Blackacre, she would measure her realized gain or loss
under section 1001 by comparing the $50,000 received for her half interest with
her basis in the half interest. Only if her basis were zero would the gain realized
equal the entire $50,000 that would be included if the payment were instead

36

See supra note 20.

37

Under a consumption tax, all outlays-even those that would constitute nondeductible capital
expenditures under an income tax-are deductible so long as the outlay is not for personal consumption. Thus, additions to savings, such as John's purchase of $50,000 worth of Blackacre, would be
deductible under a cash-flow consumption tax, even though it would be nondeductible under an
income tax. See generally Dodge, et al., supra note 12, at 472-83.
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treated under the inclusion/deduction system, and even then the gain might be
lower-taxed capital gain (instead of the ordinary income that arises under the
inclusion/deduction system) or might not be recognized at all.38 The transaction
might also produce a loss if Mary's basis for her half share of Blackacre were
higher than $50,000.
Thus, at least in theory, only the portion of a shared income stream earned by
the payor after the divorce and paid to the recipient for support (and not for her
share of property or inchoate property rights accrued during the marriage) should
be eligible for the inclusion/deduction system. The 1942 legislation attempted to
codify this idea in new section 22(k) with the following language:
In the case of a wife who is divorced or legally separated from her husband
under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, periodic payments (whether
or not made at regular intervals) received subsequent to such decree in discharge of, or attributable to property transferred (in trust or otherwise) in discharge of, a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family relationship,
is imposed upon or incurred by such husband under such decree or under a
written instrument incident to such divorce or separation shall be includable in
the gross income of such wife, and such amounts received as are attributable to
property so transferred shall not be includable in the gross income of such
husband . . Installment payments discharging a part of an obligation the
principal sum of which is, in terms of money or property, specified in the
decree or instrument shall not be considered periodic payments for the purposes

of this subsection; except that an installment payment shall be considered a
periodic payment for the purposes of this subsection if such principal sum, by
the terms of the decree or instrument, may be or is to be paid within a period
ending more than 10 years from the date of such decree or instrument, but only
to the extent that such installment payment for the taxable year of the wife (or
if more than one such installment payment for such taxable year is received
during such taxable year, the aggregate of such installment payments) does not
39
exceed 10 per centum of such principal sum.

3
Whether
39

Mary's realized gain or loss would be recognized is discussed in the next subpart.
1.R.C. § 22(k) (1942). The language referring to a transfer "attributable to property transferred
(in trust or otherwise) in discharge of" a legal obligation ensured that if a payor satisfied his alimony
obligation by creating a trust or purchasing a life insurance or annuity contract, etc., with the
payments from the trust or insurance company payable to the payee, then that income stream was
also includable by the payee. The later language that the amounts "received as are attributable to
property so transferred shall not be includable in the gross income of the husband" rendered a
deduction unnecessary to the husband to shift the income tax obligation to the payee. The income
shifting was accomplished via different means (an exclusion for the husband rather than a deduction)
but was nevertheless successfully accomplished. Regulations issued in 1942 give this example:
[Ilf in order to meet an alimony obligation of $500 a month, the husband purchases or
assigns for the benefit of his former wife a commercial annuity contract paying such
amount, the full $500 a month received by the wife is includable in her income, and no
part of such amount is includable in the husband's income or deductible by him.
Reg. 103, § 19.22(k)-l(b) (issued in Treasury Decision 5194, Dec. 8, 1942). This sentence was
transposed directly from the legislative history. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, reprinted in 1942-2 C.B.
372, 568.
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The statute provided the payor a deduction in section 23(u) for all amounts
includable by the recipient.40
The relevant qualifications for an includable/deductible payment could be
distilled, therefore, as follows:
1. The payment had to be "periodic," but a payment could be periodic even if
not made at regular intervals.
2. The payment had to be made pursuant to a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance.
3. The payment had to discharge a legal obligation imposed on the payor
because of the marital or family relationship.
4. The payment could not be an amount "fixed" for child support.
5. If the payment was an installment payment that discharged a principal sum
stipulated in the divorce decree, then the payment qualified only if the installment period exceeded ten years from the date of the decree and, even then, the
installment payment in any one year could qualify only to the extent that it did
not exceed ten percent of the principal sum designated in the decree.
Requirement 2 is straightforward, and I have already discussed requirement 4. I
shall now discuss requirements 1 and 5 immediately below and then move to
requirement 3.
The implicit assumption underlying requirement 1, that the payment be "periodic," was that a lump-sum obligation (even if paid in installments) looks much
more like a property settlement than a support payment out of new (untaxed)
earnings of the payor. But while the general idea is fairly easy to grasp, the
provision generated much litigation in search of the precise meaning of the term
"periodic."'4' The cases generally concluded that, to be periodic, the payments
had to be either for an indefinite amount or an indefinite period.4 2 Moreover, as
requirement 5 indicates, if the payment was part of an installment stream that
discharged a principal sum stipulated in the divorce decree, the payment stream
had to exceed ten years to overcome the underlying presumption that it otherwise constituted a payment for the recipient's interest in marital property. A
payment was considered to be in discharge of a principal sum if "the final sum
43
to be paid could be definitely determined at the time the decree was executed.
Even if the ten-year period was met, no more than ten percent of the principal
sum could qualify as deductible alimony in any one year.

4

1.R.C.
§ 23(u) (1942).
See, e.g., Van Orman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1969); Warnack v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 541 (1979); Bishop v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 720 (1971).
42
Barb Mattei, Comment, 1984 Deficit Reduction Act: Divorce Taxation, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 177,
185.
43

41

1d.
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An example taken from the 1942 regulations illustrates the operation of this
rule:
A divorce decree in 1940 provides that H is to pay W $20,000 each year for the
next 5 years, beginning with the date of the decree, and then $5,000 each year
for the next 10 years. Assuming the wife makes her returns on the calendar year
basis, each payment received in 1942 [the first year in which the new rules
became effective] 1943 and 1944 is a periodic payment under section 22(k), but
only to the extent of 10 percent of the principal sum of $150,000. Thus for such
taxable years, only $15,000 of the $20,000 received is includable under section
22(k) in the wife's income and is deductible by the husband under section
23(u). For the years 1945-1954, inclusive, the full $5,000 received each year by
the wife is includable in her income and is deductible from the husband's
income."4
This ten percent rule, in short, discouraged front-loaded payments that might
look as though they consisted more of a property settlement than a support
payment. Matters could get quite complicated, however. For example, the regulations provided that "[t]his 10 percent limitation applies to installment payments made in advance but does not apply to delinquent installment payments

for a prior taxable year of the wife made during her taxable year." 45 The interrelationship between the ten-year rule, the ten-percent rule, and the rules for advance and delinquent payments was illustrated by the following sticky example:
Under the terms of a separation agreement incident to divorce granted in December 1940, H agrees to pay W $500 on the first day of each month, beginning with the month after the decree, for 12 years. W makes her income tax
returns on the calendar year basis while H makes his returns on the basis of the
fiscal year ending June 30. H makes the promised payments in 1941 and 1942
and, in addition, on December 31, 1942, pays W $1,500 as an advance payment
of installments for the next three months. In the calendar year 1943, H makes
no payments at all because of financial straits. On January 1, 1944, H inherits
$15,000, which he immediately pays to W in satisfaction of not only his back
alimony installments for the last 9 months of 1943 but also his alimony installments for the next 21 months. The results as to H and W are as follows:
As to W. In the calendar year 1941, W received $6,000, none of which is
includable in her gross income. In the calendar year 1942, W received $7,500.
Since 10 percent of $72,000 (the principal sum) is $7,200, only $7,200 of the
$7,500 so received is includable in her income for 1942. For 1943, nothing is
includable in her income under section 22(k). In 1944, W received $15,000. Of
this amount, $4,500 is in payment of back installments and, therefore, is includ-

able without limitation in her income for 1944. Of the balance of $10,500, only
$7,200 is includable in her income for 1944.

'Reg.
103, § 19.22(k)-I(c), Ex. 2 (issued in Treasury Decision 5194, Dec. 8, 1942).
45
Reg. 103, § 19.22(k)-I(c) (issued in Treasury Decision 5194, Dec. 8, 1942).
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As to H. For the taxable year ended June 30, 1941, H paid $3,000 none of
which is deductible. For the taxable year ended June 30, 1942, H paid $6,000,
of which only $3,000 is deductible by H since only that much of the $6,000
was paid in the wife's first taxable year beginning after December 31, 1941. In
the taxable year ended June 30, 1943, H paid W $4,500, which, not being in
excess of 10 percent of the principal sum, is deductible for such year. In his
taxable year ended June 30, 1944, H6 paid $15,000, of which $11,700 (the sum
4
of $4,500 and $7,200) is deductible.
The result was clearly not easy or intuitive for the divorcing parties who failed
to (or could not afford to) seek advice.
As noted above, payments of less than ten-year duration would not qualify for
the inclusion/deduction system at all if they discharged a principal sum that
could be computed from the decree at the time of the execution. But, in such a
case, a contingency clause inserted into the divorce agreement to increase, decrease, or terminate payments on the happening of certain events, such as death,
remarriage, or a change in economic circumstances, was sufficient to make the
payments sufficiently indefinite in duration to be "periodic," even if the likelihood of the contingency occurring during the payment stream was low. 47 As one
commentator has made the point:
[I]f [for example] the decree obligated the payor to pay $900 per month for
nine years, the obligation was for a principal sum paid in less than ten years and
was excludable and nondeductible .... However, if the decree inserted the
contingency that the payments were to continue for nine years or until the
recipient's death, the payments became "periodic" and therefore includable,
48
deductible.
Moreover, payments under a divorce decree lacking a contingency clause would
nevertheless be considered "periodic" if state law would step in and terminate or
modify payments.' For example, in Kent v. Commissioner 0 the Tax Court held
that the possibility that a judge could modify an alimony award under state law
if the parties' circumstances changed meant that the payment was sufficiently
indefinite as to qualify as "periodic," even though the payment stream mandated
by the document itself was less than ten years and was of a principal sum. Based
on this and other holdings, one author has concluded:
The effect of local law on the interpretation of divorce and separation agreements meant that a divorcing couple in one state could use the very same
language in their agreement as that used by a couple in another state with
entirely different tax results. This lack of uniformity in the divorce tax laws

'Reg. 103, § 19.22(k)-1(c), Ex. 3 (issued in Treasury Decision 5194, Dec. 8, 1942).
Mattei, supra note 42, at 186.
"Id.
at 186 n.67.
49
Rev. Rul. 1959-190, 1959-1 C.B. 23.
5061 T.C. 133 (1973); see also Marshall v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 138, 1976 T.C.M
(P-H) 1 76,034 (ruling similarly); John Y. Taggart, Economic Consequences of Emotional Choices:
Divorce and Separation under TRA 1984, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 341, 347 (1985) (citing both).
47
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caused by the dependence on state law was one reason the decisions in this area
have appeared so contradictory and the tax treatment of divorce settlements has
been so unpredictable."
Requirement 3-that the payment had to discharge a legal obligation imposed

because of the marital or family relationship-was another device intended to
differentiate support payments from property settlements. Borrowing a sentence
directly from the legislative history, regulations issued in 1942 interpreted this
requirement as limiting eligible payments to those made "in recognition of the
general obligation to support, which is made specific by the instrument or decree." 52 If the payment was not made in recognition of the general obligation to
support, but rather to execute a property settlement, then it would fail to qualify
as a payment made to discharge a legal obligation imposed because of the
marital or family relationship and thus fail to qualify for the inclusion/deduction
system, even if the payments were "periodic."' 3 This was true even if the payments were in extinguishment of such an intangible and inchoate property interest as dower or curtesy, since such amounts were not paid for support but rather
for extinguishment of those intangible property rights. 4 This rule caused much
confusion.

For example, in Swindler v. Commissioner," monthly cash payments over a
121-month period qualified as "periodic" (because they exceeded ten years) but
were held not to be includable/deductible payments because the amount of the
payments was calculated by subtracting the value of the marital property received by the payee pursuant to the divorce from the value of the marital property received by the payor. Thus, the court concluded that the payment stream
was a property settlement and not made in discharge of an obligation of support.' 6 Even payments specifically designated as for "support" of the ex-wife in
the divorce settlement were recharacterized as a property settlement where the
payments represented the wife's interest in her former husband's partnership,
which was community property under California law. 7 Conversely, payments
specifically found by a state court to be a "property settlement" were held to be

"Taggart, supra note 50, at 347.
2
Reg. 103, § 19.22(k)-l(a) (issued in Treasury Decision 5194, Dec. 8, 1942). The legislative
history stated: "This section applies only where the legal obligation being discharged arises out of
the family or marital relationship in recognition of the generalobligation to support, which is made
specific by the instrument or decree." H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 568
(emphasis added).
53See Taggart, supra note 50, at 346. Moreover, a voluntary payment would fail to qualify, since
such a payment would not be made "in discharge of a legal obligation." See, e.g., Moore v. United
States, 449 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Tex. 1978); see generally John W. Harris, The FederalIncome Tax
Treatment of Alimony Payments-The "Support" Requirement of the Regulations, 22 HASTtNGS L.J.
53 (1970) (examining the development and then-current contours of the "support" requirement).
'See Swindle v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, 1976 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 76,001.
551d.

56Adam v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D. Wyo. 1977); accordGammill v. Commissioner,
710 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1982); Crouser v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1113 (1980).
"See Westbrook v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1357 (1980).
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"alimony" for federal tax purposes because, according to the Tax Court, the wife
did not relinquish anything of value when she transferred her joint tenancy
interest in a house to her former husband. 8 In that case, the Tax Court went so
far as to say that "the labels given to the payments by the parties or by the [state
court decree] do not govern their characterization for tax purposes."59
A further taste of the confused state of the law that emerged from attempts to
differentiate "support" payments from "property settlements" under this standard can be found in the following commentary:
The courts were often inconsistent in these recharacterizations. In Ryker v.
Commissioner,the husband agreed to pay the wife 25% of this income for more
than 10 years as property settlement. The payments were to cease at her death
or remarriage. Despite the parties' express labeling of the payments as property
settlement, the Tax Court did not even discuss the wife's property rights. Instead, the Tax Court recharacterized the payments as alimony because of the
death or remarriage contingencies. Conversely, in Riddell v. Commissioner, the
Ninth Circuit allowed an express property settlement label to stand, despite the
payment's contingency on the wife's death. The Tenth Circuit [in Hayutin v.
Commissioner] found that payments could not constitute property settlement if
the wife had no co-ownership during marriage, even though she had inchoate
rights that vested at divorce. The U.S. Court of Claims reached the opposite
result in Bernatschke v. Commissioner.The Court of Claims held 6that annuities
exchanged for inchoate dower rights were for property settlement. 0
When Congress recodified the income tax law in 1954, this treatment of
alimony and child support (as well as their definitions) was continued in sections
71 (alimony includable, child support excludable) and 215 (amounts includable
under section 71 are deductible).
As this quick perusal of cases and code sections makes clear, the law between
1942 and 1984 with respect to alimony and child support was complex, ambiguous, not uniform from state to state, and replete with a large number of traps for
the unwary. Advice of a lawyer well-versed in the tax law was crucial, and even
then, labels attached to payments in the agreements and state divorce decrees
often were recharacterized by the courts in the ensuing tax litigation. As one
writer has noted, "[c]ouples were making significant financial decisions which
might bind them for many years, yet were sometimes unable to predict the tax
consequences of their decisions with any certainty."'" Furthermore, the frequent

5
See
5

Graham v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 15, 1981 T.C.M. (RIA) 81,692 (1981).
91d. Accord Widmer v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 405 (1980) (holding that a state court's characterization of payments under a divorce decree as alimony was not controlling for tax purposes and that,
since the payments were not contingent and the wife was required to assign a stock interest to her
husband, the transaction was correctly determined to be a property settlement).
6
Mattei, supra note 42, at 186 n.72 (case citations omitted) (citing Stanley M. Grossbard, Comment, Taxation of Divorce Settlements and the Property/Support Distinction, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 939
(1977) and John W. Harris, The FederalIncome Tax Treatment of Alimony Payments-The "Support Requirement" of the Regulations, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1970)).
6
Deborah E. Behr, Comment, Tax Planning in Divorce: Both Spouses Benefit from the Tax
Reform Act of 1984, 21 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 767, 773 (1985).
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need to resort to litigation to deal with some of these complexities and ambiguities made the task of complying with the law all the more expensive and
burdensome. It is difficult to believe that all of this confusion could be justified
by any argument that the complexity was required in order to get it "right." The
law characterized an absolute obligation to pay $10,000 per year for nine years
(a total of $90,000) as an excludable/nondeductible property settlement in full,
regardless of whether this conclusion was fairly justified by the underlying facts.
No judge had the power to make an inquiry into the underlying facts with such
terms. At the same time, an absolute obligation to pay $10,000 per year for nine
years and $1,000 per year in years ten and eleven was characterized as "alimony" to the extent of $9,200 of each of the payments in years one through nine
and the full $1,000 payments in years ten and eleven, with only the remaining
$7,200 characterized as "not alimony"-unless the underlying facts convinced a
judge that the payment stream really was meant to compensate the recipient for
her interest in marital property so that the payment was not made in discharge of
an obligation for "support." I think it would be mere happenstance if these tax
conclusions labeled the status of these payment streams "correctly."
2. In-Kind Property Transfers
Notice that the definition of includable/deductible "alimony" enacted in 1942
contained no requirement that the payment be made in cash.62 Thus, a $500
alimony obligation could be discharged with the transfer to the alimony recipient of property worth $500. Moreover, property settlements often required the
transfer of property in kind from one spouse to the other. How were these
transfers treated for tax purposes?
One result has already been described: If the transfer otherwise qualified as
"alimony" under the requirements described in Part I.B. 1, above, then the recipient had to include the value of the property in gross income and the transferor
could deduct it. Conversely, if the transfer failed to qualify as "alimony," then
the recipient would exclude the receipt and the transferor would not be permitted
to deduct it. But with an in-kind property transfer, a second question arose in
both instances: Was the transfer a realization and recognition event, so that any
built-in gain or loss is taken into account for tax purposes? Disagreements on the
answer to this question led the Supreme Court to decide Davis v. Commissioner63 in 1962.
In 1955 and pursuant to a divorce decree, H transferred to his former spouse,
W, shares of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. that had a cost basis in H's hands
of approximately $75,000 and a fair market value at the time of transfer of
approximately $82,250. In return, W released H from all claims, including dower

62

See supra text accompanying note 39.
63370 U.S. 65 (1962). The following paragraphs describing Davis and the evolution of the law in
the years following are taken from Deborah A. Geier, Form, Substance, and Section 1041, 60 TAX
NoES 519, 520-21 (1993).
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and any rights under the laws of testacy and intestacy. Concluding that "the
inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by Delaware law do not
even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership,"' the Court applied the marketplace rule that the transfer of property owned by one taxpayer to another
taxpayer in exchange for the release of an independent legal obligation is a
realization event.65 Assuming that the value of the release of the inchoate marital
rights equaled the value of the stock, the Court concluded that H realized a gain
of approximately $7,250 on the transfer and that W took a cost basis of $82,250
in the stock.' The Court noted in a footnote the "administrative practice" of not
taxing W on the release of marital rights.67
Had W possessed some sort of ownership interest in the stock at the time of
the divorce, as in a community-property state, the outcome might have been
different. The transaction might have been viewed instead as a division of jointly
owned property, which was not considered a realization event. The Court acknowledged, but apparently was not overly troubled by, the disparities that its
decision would create between residents of community-property states-in which
the division of marital property would generally not be deemed a "transfer"and residents of common-law states.
As described below, the post-Davis era was one of confusion, uncertainty, and
traps for the unwary. It was also an era that witnessed state legislation designed
to frustrate a federal tax case, the Davis case, while maintaining a common-law
property regime in other respects.
The government eventually conceded that approximately equal divisions of
community property 68 or property in states where the law is "similar to community property law" 69 were not taxable; the transferee took a carryover basis and
tacked holding period in the property. Similarly, the Service ruled that approximately equal divisions of property owned in joint tenancy or property held as
tenants in common were nontaxable divisions of property, even though ownership was not partitioned but, rather, some assets went entirely to one spouse and
some went entirely to the other.70 Not all transfers in community-property states
were tax-free events, however. An exchange of separate (nonmarital) property
for community property or an unequal division of community property resulted

14370 U.S. at 70.
6

'!d.
at 68-70.
Cf. International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding that a
transfer of appreciated property to an employee in payment for services rendered was a realization
event for transferor).
'See 370 U.S. at 71-74; see also Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp.
184, 187 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (holding the basis of property received in taxable exchange to be the fair
market value of the property received).
67370 U.S. at 73 n.7.
"SRev. Rul. 1976-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213.
'Rev.
Rul. 1974-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26.
75
Rev. Rul. 1981-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158.
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in taxation. 7 Similarly, unequal divisions of jointly owned property in noncommunity-property states resulted in taxation.72
Davis thus required an examination of state law in order to determine whether
a transferee of property had an existing property interest in the property received
at the time of the transfer, notwithstanding that the transferor was titleholder to
the property. If the transferee in a common-law state possessed an interest "simi,
lar to community property," such as was held under some "equitable distribu,
tion" statutes,73 the transferor might not realize a gain on the transfer and the
transferee would take a carryover basis, even though the property was not in fact
community property or jointly held. This reliance on state law enabled states to
enact "anti-Davis" legislation, exemplified by Oregon's statute: "Subsequent to
the filing of a petition for annulment or dissolution of marriage or separation, the
rights of the parties in the marital assets shall be considered a species of coownership and a transfer of marital assets ... shall be considered a partition of
jointly owned property."74 The "equitable distribution statutes" of other states
often were interpreted to vest a property interest-in the transferee in the case of a
"special equity" determination. These eleventh-hour vestings of property rights
during the course of divorces in noncommunity-property states were routinely
upheld by the courts as effectively eviscerating Davis.75
As noted above, this state of affairs resulted in much confusion and costly
litigation under Davis, many traps for the unwary, and a variety of results for
what appeared to be similarly situated taxpayers, all of which hinged on state
law. It also resulted in a fair amount of whipsaw for the Federal Treasury, with
the transferor spouse claiming a tax-free division of property and the transferee
claiming a stepped-up basis under Davis on later disposition. This state of con.
fusion thrived until the law was amended in 1984.
C. From 1984 to the Present
1. Activities Leading to the Tax Reform Act of 1984
In the early 1980s, the American Bar Association (ABA) Tax Section created

7

See, e.g., Siewart v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 326 (1979) (holding the receipt by W of noncommunity cash and a personal note of H for transfer of her one-half interest in community property
constituted a sale, not a division of community property); Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959
(1975), aftd, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (finding a taxable sale to W to the extent H
used his separate property to pay for W's community property interest in stock but no taxable sale
with respect to the portion of such stock exchanged for H's interest in other community property).
"Rev. Rul. 1974-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26.
"See Cynthia Garrison Lepow, Proposals to Reform the Tax Treatment of Property Division
Incident to Divorce-A Splitting Headache, 10 CoMMUNiTY PRop. J. 237, 250-53 (1983) (describing
cases).
74
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(I)(f) (discussed in Laird v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 441,445 (1989)).
"See, e.g., Boucher v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1983); Bosch v. United States, 590
F.2d 165 (5th Cit. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980); Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853
(10th Cir. 1975); Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969); McIntosh v. Commis,
sioner, 58 T.C. 4 (1986) (applying pre-1984 law); Cook v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 513 (1983), affd,
742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984); Laird v. United States, 61 Cl. Ct. 441 (1989) (applying pre-1984 law).
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the "ABA Domestic Relations Tax Simplification Task Force"76 to study and
make recommendations regarding the taxation of transfers in divorce. It identified six criticisms of the law at that time, as follows:
1. That many of the exiting rules are overly complex, requiring a degree of tax
sophistication on the part of taxpayers (or their counsel) that is frequently
perceived as too costly to obtain;
2. That some rules, although seemingly relevant in countless cases, are not
clearly established by existing authorities;
3. That due to the significance of local law in this area, disparate tax results
ensue for substantially comparable transactions occurring in different states;
4. That the triggering of an income tax by some types of property transfers at
the time of divorce (as in the case of so-called Davis transfers) may simply be
"bad policy," an unnecessary consequence that in many cases simply depletes
overly strained liquidity;
5. That the overall domestic relations tax structure has produced, and continues
to produce, far too many tax controversies, causing a serious drain on the
manpower and resources of the courts, [the] Service, and state taxing authorities; and
6. That there may be a significant degree of noncompliance with the applicable
tax rules, a situation conducive to disrespect for the entire tax system.77
The "basic touchstone" guiding the Task Force's recommendations was the
concept of "private ordering," under which "parties to a divorce or legal separation, via a written agreement, may set their own tax framework."" As discussed
in more detail below, this idea was not carried out in the Task Force's proposals
to the maximum extent possible and was largely rejected, with only one small
nod to the contrary, in the legislation eventually enacted in 1984.
The Task Force made the following major recommendations with respect to
the income tax treatment of transfers in divorce.79 First, it recommended that all
in-kind transfers of property under a decree of divorce or written instrument

76

The members of the Task Force were David H. Hopkins (Project Coordinator), Bemeice A.
Anglea, Joseph N. DuCanto, Steven D. Kittrell, Robert H. Mnookin, Marjorie A. O'Connell, Gary C.
Randall, Frank E.A. Sander, Thomas R. White, III, J. Nelson Young, and Michael J. Graetz (Liason
with Tax Section Simplification Committee). See signatories to PreliminarySpecificationsfor Simplification of Domestic Relations Tax Law, Technical Memorandum to the Report of the American
Bar Association'sDomestic Relations Tax Simplification Task Force, ABA Section of Taxation at 28
(May 17, 1981) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Task Force Technical Memorandum]. This
"Technical Memorandum" contained a detailed description of the proposals more concisely summarized in American Bar Association'sDomestic Relations Tax Simplification Task Force, Preliminary
Specificationsfor Simplification of Domestic Relations Tax Law (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Task ForcePreliminarySpecifications].
77
Task Force Technical Memorandum, supra note 76, at 1-2.
7
ld. at 2.
9

" The Task Force also considered issues arising under the estate and gift tax, which are not

considered in this paper. See id. at 26-28.
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incident to such a decree be nonrecognition events, with a carryover basis. 80 In
other words, the Task Force sought to abandon the Davis approach in the context of divorce."' The Task Force's approach essentially would allow the pre1984 treatment that applied to equal divisions of community property in
community-property states to apply to all transfers of property in divorce. Thus,
the transferor would not recognize the built-in gain or loss embedded in the

'It recommended that nonrecognition be the norm, whether or not the property is encumbered
with debt in excess of basis or incurred on the eve of the transfer in an effort to "cash out" the value
while transferring the obligation to repay the encumbering debt to the transferee spouse. See id. at 5.
Under some other nonrecognition provisions, where one property is "exchanged" for another, debt in
excess of basis, or debt incurred on the eve of transfer, may produce recognized gain on the transfer,
notwithstanding the general nonrecognition rule to the contrary. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 357(b), (c). The
gain produced under section 357(c) on transfers of property with debt in excess of basis is equal only
to that excess amount, and that gain recognition is required solely to avoid the negative basis that
would otherwise occur in the property received under the mechanical rules of section 358. There is
no such "negative basis" problem in this context, since any property received in exchange takes its
own "carryover basis" rather than a "transferred basis" that starts with the basis of the property given
up and is reduced by any encumbering debt. Cf. I.R.C. § 358(a)(1), (d).
The gain produced under section 357(b) equals 100% of the transferred debt and is intended to
dissuade transferors from "cashing out" the value of the property by encumbering it with debt
shortly before the exchange and then transferring the obligation to repay the debt along with the
property. Professor Gabinet has questioned whether this aspect of the section 357 approach ought to
be extended to transfers in divorce. See Leon Gabinet, Section 1041: The High Price of Quick Fix
Tax Reform in Taxation of Interspousal Transfers, 5 Am. J. TAX POL'v 13, 37-40 (1986). My own
view is that divorce is not a transaction, like the corporate reorganizations that are the subject of
section 357, undertaken to cash out property appreciation without tax, and that the cooperation of the
transferee spouse in accepting the property subject to the debt obligation decreases the likelihood
that such transactions could occur on a routine basis. Moreover, in the real world sometimes parties
need the flexibility to encumber property immediately prior to a transfer in order to ensure that the
divvying up of value is equal, which is irrelevant in the context of corporate reorganization exchanges. As recognized in the Task Force's recommendations:
[A]t the time of marital split-ups assets are frequently not in the most divisible form. For
example, if a couple owns $400,000 worth of property, none of which is in the form of
cash or cash equivalents, the new rules would permit the couple to encumber the property
with a $200,000 liability and then allocate in a nonrecognition transaction the encumbered
property (now with a net value of $200,000) to one spouse and the new cash to the other
spouse.
Task Force Technical Memorandum, supra note 76, at 10.
I therefore think that the Task Force's recommendation to ignore debt encumbrances in deciding
whether in-kind property transfers ought to be taxable events in divorce is defensible. Divorce,
where the parties are attempting to divvy up property between them, really is different, in a fundamental way, from corporate reorganizations, where the parties are attempting to continue their
ownership in transferred property indirectly via stock ownership. Nevertheless, Congress amended
section 1041 in 1986 to provide that transfers of encumbered property to a trust will result in gain
recognition to the extent that the debt exceeds the transferor's basis. It also provided that transfers of
installment obligations to a trust would result in gain recognition.
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1842(b), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). While there is
no legislative history underlying these changes, presumably transfers in trust, as opposed to direct
transfers, were thought to raise the potential for abuse.
"It made no recommendations with respect to transfers of property during marriage that are not
incident to divorce. When enacted, however, section 1041, which substantially adopts the Task
Force's nonrecognition recommendation, was made to apply to transfers during marriage as well,
whether gifts or sales for consideration. See Rev. Rul. 1969-608, 1969-2 C.B. 43 (considering
whether application of section 1041 should to be limited to the divorce context).
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property at the time of divorce, and the transferee would take the same basis in
the property that it carried in the hands of the transferor. Any built-in gain or
loss would be preserved in the hands of (and shifted to) the transferee. Under the
"private-ordering" concept, the Task Force did not oppose the possibility that
taxpayers be given the choice to "elect out" of nonrecognition treatment (with an
ensuing fair market value basis in the hands of the transferee) under Davis. 2 It
did recommend, however, that if taxpayers were given that option, the election
should be on an "all-or-nothing" basis, with no ability to cherry pick which
assets would fall under the nonrecognition/carryover basis regime and which
would fall under the recognition/fair market value basis regime. 3
Second, the Task Force recommended amending sections 71 and 215 in a
number of ways. It recommended that the inclusion/deduction system be limited
to cash payments so that in-kind property transfers could no longer be deductible
as "alimony" by the transferor and includable by the transferee. 4 It also recommended that the "periodic" and "support" requirements, as well as the "principal
sum" rules, be eliminated. 5 Most important, the Task Force recommended that
the parties be given the freedom (with the exceptions noted below) to designate
how much, if any, of such cash payments (including cash payments to third
parties on behalf of a spouse) would be includable by the payee and deductible
by the payor. Any portion of any payments that was not specifically designated
by the parties as being includable by the payee and deductible by the payor
would be excludable and not deductible. The private-ordering elections would
be respected, regardless of whether or not any contingencies-such as the death
or remarriage of the recipient spouse or the ability of a state court to alter awards
based on changed economic circumstance-would increase, decrease, or terminate any of the payments in the future. 6 Therefore, in the view of the Task
Force, there would be little or no need to resort to litigation to determine whether
or not a payment fell within the inclusion/deduction system of sections 71 and
215:
Under private ordering, the parties' explicit choice as to the income tax treatment for their "[slection 71 package" would apply irrespective of whether any
or all payments are explicitly restricted for child support or whether any contingencies might increase, decrease, or terminate any of the payments in the future. Moreover, the parties could agree to different treatment for different
components of their "[slection 71 package." For example, they could designate
all of the intended spousal support as "includable/deductible" and all of the
intended child support as "excludable/nondeductible" or vice versa. As another

Task Force TechnicalMemorandum, supra note 76, at 11.
s1d. Cf Gabinet, supra note 80, at 31-37 (questioning whether the parties ought to be able to
decide whether a transfer is a taxable or nontaxable event under the concept of "private ordering").
See also infra note 260 and accompanying text (defending the current rule mandating nonrecognition
in all in-kind transfers).
"See
Task Force TechnicalMemorandum, supra note 76, at 17.
85
82

1d.

"6Task Force PreliminarySpecifications,supra note 76, at 3.
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example, the parties might agree to a percentage arrangement, e.g., 30% of the
husband's compensation income going to the ex-wife, cast in the traditional
unallocated form, but nevertheless designate that the first $1,000 per month
would be "includable/deductible," with all payments in excess of this amount
as "excludable/nondeductible." Further, if the parties choose, the safe-harbor
designations could also cover certain types of cash payments to third parties,
such as payments for education, medical costs, or life insurance premiums.87
The Task Force did not see a need to deal specifically with child support,
since it believed that the Lester Rule then in force already provided "private

ordering," in that any nonallocated "family support" payment would automatically be considered a potentially includable/deductible payment (if so designated
by the parties under the proposed system). In contrast, a payment specifically
"fixed" for child support would remain the means by which the parties could
"elect" to make a payment excludable/nondeductible. Therefore, the Task Force
made no recommendations to change the child support rules:
In connection with the above proposals, it should be noted that the Task Force
contemplates no basic change to the existing child support rules of [slection
71(b). Payments "fixed" as child support would continue to be "excludable/
nondeductible" under the "fall-back" rules; and, similarly, courts and parties
would continue to have flexibility of creating "unallocated" support arrangements under the Lester principle [which could
be designated as "includable/
88
deductible" payments under the new rules] .
The Task Force, however, intended that the concept of private ordering be
limited to spousal and child support payments-not to cash property settlements.
Recall the difficulty under prior law, however, of identifying whether a cash
payment was really a property settlement by looking to whether the payment
discharged a support obligation of the payor. 9 To avert this difficulty, the Task
Force recommended implementing the limitation with the adoption of a mechanical, though complex, "netting rule" in order to prevent cash payments to
the payee intended to compensate for the payee's interest in property going to
the payor from being subject to the inclusion/deduction system of sections 71
and 215.
Consider the example in which a couple jointly owns $400,000 of "hard
assets."' An equal division would direct that $200,000 go to each former spouse.
Instead, the parties agree that $100,000 worth of the property will remain with
W and that $300,000 will go to H-$100,000 more than he should be entitled
to-and that H will make payments to W intended to fall within the inclusion/
deduction system. Because the payments will be includable, W will presumably
"7Task Force Technical Memorandum, supra note 76, at 12.
88
Id. at 19.

"gSee supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
rhe Task Force generally used this term to mean property, whether tangible or intangible, that
has a basis for tax purposes. See Task Force Technical Memorandum, supra note 76, at 6-7. It would
not include marital rights, such as dower or curtesy, though such rights are "property rights" under
state law.
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demand payments exceeding $100,000 (say, $120,000) so that her after-tax position will be the same as if she had simply taken the full $200,000 in property
(since in-kind property receipts could not fall within the inclusion/deduction
system). The deduction by H of the payments would effectively allow him to
deduct his "purchase price" for the $100,000 worth of property that exceeded his
one-half interest. 9'
The Task Force proposal would have prevented the first $100,000 of payments made by H to W from falling within the inclusion/deduction system.
"[T]he 'hard assets' received from one spouse in the property division would
first be netted against any [s]ection 71 private ordering payments to such spouse,
with only the excess being eligible for an 'includable/deductible' designation."92
That is to say, the $100,000 worth of property that W transferred to H (the
amount in excess of his one-half interest) would be netted against the first
$100,000 of cash payments made by H to W, thus preventing the first $100,000
of cash payments from falling within the inclusion/deduction system. H would
be able to deduct (and W would have to include) only the remaining $20,000
(the difference between $120,000 and $100,000). The Task Force recognized
that the calculation of how much property was "transferred" from W to H (and
thus how much cash going from H to W was precluded from entering the
inclusion/deduction system) would vary between residents of community-property states and common-law states.
To some extent, though, variances as to the impact of the new rules would still
ensue, as the determination of "hard asset interest" will differ, but these variances will be due essentially to differences in state property laws, principally
differences between the property laws of community property and common law
states. Despite the objective of the Task Force's proposals to establish as much
uniformity among the various states as possible, some variances due to differ93
ences in state property laws probably remain unavoidable.
Finally, the Task Force recommended that the rules pertaining to who may
claim a dependency exemption for minor children of the divorced parents should
be simplified.94 One commentator summarized the pre-1984 authority in this
respect as follows:
As a general rule, Congress gave the child exemption to the custodial parent,
who will be assumed for the purposes of this discussion to be the wife. The
husband, as noncustodial parent, was entitled to the exemption if the divorce or
the couple's written agreement named him as the parent entitled to the exemption and he paid at least $600 for the support of the child in the tax year. If the
agreement or decree were silent, the husband, as noncustodial parent, might
still qualify for the exemption if he provided $1,200 or more in support for the
child in the tax year and the wife could not "clearly establish" that she provided
9

See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.

92
Task
93

Force Technical Memorandum, supra note 76, at 17.
1d. at 20.
'See id. at 24-26.
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more support. For example, assume that the wife has custody of the child for
the entire year and that the divorce decree did not address which parent would
claim the exemption. Additionally, assume that the wife provided $700 support
for the child, while the husband provided $1,300 in support. Since the husband
provided more than $1,200 and the wife could not have clearly established that
she paid more, the husband would have been entitled to the child exemption.
Prior to [1984], the statutes established a framework that would have permitted
the couple's own agreement to control which spouse would claim the tax exemption for the child. If the couple could not reach such an agreement, difficult
questions arose regarding which spouse contributed more "support." The determination of support was the subject of much litigation, for the statutes themselves did not define this critical term. Also, the regulations vaguely defined
support as including "food, shelter, clothing, medical and dental care, education, and the like." As a result, much of the interpretation of qualifying expenditures for support was left to the courts.
Courts generally took a broad view of support to include almost any payment
made by the parent on behalf of the child. As one court noted, support was
more than the necessities and could include extras, such as summer camp
payments, that were available at certain stations in life. The courts, though, set
some limits on what types of payments did not meet even this liberal interpretation of support. Gifts to the child or visits and telephone calls made by the
parent to the child did not qualify as support. Likewise, the value of babysitting
or other personal services performed by the custodial parent were not includable in the calculation of support, because a payment had not been made on the
child's behalf.
In addition, payments must actually have been made by the parent to be considered support. Unpaid child support was not counted even though it was court
ordered and enforceable for the tax period in question. Likewise, arrearages for
support relating to prior tax periods, but paid in the current tax year, were not
included as support. For example, if the husband failed to pay his $500 a year
child support for each of the past two years, his payment of the past due $1,000
and the presently due $500 would not entitle him to the child exemption in the
current year. This was true even though he paid over $1,200 and technically
met the statutory standard necessary to claim an exemption. Finally, government payments, such as welfare aid, made to the custodial parent on behalf of
the child were not considered as support contributions by that parent for the
determination of tax exemptions. 95
At a meeting in April of 1982 of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation,
representatives of the ABA Tax Section, and representatives of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Tax Division to consider the
Task Force's recommendations, the point most discussed and questioned was
the concept of "private ordering." The Task Force therefore issued another docu-
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Behr, supra note 61, at 802-03 (footnotes with citations omitted).
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ment on August 2, 1982, which was intended to clarify the concept and justify

its use in the divorce context. 96 In part, it explained:
The advantages to the federal government in adopting the proposed "private
ordering" are difficult to quantify in terms of dollars; but, in light of the staggering level of tax controversies generated by [s]ections 71, 215, and 152 and
the probable degree of non-compliance, administrative costs and lost revenue to
the government attributable to present law are plainly substantial.

The number of tax cases produced by present rules plainly imposes a heavy
burden on the Internal Revenue Service, state taxing authorities, and the courts.
Illustrative of this number is the fact that as of June 30, 1982, some 481 cases
docketed in the Tax Court involved [sjections 71, 215, and/or 152. As most
cases in this area are probably settled at administrative levels, the foregoing
number would appear to be only the "tip of the iceberg." 97
The Task Force quoted at length from a Tax Court opinion written by Judge
Dawson, as follows:
It is well settled that the determination of whether payments are in the nature of
support or part of a property settlement does not turn on the labels assigned to
the payments by the court in the divorce decree or by the parties to the agreement . . . .This issue is a factual one and requires an examination of all the
surrounding facts and circumstances ....
Unfortunately, because of the vexing problems which frequently arise in determining the nature and extent of a spouse's property rights under State law, this
supposedly factual inquiry has all too often taken on a metaphysical aura as the
courts have struggled to classify a particular payment as either support or
property settlement, when, in reality, the payment possesses a hybrid nature
sharing characteristics of both. In the process, similarly situated taxpayers have
occasionally been accorded disparate treatment merely because of differences
in State marital property laws. For this reason, and because the confusion in
this area has spawned a relentless stream of litigation, it would appear that
legislative reform is warranted. As we stated in Schatz v. Commissioner, ...
some sort of safe harbor is needed so that taxpayers and divorce courts can
predict with confidence the income tax consequences stemming from periodic
payments occasioned by divorce. Until such legislation is enacted, however, we
are left with no alternative but to plunge into the morass of the decided cases,
many of them irreconcilable, and resolve this issue as best we can by applying
the various factors which have been identified by prior decisions.9"

'See American Bar Association's Domestic Relations Tax Simplification Task Force, The "Private Ordering" Concept in Proposalsfor Simplification of Domestic Relations Tax Law (Aug. 2,

1982) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Task Force Private Ordering].
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1d. at 2-3.
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1d. at 3-4 (quoting Beard v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1275, 1283-84 (1981)).
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The document then addressed the question of whether "private ordering" would
undermine the progressivity of the federal income tax system and concluded that
it would not, denying that the proposals would entail a "radical change in domestic relations tax law in any substantive sense" in view of the ability-if the
divorcing parties knew the appropriate magic words-to accomplish under prior
law much of the private ordering that the proposals would make explicit."
Furthermore:
As noted, "private ordering" in marital settlements substantially exists under
present law, although some of the rules are complicated and produce many tax
controversies. From the standpoint of practitioners, these rules are frequently
viewed as "planning tools;" and, in a large majority of cases, if parties are
cooperative and adequately advised, they can "pick and choose" the correlative
tax consequences of many aspects of their settlement by utilizing one or a
combination of the key planning tools.'0
The document then listed some of these "hidden" private-ordering tools. It
noted, for example, that under the section 71(c) principal sum rules, the parties
could avoid the excludable/nondeductible conclusion that the statute provided
normally applies to a principal sum paid out in fewer than ten years "by parties
agreeing that payments shall merely be contingent upon the recipient's survival,
a condition that is frequently of little practical or actuarial consequence in the
eyes of the parties."'"' Under the Lester Rule, the parties could decide for themselves whether or not child support was includable/deductible or excludable/
nondeductible by specifically "fixing"--or not-an amount for child support in
the agreement. Even reductions for contingencies clearly relating to the children
would not transform a portion of an unallocated "family support" payment into
nondeductible "child support."'0 2 The document also described the use of "ridethroughs," which were described as follows:
This term refers to various types of arrangements under which parties agree for
includable/deductible payments to continue beyond standard terminating events
under state law, most typically an ex-wife's remarriage. By entering into a
written agreement that carefully preserves the recipient's right to support for
the desired period, the parties can usually achieve their intended tax consequences, notwithstanding the occurrence of one or more of the standard terminating events. In many cases, the "ride-through" technique is coupled with the
Lester principle, with the result that payments to an ex-wife subsequent to her
remarriage, plainly and solely intended to benefit the parties' children, retain
their alimony character. See Revenue Ruling 70-557, 70-2 C.B. 10. A "support

package" entailing a "ride-through" is often utilized in lieu of a larger property
allocation to the recipient, with either or both parties attaining a better after-tax

991d.
at 5.

"Task Force Private Ordering,supra note 96, at 6.
1011d.
12Id.
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result. Tricky questions under state law sometimes arise, and anything less than
careful planning and drafting can prove costly. ... .0'
In addition, the document addressed how the "support" obligation could be
used by the parties:
In most cases, includable/deductible treatment under [s]ection 71 is available
only for payments based on the payor's support obligation under state law. In
many states, though, this obligation can be met by either a property allocation
(perhaps in installments) or includable/deductible periodic payments. Accordingly, parties often attain their objectives by contractually defining the level of
the recipient's support need in the desired manner taxwise and then providing
for an appropriate stream of payments in the context of either the support
section or the property section of their agreement, depending solely on tax
considerations. For example, assume that a wife's support needs could be met
with $5,000 of alimony per month, that the husband could pay this amount, but
that $3,000 of alimony per month would bring the parties' projected taxable
incomes into equilibrium. A tax-oriented agreement could provide for the $3,000
monthly alimony, but nevertheless "feather into" the property division an equivalent of the projected after-tax net of an additional $2,000 in monthly alimony."°
Summarizing its position, the document further stated:
[P]rogressivity is not, and has not been, a significant element of the present
domestic relations tax system. Contrary to undermining the progressivity principle, therefore, the Task Force's recommendations are intended to simplify the
mechanism by which parties may effect the kind of income-shifting sanctioned
by present law. 05
Perhaps it was the explicit use of the term "income-shifting" in the last-quoted
sentence that raised red flags. That term has always carried negative connotations involving abuse entailed by shifting income from someone in a higher tax
bracket to someone in a lower tax bracket while nevertheless retaining control
over it by keeping it "all in the family."' 1 6 In any event, a subsequent meeting of
various government officials, representatives of the ABA Tax Section, and the
AICPA Tax Division on November 19, 1982, raised the question of whether
"income-shifting" between divorcing spouses under sections 71 and 215 ought
to be ended entirely by repealing those sections altogether. This prompted the
Task Force to issue yet another report in January of 1983, defending the incomeshifting principle in divorce. 07 The members of the Task Force "unanimously
1031d. at 6-7 (citing Hoffman v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1607 (1970), acq'd, 1981-2 I.R.B. 5, aff'd,

445 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1972).
"41d. at 7.
'15Task Force Private Ordering, supra note 96, at 8. The document also argued that the "private
ordering" proposals were consistent with trends in substantive state domestic relations law, particularly the increasing emphasis on privately negotiated divorce agreements (as opposed to judicially

crafted ones). See id. at 8-9.
16See infra notes 260-314 and accompanying text (describing the assignment-of-income doctrine).
7

'1 See American Bar Association's Domestic Relations Tax Simplification Task Force, The "Income-Shifting" Principle in Proposalsfor Simplification of Domestic Relations Tax Law (Jan. 20,
1983) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Task Force Income Shifting].
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concluded (1) that repeal of sections 71 and 215 would not simplify federal tax
law, (2) that such a measure would be contrary to other basic tax policies, such
as equity and rationality, and (3) that appropriate tax simplification can be
achieved without such a drastic step."' 8
With respect to item (1), the report is not completely persuasive. Making all
payments in a divorce tax-neutral should be simple. An argument to the contrary
was that states would react by creating property rights in the wife regarding the
ex-husband's income stream that would operate to shift taxation to the wife in
any event, thus frustrating the repeal of section 71 and introducing new complexities. The Task Force characterized the argument as follows:
From the standpoint of state legislatures, if the recent "anti-Davis statutes" are
viewed as providing any clues-and, in the opinion of the Task Force, they
should be so viewed-the repeal of [slections 71 and 215 would surely lead to
a continuation of efforts to defeat unpopular federal tax rules in the domestic
relations tax area via the "back door." The focus would shift, of course, from
the "property rights" of a non-titled spouse in "marital property" to such spouse's
"rights" in the post-divorce income the other party. The consequences-i.e.,
frequent changes in state property and divorce laws-would likely lead to
further complexities, controversy, and uncertainty, as well as to disparate results for essentially comparable transactions occurring in different states. Further, as is the case with present law, the government would simply be whipsawed
in a multitude of cases, as many ex-spouses would surely take inconsistent
positions on their returns.'°9
It is difficult to evaluate whether the dire forecasts regarding the reaction of
states to such a legislative change would actually transpire. The Task Force's
stronger arguments were that such a change would be contrary to common
notions of fairness and flexibility and that repealing sections 71 and 215 in the
name of simplification would be tantamount to throwing out the baby with the
dirty bath water, as "most of the attainable goals in terms of tax simplification
can still be achieved with other reform measures.""10
While the high war-time marginal rates in 1942 surely were the precipitating
factor in shifting the tax burden on "tax alimony" (which, as we have seen, is a
term that mirrors "alimony" for state law purposes only coincidentally) to the
payee, taxation of the recipient also accorded with other commonly held norms
of tax fairness. As the Task Force noted:
The commonplace perception that income-shifting under [s]ections 71 and 215
is fair and equitable as a matter of federal tax policy stems from numerous
factors. For purpose of clarity, though, it should be noted that the term "income-shifting" is misleading. The question presented is not whether income
should be shifted from one spouse or ex-spouse to the other, but whether the
income that in fact is shifted between the parties by local law should or should

'081d. at1-2.
091d.at

3.

'Old. at9-10.
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not be taxed to the recipient. As indicated, various factors point to an affirmative answer to the foregoing question ....
"I
The Task Force then listed some of these factors. First on the list was the fact
that the recipient has control over the cash received, which has always been a
prime factor in the income-shifting area in determining who, between two parties, should be taxed on income."' "[T]hese elements of control make it far more
equitable to tax alimony to the recipient, the party who is actually consuming it
and who has the 'cash flow' from which the tax dollars can reasonably be
expected to come.""' 3 The Task Force next contended that eliminating incomeshifting would discriminate between well-to-do couples with income-producing
property, who would effectively be able to continue to engage in income-shifting by transferring such property in satisfaction of support obligations, and less
wealthy couples.'I"
The Task Force also argued that the collective tax burden on the divorced
couple would be higher if sections 71 and 215 were repealed than under either
the current law at that time or the proposed changes, since most payors were
probably in higher tax brackets than their recipients. Thus, denying a deduction
to the higher-bracket taxpayer and allowing an exclusion to the lower-bracket
taxpayer would probably result in more dollars going to the Treasury than under
either a rigid inclusion/deduction system or private ordering. "Since divorce
frequently strains liquidity to the breaking point anyway, in the view of the Task
Force, such a harsh result, i.e., divorce per se pushing incomes into higher
brackets, should be avoided, if possible.""' 5 Finally, the Task Force derided the
sacrifice in flexibility inherent in a rigid exclusion/non-deduction system:
[T]he "Lester" principle.., allows parties with children considerable room for
tailoring their own settlements; and this ability for so many divorcing couples
to set their own framework to a significant extent is a major factor contributing
to settlements of more than 90% of all divorces at a stage short of a full-blown
court contest ....Thus, elimination of [s]ections 71 and 215 from the Code
would not only deprive parties of much flexibility, but would surely prove
counterproductive for the settlement process in general. The result, of course,
would be an increasing number of cases going to full contest in state courts.
Actually, the success generally ascribed to the "Lester" principle-as a rule that
maximizes flexibility, as well as one that is generally understood-has been a
major factor taken into consideration by the Task Force in developing its recommendations for the "[s]ection 71 private ordering rules."" 6
After almost six months to the day, the Ways and Means Committee of the
House of Representatives introduced H.R. 3475, the Tax Law Simplification and

...
Id.at 5.
"23See infra notes 260-314 and accompanying text (describing the assignment-of-income doctrine).
" Task Force Income.Shifting, supra note 107, at 5.
' 41d. at 6.
"1d.at7.
"61d. at 8.
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Improvement Act of 1983, a portion of which dealt with divorce taxation, and
convened hearings." 7 The bill proposed to enact new section 1041, which would
provide that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of property from
an individual to (or in trust for the benefit of) (1) a spouse, or (2) a former
spouse, but only if the transfer is incident to the divorce.""' The transferee
would exclude the value of the property, as though it were received as a "gift,"'" 9
and would take a carryover basis in the property. A transfer would be considered
incident to divorce if it occurred within one year of the marriage ceasing or was
"related to the cessation the marriage."'20 Section 1015, which normally governs
the basis of property received by gift, was proposed to be amended so that
transfers described in section 1041 would be governed by the carryover basis
rule described there instead of the general gift basis rules.' 2 ' Thus, Davis would
be put to rest, with no "private ordering" option provided to the divorcing parties
to opt out of the new provision so that a transfer could be a recognition event for
the transferor and result in a fair market value basis for the transferee.
With respect to sections 71 and 215, the bill cherry-picked some of the Task
Force's recommendations, rejecting others. Consistent with the Task Force's
recommendations, it carried forward the Lester Rule intact. That is to say, amounts
"fixed" for child support would be excludable/nondeductible payments, with no
mention that reductions relating to contingencies connected to the children would
result in a portion of such payments being labeled as "child support." Thus,
private ordering would be de facto continued, with parties able to determine for
themselves (so long as they knew the magic words) how much of a total "family
support" obligation, if any, should be taxable to the recipient and deductible by
the payor, or vice versa.'2 2
The bill also accepted the Task Force's view that only cash payments should
be eligible for the inclusion/deduction system of sections 71 and 215123 but that
cash payments intended to compensate the recipient for an interest in property
should not fall within it. It rejected, however, the Task Force's suggested means
by which to differentiate cash support obligations from cash property settlements. The Task Force's approach'24 required netting cash payments against the
value of any "hard assets" surrendered by the cash recipient, with only the
excess amount being eligible for the inclusion/deduction system. Rather, the
proposals appear to have attempted to differentiate cash property settlements

"'Tax Law Simplification and Improvement Act of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 3475 Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong. 98-40 (1983) [hereinafter House Hearing].
"Ild.
at 18.
"Gifts, subject to exceptions not relevant here, are excludable from gross income under section
102(a).
12House Hearing,supra note 117, at 19.
2'See id.; see also infra note 314 (describing the gift basis rules in connection with considering
whether section 1041 should be amended to carve out transfers between spouses not incident to
divorce).
"'See House Hearing, supra note 117, at 22-23.
'23See id. at 21.
"'Seesupra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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from support obligations in the following three-pronged manner.
To be eligible for the inclusion/deduction system, the payment could not be
"made for a transfer of property by the payee spouse."' 25 That, obviously, would
constitute an explicit carve-out for cash property settlements. But what if the
parties did not label the cash payment as a payment for an interest in property?
The following two, more subtle requirements attempted to identify disguised
property settlements. First, the liability to make the payment had to end with the
recipient's death, and there could not be any obligation to make any substitute
payments after the death of the payee spouse. 26 The notion, presumably, was
that a recipient spouse would demand that even her estate be entitled to payment
after her death if the payment were really a cash property settlement rather than
a support payment. Thus, she would agree to the payments stopping on her death
only if, in fact, they constituted support payments (which, since she was dead,
she would no longer need). One might recall that inserting this kind of contingency clause was one means by which taxpayers could prove that a payment
was "periodic" under the 1942 rules, since the contingency transformed the
payment amount into an "indefinite" amount.'27 What the drafters did was essentially to incorporate into the statute that one means of proving that a payment
was "periodic," removing the "periodic" language itself but keeping its "soul," if
you will.
Second, the payment had to be "[one] of a series of cash payments where it is
reasonable to expect at least 50 percent of the amount payable under such series
will be paid more than [one] year after the date on which the first of such
payments is made."' 2 The underlying assumption here was that payments concentrated into a short period after the divorce were more likely to constitute a
property settlement than a support payment. Instead of the more-than-ten-year
payment period required under the 1942 rules, however, the bill proposed to
29
shorten it dramatically to just over a year.1
The one new nod to "private ordering" adopted in the proposed bill was that
payments otherwise eligible for the inclusion/deduction system could be labeled
as excludable/nondeductible payments by the parties in their agreement. 3 ° In
other words, the parties could opt out of the inclusion/deduction system with
respect to a payment that would otherwise qualify as a "support" payment (rather
than a property settlement) under the tests described above. The parties could
not, however, opt "into" the inclusion/deduction system with respect to a payment that did not otherwise qualify because, for example, there was no require-

'"House
Hearing, supra note 117, at 21.
126See id. at 22.
12'See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
'28House Hearing, supra note 117, at 22.
'For example, suppose that a decree required that a payment of $10,000 be made on January 20
of year one and a second payment of $11,000 be made on January 25 of year two. Both payments
could be eligible for the inclusion/deduction system, because at least 50% of the stream of payments
was paid more than one year after January 20 of year one, the date of the first payment.
'"°See House Hearing, supra note 117, at 21.
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ment that the payment stream stop on the recipient's death.
Finally, the bill proposed to simplify the rules regarding who was entitled to
the dependency exemptions for minor children of the divorced couple by essentially creating a default rule that the custodial parent could take the exemptions,
unless she properly assigned them to the noncustodial parent. 3' Thus, all of the
litigation over who provided more dollars in support of the children would
32
disappear.1
Only three people testified with respect to the portion of the bill dealing with
divorce taxation at the hearings, but each of the three was a powerful and
respected commentator. The first was Ronald A. Pearlman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury. 33 He spoke forcefully in
favor of proposed section 1041, the anti-Davis provision applicable to in-kind
property transfers. 34 With respect to the alimony provisions, however, he objected to "the complete elimination of the periodic payment requirement and 10year rule requirement presently contained in the [C]ode.' 13 1 He believed the
rules adequately distinguished "property settlements" from "support payments"
and that only the latter ought to fall within the inclusion/deduction system. He
said, "[w]hile the precise application of these requirements has generated a fair
amount of controversy in the past, they do remain as important safeguards for36
preventing nondeductible property settlements from being treated as alimony."'
The changes advocated by Mr. Pearlman included: reducing the ten-year payment period to five years; measuring the period by reference to the first payment
instead of the date on which the divorce decree became final; providing that any
payments mandated for a period of less than five years would not qualify as
"alimony," even if a "contingency" clause were inserted so that the payments
would stop on the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse; providing that any
payments that were not mandated for any specific period would qualify as "alimony" if a contingency clause were inserted, even if the payment period turned
out to be less than five years because the contingency transpired; and allowing a
maximum deduction in any one year of no more than 20% of the total amount of
a principal sum provided in the divorce decree.'37 He testified as follows:
We recognize that eliminating the contingency rule might have the effect of
denying alimony treatment to some series of payments made over a relatively
short period, even where the payments are intended for the support of the

a See id. at 26-28.
'See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
"'33See House Hearing, supra note 117, at 150. Mr. Pearlman is now a professor at Georgetown
University Law Center. He hopes his testimony 17 years ago will not dissuade Congress and the
Treasury Department from taking a "fresh look" at this area of law to determine whether any
changes are warranted today.
"See id. at 152.
13'1d. at 153.
'361d. at 153.
'3See id. at 153-54.
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recipient spouse. We believe these situations will be rare, however, because the
proposed rules would be readily understandable by the parties ....
While we
recognize that support payments lasting less than five years would not be deductible, in our view any slight disadvantage from that result would be more
than offset by the simplicity and certainty that the proposed system would
provide.
We also believe this proposed approach is preferable to the rule of the bill
requiring that it be "reasonable to expect" that at least one-half of the amounts
payable in a series will be paid more than one year after the first payment. In
effect, this reduces the ten year period to two years. We are concerned that such
a short time requirement does not provide a meaningful safeguard. 3
The second person to testify regarding the divorce provisions was M. Bernard
Aidinoff, a partner in the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, testifying in his
capacity as Chair of the ABA Section of Taxation.' He, too, strongly supported
proposed section 1041, 40 but he disagreed with Mr. Pearlman's criticisms of the
proposed changes to the definition of "alimony."
I would like to comment, however, on the statement made by Deputy Assistant
Secretary Pearlman on the elimination of the periodic payment test. We of the
section of taxation believe what is in the bill, which is basically an elimination
of most of the periodic payment test, is a much simpler provision, a much fairer
provision, and one which represents more reality in today's situation where
couples are more anxious to disengage themselves completely when a divorce
or separation is involved.
In many respects, the tax section would have gone further than what is in the
bill. But we think that the bill in its present form, in dealing with this question,
is an appropriate balancing of interests and one that should be adopted. 4 '
Mr. Aidinoff had one strong criticism of his own, however, and that was the
proposal that at least 50% of the total payment amount must be paid more than
one year after the first payment if the payments were to qualify as includable/
deductible payments. As Mr. Aidinoff explained:
Contrary to an overall purpose of Title II [which contained the proposed amendments regarding divorce taxation], as stated in the technical explanation, [the
proposed rule] serves to preserve a "periodicity" requirement for alimony as a
result of the proposed "one of a series" language. Such a requirement and the
"reasonable to expect" and the "at least 50 percent" requirements also inject
subjective tests into the alimony rules, especially in cases involving fluctuating
amounts for support (e.g., 30 percent of an ex-husband's earned income). As

'3 1d. at 153-54. Mr. Pearlman also strongly supported the proposed amendments concerning
which
spouse should be entitled to the dependency exemptions for minor children.
39
O'
See House Hearing,supra note 117, at 203.
"'"At long last the bill presents a legislative solution to the problems created by the Supreme
Court in its 1962 Davis decision which made taxable the transfer of appreciated property in a divorce
settlement. This alone would be a major accomplishment .. ." Id. at 204.
'4 'Id. at 204.
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demonstrated by the unfortunate experience under present law, such subjective
tests are frequent traps for the unwary, as well as productive of much tax
controversy. The effect of [the proposed rule], therefore, would be to continue
these extremely undesirable aspects of present law.
Also contrary to an apparent objective of Title II, [the proposed rule] flies in
the face of local divorce statutes and trends. The comments in the technical
explanation imply that a "one-time lump-sum payment" (or similar payment)
can never be intended for support. This perception is erroneous, as in the vast
majority of states today support needs of one spouse can be and are frequently
met, in whole or in part, with a one-time transfer. Moreover, the trend today
(particularly if there are no children involved) is for ex-spouses to "disengage"
in their relationships with each other; and support to an ex-spouse for a short
period-e.g., 6, 12, 18 months-is common. In this regard, the effect of [the
proposed rule] is to militate against Federal tax law harmonizing well with
State substantive divorce laws.
One inference that can be drawn from the comments in the technical explanation on [the proposed rule] is that the proposed rule stems from the notion that
it is contrary to sound tax policy for a single one-time lump-sum payment to be
accorded "includable/deductible" treatment. The [ABA tax] section does not
share this view, especially since it believes that the fundamental tax policy for a
basic alimony and separate maintenance rule should be that the taxpayer who
consumes the payment(s) should be the one to bear the correlative tax. Moreover, in most cases, a one-time lump-sum payment (or a short-term series of
payments) involving a relatively small dollar amount is intended to be solely
for the recipient's support. On the other hand, if substantial dollars are involved
and the payment(s) are plainly intended to meet both support rights and other
marital rights, overall tax revenues to the Government would rarely be reduced
anyway, due to "bunching of income" for the recipient [which would push the
recipient into a higher tax bracket with respect to the payment]. In either case,
[the proposed rule] serves no meaningful purpose in relation to the basic objectives of Title II.
Another major weakness of [the proposed rule] would appear to be the ease
with which it could be avoided, particularly in cases in which substantial dollars (and sophisticated parties and/or counsel) are involved. Thus, it would
seem that the situations that the proposed rule is intended to snare would rarely
occur, as taxpayers in those situations would simply "draft around" the rule.
Realistically, parties for whom [the proposed rule] would pose the most diffi1 42
culties are likely to be less substantial and/or less well-advised taxpayers.
Mr. Aidinoff also made the point that the current flexibility represented by the
Lester Rule should continue:
An important interpretation of [the treatment of "child support"] is contained in
Lester v. Commissioner. . . . The Technical explanation, however, does not
elaborate on [the treatment of "child support"]. The section suggests, therefore,

42
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that the committee's report on the legislation indicate that no change is intended in the child support area, including the principles enunciated by the U.S.
43
Supreme Court in the Lester case.
The final person to testify was Marjorie A. O'Connell, a partner in the law
firm of O'Connell & Associates and a member of the ABA Task Force. 144 Like
her predecessors, Ms. O'Connell supported proposed section 1041 .14 1 With respect to the definition of "alimony" eligible for the inclusion/deduction system,
she had several suggested changes. First, with respect to the provision that

payments for the transfer of property rights not be eligible for alimony status,
she urged that the term "property" be defined to include only hard assets: "This
rule should not apply to any release of an inchoate property right such as rights
under an equitable distribution statute."'' 46 Ms. O'Connell also urged deletion of
the requirement that payments must cease upon the death of the payee:
While support needs of the recipient is the cornerstone of alimony, death does
not always terminate those needs. For example, spouses may value the recipient's
support rights for life at $200,000 based on his or life expectancy. Instead of
paying this amount for life, the payor may want to pay it over a shorter period.
If the recipient dies before the end of the shorter period, any continuing payments would be in respect of a support obligation. The recipient may have postdeath obligations that those payments would run to, such as the pay-off of debts
incurred to meet support needs during life. This is often the case where serious
medical problems cause the recipient's precipitous death. While I understand
the genesis of the post-death prohibition, I urge that the committee seriously
consider deleting this provision from the bill.' 47
As did Mr. Aidinoff, Ms. O'Connell also challenged the rule requiring an expectation that at least 50% of the total stated payments would be made more than
one year from the first payment.
This rule is the last vestige of the current periodicity requirements that have
caused so many problems. The apparent evil this rule strikes at is a lump sum
payment for support in the year of divorce. This type of arrangement is rarely
done and virtually never for tax reasons .... Nevertheless, I submit that this 50percent rule is an unnecessary complication. Moreover, the application of this
rule would require a subjective evaluation of future events to determine what is
the time!period in which it is "reasonable to expect" for payments to be made. "I
Finally, Ms. O'Connell advocated that the implicit flexibility inherent in the
Lester Rulebe transformed into an explicit election so that all parties, not only
those knowing the magic words, could decide for themselves who would pay tax
on the amounts paid out as child support.
3

1d. at 210. Mr. Aidinoff supported the proposed changes to the dependency exemption provisions as well. See id. at 211.
'"See
id. at 263.
'14 See House Hearing, supra note 117, at 267.
46

1d. at 267.

1471d. at 267-68.
'4 1d. at 268.
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Under [Lester], payments made "for the support of a spouse and children" are
all alimony. I believe the statute should contain at least this continuation of
present law. I urge serious consideration of a further refinement. Parties should
also be allowed to designate fixed child support as taxable to the recipient
parent and deductible by the payor parent. This would accomplish two beneficial results. First, Lester has proven to .be a trap for uniformed taxpayers.
Divorcing spouses may enter into arrangements without understanding the tax
differences of fixing child support. Second, both state and federal law often
give greater protection to enforcing solely child support obligations. For example, the amount designated for support in a Lester arrangement has been
held not exempt from a wage levy for federal taxes, while a fixed child support
obligation would have been exempt under section 6334(a)(8). Thus a payor's
means to pay child support may be removed by the very federal taxing system
one would hope would encourage payment or at least be neutral. If parties
could fix a separate child support payment but preserve its alimony treatment,
they would be more likely to fix an amount for child support payments. This
49
would help enforcement of child support obligations.

After further negotiations among the staffs of the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Joint Tax Committee, the Task Force, and representatives of
the Treasury Department, 5 " some of these suggestions were taken to heart in the
bill actually passed by the House. The bill retained unchanged the proposed
section 1041 regarding the nonrecognition of gain or loss on in-kind transfers of
property 5 ' and the simplified dependency exemption rules.'52 The bill also retained unchanged the rule that amounts "fixed" for child support were excludable/nondeductible payments, with the Lester Rule gloss that an unallocated
"family support" payment could constitute includable/deductible "alimony" in
full, even if the payments were reduced upon events relating to the children.'
The remaining components of the definition of "alimony," however, did undergo
some significant changes.
Under the House bill, "alimony" falling under the inclusion/deduction system
had to satisfy the following requirements: It had to be in cash and be received by
(or on behalf of) the former spouse; it had to be paid under a decree of divorce
or separate maintenance, or under a written instrument incident to the divorce, a
written separation agreement, or a decree requiring support or separate maintenance; the divorced or legally separated parties could not be members of the
same household at the time of payment; the payment had to terminate at the
death of the payee spouse and there could not be any obligation to make a
substitute payment after the death of the payee spouse; the parties could not

"I91d. Ms. O'Connell also urged adoption of the proposed changes to the provisions governing
dependency exemptions.
0
15
See Marjorie A. O'Connell, The Domestic Relations Tax Reform Act: How We Got It and What
We Can Do About It, 18 FAM. L.Q. 473, 492-93 (1985) (describing the negotiation of the "recapture
compromise").
1'See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 191-92 (1983).
MSee id. at 197-99.
"13See id. at 195.
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have designated the payment as "not alimony" that was excludable/nondeductible;'3 4 and the amount could not have been "fixed" as child support. Thus, the
language specifying that the payment must not be in payment for property was
deleted, as was the language requiring that at least 50% of the payment must be
expected to be made more than one year after the first payment. The underlying
idea of the latter provision was, however, carried forward in a new (and complicated) "recapture" provision in newly proposed section 71 (f).
As described by the House Report:
[If] alimony payments in the first year exceed the average payments in the
second and third year by more than $15,000, the excess amounts are recaptured
in the third year by requiring the payor to include the excess in income and
allowing a payee who previously included the alimony in income a deduction
55
for that amount...'.

In effect, the prior inclusion of the payee and deduction of the payor would be
"reversed" in the third year by allowing the original payee to deduct the "excess" alimony and requiring the payor to include the same amount as "phantom
income." Recapture would also apply if payments in the second year exceeded
payments in the third year by more than $15,000. The House Report provided
the following example:
[I]f the payor makes alimony payments of $50,000 in the first year and no
payments in the second or third year, $35,000 will be recaptured.... If instead
the payments are $50,000 in the first year, $20,000 in the second year and
nothing in the third year, the recapture amount will consist of $5,000 from the
second year (the excess over $15,000) plus $27,500 for the first year (the
excess of $50,000 over the sum of $15,000 plus $7,500). (The $7,500 is the
average payments for years two and three after reducing the payments by the
56
$5,000 recaptured from year two).1

The Senate had no provisions dealing with the taxation of payments in divorce in its 1984 companion bill. As described by both Marjorie O'Connell and
Barb Mattei, the Conference Committee convened to forge a compromise bill
became a contentious battleground, where staff members of the Senate Finance
Committee strongly advocated complete elimination of the alimony deduction. 5
Ms. Mattei reports that the Finance Committee staff members viewed the
taxation of support payments from the "what-is-income" perspective, arguing
that because support payments (whether child support or alimony) did not con-

4
15
See id. at 193-96.
55
1 1d. at 195.
6
" ld. at 196. The recapture rules would not apply if payments decrease because of death or
remarriage or because of an obligation to pay a constant percentage from a fluctuating source of
income. Nor would they apply to temporary support payments.
5
1' See O'Connell, supra note 150, at 494-97; Mattei, supra note 42, at 193 n.120. Ms. O'Connell,
as a member of the ABA Task Force, was a close observer of these events. Ms. Mattei conducted a
telephone interview with Mr. Harry Graham, Senate Finance Committee staff tax counsel, for her
Note on the topic.
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tribute toward earning the payor's income, it should be considered nondeductible personal consumption.'58 They argued that the only reason why this approach was abandoned in 1942 was the high war-time marginal rates then in
effect and that, with the much lower 50% top marginal rate in effect in 1984,
there was no longer any justification for the alimony deduction. 5 9 Ms. O'Connell
described in detail the machinations that then transpired, which are worth a
lengthy quotation to get a flavor of how we ended up with the final product.
On May 23, 1984, the author [Ms. O'Connell] learned from a House member's
office that the Finance Committee staff was trying to organize women's groups
to support the elimination of the alimony deduction. The next day, O'Connell
met with representatives from the Congressional Caucus on Women's Issues,
the National Organization of Women, the Women's Equity Action League, the
National Association of Business and Professional Women, and the National
Women's Political Caucus. The author implored these women to recognize that
without the alimony deduction payors would be far less inclined to meet their
spousal support obligations as well as their child support obligations for which
a deduction was available under Lester. She explained the income shifting
principle. The author urged the women's groups to oppose the elimination of
the deduction and to support the House bill.
Finance Committee staff members met on May 29, 1984, with various women's
groups representatives. From several sources, it was reported that the staff
members argued that the ABA had never considered if alimony should be
deductible, that the ABA had never consulted the Finance Committee about the
Task Force's proposals, and that the alimony deduction hurt women. In addition, the staff members suggested that without support from the women's groups
for the elimination of the alimony deduction, the Senate conferees might maintain the deduction, but instead, would oppose the repeal of the Davis rule. The
staff members claimed to have conferred with law professors who called the
alimony deduction irrelevant. Indirectly, the Finance Committee staff members
raised the specter of trouble for retirement equity provisions pending in the
Senate if women's groups did not support the alimony deduction repeal.
On June 4, 1984, the author learned from a Ways and Means staff member that
the Finance staff, at a pre-conference meeting, had offered to support [the
remaining provisions of the bill, including Davis repeal,] in exchange for the
elimination of the alimony deduction.
Publicly, at this time, the Finance Committee first claimed that it had no plan to
repeal the alimony deduction, but later admitted to considering the proposal,
although both the committee chairman's staff and the committee staff demurred
that no final decision had been reached about alimony. One factor that drew the
staffs out on the issue was that in late May and early June, Divorce Taxation

8
11
See Mattei, supra note 42, at 193 n.120.
5
' 1t is not clear from the reported discussions whether the Finance Committee staff members also
advocated repeal of section 71, so that alimony payments would revert to being excludable, or
whether such payments would also remain includable by the payee. See infra notes 241-42 and
accompanying text.
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Education, Inc. (DTE), plunged into the fray to convince the Finance Committee that opposition to the elimination of the alimony deduction was prevalent
and strong. DTE was formed to educate attorneys and other concerned persons
about domestic relations tax issues. Free of organizational strictures on lobbying activities and public statements, DTE contacted members of Congress and
organized support coverage for the issue to save the alimony deduction and the
House bill.
Meanwhile, the conferees from the Ways and Means and Finance Committees
convened in early June. . . . On June 7, 1984, the conferees approved the
dependency exemption [provisions] .... Conferees and staff members from the
Senate Finance Committee refused to announce publicly when they would raise
the alimony and property provisions.
On Friday, June 15, 1984, the Senate sent an offer to the House via staffs to
rescind the House bill's alimony and property provisions if the alimony recapture rules were made more stringent and were extended from three to ten years,
and if Lester were restricted. No staff meetings were scheduled for that weekend, but an impromptu (or perhaps late scheduled) meeting on Saturday, June
15, 1984, reportedly resolved the alimony and child support issues in ten minutes.
The discussion of alimony and child support began with an offer from Finance
Committee staff members to support the repeal of Davis in exchange for the
elimination of the alimony deduction. When Ways and Means staff members
rejected the suggestion . . . Finance countered with an offer that deductible
alimony be limited to payments over ten years. Ways and Means rejected the
term as too long, and a Treasury representative reiterated the recommendation
for a five-year term that Treasury had made at the H.R. 3475 hearings. The
staff members agreed to a compromise requirement that payments must extend
over six years to qualify as alimony unless they were to end on a payee's death
or remarriage or a payor's death. Recapture would be calculated over six years
as well. In addition, Ways and Means staff members acceded to the Finance
staff members' suggestion that the Lester rule be repealed, making all child
support nondeductible whether or not commingled with spousal support.
The conferees adopted these staff proposals on Monday, June 18, 1984. Then
the staff members, primarily those from the Joint Committee, set out to draft
language for the Conference Committee's bill. Not until June 22, 1984, was the
language of the Conference Committee's ... provisions available to the public.
The bill provided that to qualify as alimony, support payments must extend for
at lest six calendar years to the extent that the payments exceed $10,000 per
year. The divorce or separation instrument had to provide explicitly that payments end on the payee's death. Recapture would be measured over six years.
The basic rule would be that the amount of each payment made during the first
six post-separation years must not be $10,000 greater than any earlier payment
made during that time. To the extent that an earlier payment would exceed a
later payment by $10,000, the difference would be income to the payor and a
deduction from gross income to the payee. To the extent that any payments
would be reduced due to a contingency that related to a child's reaching a
specified age, marrying, dying, or leaving school, the payments would be treated
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as fixed for child support, not as alimony. Any contingency that was clearly
associated with such an occurrence would have the same effect.
A few days after the Conference Committee report was issued, the Conference
Committee's bill passed both houses. The President signed it into law on July
18, 1984.12. The Final Results
Thus, the Deficit Reduction Act of 198461 (the "1984 Act") introduced section 1041, essentially repealing the Davis result for all in-kind property transfers, and substantially amended the definition of includable/deductible "alimony"
in section 71 and 215.162 The new alimony recapture rules were particularly
complex.63

The criticisms of the new alimony rules began almost immediately.'6 The
abandonment of the flexibility to create fully deductible unallocated "family
support" payments that contained an element of child support was criticized.'65
This proposal, which first surfaced in the Conference Committee, came as a
surprise to everyone. The flexibility inherent in the Lester Rule was supported
by the Task Force's various reports and was never questioned either in the
meetings between the Task Force and government officials throughout the process or in the formal hearings held by the Ways and Means Committee. 66 It
seems that revocation of the Lester Rule was used solely as a bargaining chip in
conference by those who wished to repeal the alimony deduction entirely in the
quest to at least narrow the "alimony" deduction. The required six-year payout

600'Connell, supra note 150, at 494-97.
L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
' Section 215 continued to provide an alimony deduction for all payments that were includable
under
section 71 as "alimony."
163The Conference Committee Report gave the following example of how the recapture provisions
would work.
6
'Pub.
62

Thus, for example, if alimony payments of $25,000 are made in year I and payments of
$12,000 are made in year 2, then $3,000 will be recaptured in year 2. If the payments
further decline to $1,000 in year 3, then, in year 3, an addition $11,000 will be recaptured
from year I and $1,000 will be recaptured from year 2. If, prior to the end of year 6,
payments further decline, additional recapture will occur.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-861 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1804.
"Ms. O'Connell reports:
At the ABA's annual meeting in Chicago on August 2, 1984, the Council of the Tax
Section adopted a resolution at the task force's request. This resolution directed the officials of the Section to inform Congress that the new alimony rules create significant
technical problems. The resolution further directed these officials to request from Congress
either a technical correction in the alimony provisions by the end of 1984 or a one-year
delay in the effective date of the provisions. The Tax Section made these requests, but
abandoned its efforts on confronting adamant opposition from the Senate Finance Committee staff.
O'Connell,
supra note 150, at 501.
' 6'See id. at 500-01.
"See Mattei, supra note 42, at 204.
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period was also criticized as being inconsistent with the growing trend toward
short-term "rehabilitative alimony" to provide the payee with support for a short
period while she gained job training or attended college.'67 Finally, the alimony
recapture rules were also criticized as being complex and containing fundamental flaws:
State laws make court-ordered alimony payments subject to change under many
circumstances. Recapture could occur if payments were reduced under these
laws even though the payor was fulfilling his obligations under state law.
Recapture resulting from modifications under state law could produce other
anomalous results. For example, in most states a court must modify alimony if
the parties' circumstances change. If a payor's obligation is so reduced because
the payor's income has decreased, then the payor will be subject to recapture
when he or she is already in adverse financial circumstances. Or, for example,
an automatic termination of alimony payments occurs in many states when a
court finds that the payee is cohabiting, without marriage, with another party of
the opposite sex. Such termination could lead to significant recapture with a
large deduction for the payee for whom state law intended no further accrual of
financial benefits. In addition, a payee in most states may waive his or her right
to support. If a payee did so at the end of the fifth year, recapture would occur
in the sixth year. .

.

. [T]he resultant deduction to the payee could be more

beneficial than receiving the sixth year of alimony would have been. However,
the payor could be forced to include a far larger sum in income than the payor
would have paid as deductible alimony.
Finally, factors beyond the control of either party or of a court could cause
recapture under circumstances where the recapture hardly seems fair. For example, payors often must bear the costs of their former spouse's post-divorce
medical costs. If such costs are large during one year of the first five years after
divorce, then a significant recapture amount could result in the following year
when normal payments resume. Similarly, if a payor loses his job and misses a
payment, recapture based on the earlier year's payment would occur. If the
payor made up the arrearage in a later year, thus greatly increasing his payment
that year, additional recapture would occur in the following year. Such results
seem inequitable, particularly because the payors in both examples meet their
obligations under local law and do so by the end of the six-year period.' 68

Perhaps due in part to such criticisms, the statute did not lie in repose for
long. The Tax Reform Act of 1986169 (the "1986 Act") amended the alimony
definition yet again to eliminate the six-year payment period, to reduce the
recapture period to three years, and to increase the recapture trigger amount
from $10,000 to $15,000,170 exactly like the first compromise recapture rule
proposed in the original House bill in 1983.1'' It also repealed the requirement
67

' See O'Connell, supra note 150, at 499.

'1Md. at 498.

"Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).

'70I.R.C. § 71(f).

'See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. The example given from the 1983 House

Report is precisely the example given in the 1986 Conference Report regarding how the amended
provision would work.
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that the divorce or separation instrument explicitly provide that the obligation to
make payments otherwise qualifying as "alimony" for tax purposes ends on the
payee's death.' 72 The obligation to continue making payments must end, but it is
sufficient if state law would automatically require the payments to stop, even if
the governing document is silent in this respect. The 1986 Act retained, however, the repeal of the Lester Rule, as well as all other aspects of the amended
alimony definition adopted in 1984.
II. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
A. Cash Payments
So where are we today? While I think the law was, on balance, improved in
1984, it continues to generate an overabundance of confusion and litigation, as
briefly described in Part II.A.1 below, an unfortunate and unnecessary cost to
both the government and divorcing couples. This is particularly true since, as the
discussion below will show, these disputes result not from law that is premised
on firm theoretical foundations and the resulting necessary complexity required
to successfully differentiate "alimony" from "child support" from cash "property
settlements." Rather, the discussion will show that it is impossible to differentiate successfully among these payments. Furthermore, state courts and divorcing
parties no longer tend to think in terms of the strict definitional categories that
historically applied. Indeed, only the drafters of the Code continue to insist on
compartmentalizing the world in this fashion. Moreover, the huge costs and
frustrations incurred in the classification effort serve only to determine which
person's marginal tax rate will apply to cash payments transferred between the
parties as a result of divorce or child support obligations outside divorce. Very
little revenue is likely at stake here. Finally, much misunderstanding and litigation is due chiefly to the Code's insistence on making the parties' flexibility to
decide to whom cash payments should be taxed dependent on the transactional
form for the payments chosen by the parties, elections effectively available only
to those well informed of the proper transactional structures.
As a result of the 1980s legislation, the flexibility to decide to whom cash
payments should be taxed flip-flopped by category. Prior to the legislation, there
was great flexibility (so long as one knew the magic words) to decide to whom
amounts paid out as "child support" would be taxed and little flexibility to
determine to whom "alimony," as defined for Federal tax purposes, would be
taxed. After the 1980s legislation, in contrast, there was little flexibility to decide
to whom "child support" should be taxed and greater (albeit still limited) flexibility to decide to whom "alimony" should be taxed.
Prior to the 1980s legislation, the parties could choose to tax the payor on
child support payments by explicitly labeling the payments as "child support,"
which would then be excludable by the payee and not deductible by the payor.'73
72

' The Act accomplished this result by deleting the final parenthetical in section 71(b)(l)(D).
' See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.

73
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The parties could, in contrast, choose to tax the payee by designating the payment a "family support payment," unallocated between "alimony" and "child
support." Such an unallocated family support payment would be taxed to the
payee because-since no amount was explicitly "fixed" as child support in the
agreement-it would be includable as "alimony" and deductible to the payor (so
long as the remaining requirements pertaining to "alimony" were satisfied).
Under the Lester Rule, this would remain true even if the unallocated family
support payment was scheduled to be reduced upon events clearly linked to the
emancipation or death of the children, which would seem to indicate that a
portion of the payment was intended by the parties all along to be, in fact, child
support. There was, thus, great flexibility to determine to whom child support
payments would be taxed, albeit only for the well-advised.
At the same time, there was much less flexibility regarding "alimony" within
the tax definition of that term. If a payment satisfied the tax definition of alimony, it was includable by the payee and deductible by the payor, even if the
parties tried to avoid this result and transform the payment into a tax-neutral
"property settlement" by calling the payment a cash property settlement in the
divorce agreement. If the court was convinced that the payment satisfied a
support obligation, rather than a division of property, then it could rule that the
payment was includable/deductible "alimony," regardless of the labels attached
to the payments by the parties or even by state law, so long as the other statutory
17 4
requirements were satisfied.
As a result of the 1980s legislation, the Lester Rule was repealed, which
meant (on the face of the statute, at least) that the parties should have no
flexibility to determine to whom child support payments should be taxed. With
the introduction of the rule that amounts should be considered "fixed" as child
support if the payments are reduced upon a contingency directly related to one
or more of the children, the drafters seemed to have intended that even "disguised" child support should be subject to a strict rule of exclusion on the part of
the payee and nondeduction on the part of the payor, regardless of the wishes of
the parties.
At the same time, the drafters introduced the rule that payments of "alimony"
within the tax definition of that term could be designated by the parties as "not
includable" and "not deductible," providing some flexibility for the parties to
decide to whom "alimony" should be taxed.'75 But the flexibility is constrained:
The parties can elect out of the inclusion/deduction system, but they cannot elect
into it. To qualify for the inclusion/deduction system, each of the requirements
for tax "alimony" must be satisfied, including the requirement that the payments
must stop on the payee's death, whether by agreement of the parties or under

74
"'
See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
"'75While there has not been significant litigation under this new "elect-out" option, a few cases
have arisen, where the issue was whether the parties' language was sufficient to trigger the election.
See, e.g., Schutter v. Commissioner, 2001-1 U.S.T.C 50,142, 86 A.F.T.R.2d 7,292 (10th Cir.
2000); Jaffe v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2167, 1999 T.C.M. (RIA) 99,196.
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state law. This requirement was one means by which the drafters intended to
disallow cash property settlements from qualifying as "alimony," the other means
being the mechanical "recapture" rule that effectively re-characterizes, in the
third year, a portion of prior payments otherwise satisfying the definition of
"alimony" if the payments are excessively front-loaded. Thus, on balance, it
seems that there was little change in the overall amount of flexibility granted to
the parties to decide to whom cash payments should be taxed; only the locus of
the flexibility was flip-flopped from child support to alimony.
Part II.A.1, below, reviews some of the litigation that evidences the continuing weaknesses of current law. Part II.A.2 discusses recommendations for change
regarding the taxation of cash payments in divorce.
1. The Tax Litigation
Even a cursory review of the tax litigation that has occurred since the 1984
Act confirms that change is definitely needed. Family court judges and divorcing parties do not themselves extricate mixed payments and categorize them in
the nice, tidy packages envisioned by the federal tax rules. They see payment
streams as mixed. It would be almost sheer coincidence if the labels attached in
section 71 actually corresponded to reality. The reality is that no one, except the
drafters of the Code, thinks that we can adequately distinguish different types of
payments from one another.
The cases also illustrate that real parties in the real world, even when represented by counsel, do not understand the current rules adequately and do not
draft agreements that reflect them. It is obvious upon reading the cases that the
parties are often taken by surprise when they find out that their assumptions
regarding who will be liable for the tax obligation turn out to be wrong.
While it is not possible to cite every case decided since 1984 dealing with the
problems under these provisions, several of the most authoritative cases are
"
noted. 76
' They represent only the tip of the iceberg, of course, since many more
disputed cases are settled at the administrative level or resolved in the unreported small case docket of the Tax Court than ever reach a reported court

"'76Craven v. United States, 215 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2000); Preston v. Commissioner, 209 F.3d
1281 (11 th Cir. 2000); Schutter v. Commissioner, 242 F.3d 390 (Table), 2001-1 U.S.T.C. T 50,142,
86 A.F.T.R.2d 7292 (10th Cir. 2000); Ribera v. Commissioner, 139 F.3d 907 (Table), 98-1 U.S.T.C.
150,260, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1998); Richardson v. Commissioner, 125 F.3d 551 (7th Cir.
1997); Walters v. Commissioner, 97-1 U.S.T.C. 1 50,204, 79 A.F.T.R.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1997);
Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 1996); Murley v. Commissioner, 104 F.3d 361
(Table), 97-1 U.S.T.C. J 50,172, 79 A.F.T.R.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1996); Heller v. Commissioner, 103
F.3d 138 (Table), 97-1 U.S.T.C. 50,193, 78 A.F.T.R.2d 7610 (9th Cir. 1996); Barrett v. United
States, 74 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1996); Ames v. Commissioner, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992); Kenfield
v. United States, 783 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Votzmeyer v. United States, 202 B.R. 235
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996); Christoph v. United States 919 F. Supp. 1576 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Barrett v.
United States, 878 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Miss. 1995); Smith v. Commissioner, 94-2 U.S.T.C. 9150,503,
75 A.F.T.R.2d 2253 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Laird v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 441 (1989); Goldman v.
Commissioner, 112 T.C. 317 (1999); Balding v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 368 (1992); Darby v.
Commissioner, 97 T.C. 51 (1991); Zinsmeister v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 774, 2000
T.C.M. (RIA) 12000-364.
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decision. In many of these cases, the government often issues notices of deficiency to both parties, claiming that the payment excluded by the payee should,
in fact, have been included and that the payment deducted by the payor should,
in fact, not have been deducted (or vice versa). It concedes that only one or the
other claim should prevail, that it is merely a stakeholder in the litigation, depending on how the court characterizes the payment.'77 As recited by the Tax
Court in one case, the government "has taken the position of a stakeholder and
has no preference concerning whether we find that the payments in controversy
are alimony includable by [the payee] or property settlement and/or child support not deductible by [the payor]."' 78
What it means to "fix" an amount for child support continues to generate
significant litigation. Under the Lester Rule, an amount not specifically denominated as "child support" in the relevant documents was not considered "child
support" for tax purposes, even if the surrounding circumstances tied the payments to the children. The 1984 amendments provided that payments that are
reduced upon the happening of contingencies relating to the children would be
considered "fixed" as child support,'79 but they went no further. That is to say,
the statute was not amended to provide that, if surrounding circumstances of any
kind indicate that the payments might have been intended as "child support,"
they should be so treated for tax purposes. What if surrounding circumstances,
other than a reduction upon the happening of contingencies related to the children, indicate that an amount might have been intended as child support, though
not denominated as such?
In 1988, Congress mandated that each state create and publish child support
guidelines. 80 The federal law contains a rebuttable presumption that the amount
of child support awarded under the guidelines is correct.' 8' My own home state
of Ohio has complied by issuing detailed listings of how much child support
should be ordered for each child, depending on the income levels of the payor
and payee.8 2 While a judge can deviate from the guidelines, the judge must
"'See, e.g., Richardson v. Commissioner, 125 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[Tjhe Commissioner has sent inconsistent notices to protect the government's right to tax revenue. This practice
has been recognized as valid."); Murphy v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3144 (1996) ("[I1n the
notices of deficiencies and in her pleadings, respondent has taken inconsistent positions, disallowing
alimony deductions to Ronald Murphy but requiring Diane Murphy to report alimony income.
Respondent, however, does not ask us to sustain inconsistent positions. Respondent is content that
we determine the tax consequences of the subject payments ... consistently between petitioners.");
accord Leventhal v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1670 (2000); Jaffe v. Commissioner, 77
T.C.M. (CCH) 2167 (1999); Baxter v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2137 (1999); Raymond v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2752 (1997); Richardson v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH)
1390 (1995); Heffron v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2849 (1995). But see Christoph, 919 F.
Supp. 1576 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (where government took inconsistent positions and court held that fact
to be significant to its decision); infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
'189 Burkes v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1772, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) 98,061.
7See O'Connell, supra note 150, at 500-01; see also Mattei, supra note 42, at 204.
1w°See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305, 1321,
amended by The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343.
'See 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1994).
82
' See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.2115 (2000).
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defend the deviation by reference to the surrounding circumstances that justify
it. What happens when a judge makes an unallocated "family support payment"
for the support of the ex-spouse and children? Can the recipient spouse argue
that the portion of the payment equal to the guideline amount should be considered "fixed" as child support within the meaning of section 71 (c)(1)?
The Tax Court has said "no." In Simpson v. Commissioner,"3 for example, a
Pennsylvania family court issued an order requiring Mr. Simpson to pay a monthly
unallocated family support payment of $718 to Mrs. Simpson for the support of
her and their minor children. Mrs. Simpson argued that the entire payment
constituted child support, since the Pennsylvania child support guidelines would
require a monthly payment of $789, which exceeded the unallocated family
support payment. The Tax Court, however, concluded that such inferences from
state child support guidelines are not permissible in determining whether any
amount is "fixed" as child support. According to the Tax Court:
The language of section 71(c)(1) is clear that for payments to be child support,
the written divorce instrument by its terms must fix a sum which is payable as
child support. It is inappropriate, in light of this clear statutory language, to
look beyond the written instrument to examine what effects, if any, are made
by operation of State law.
If Congress had intended for us to look beyond the written instrument, it would
have amended section 71 (c)(1) to so reflect....
We conclude, therefore, that because the court order does not specifically fix a
portion of the $718 monthly payment as child support, the entire amount of
such payments received by petitioner in 1994 and 1995 is alimony and includable in income.'
In a similar case where the payee made an identical argument, relying on the

published state child support guidelines, the Tax Court held:
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a simple reference to the grid
would produce an accurate figure for what portion of the amounts she received
was for child support, petitioner has not satisfied the requirements of section
7 l(c)(1). The amount of child support must be fixed by the terms of the instrument.... The Supreme Court stated in Commissioner v. Lester... that it is the
"'written instrument' that must 'fix' the portion of the payment that is for
child support. Petitioner replies that Lester has been overruled by statute. While
it is true that the result in Lester has been overruled by section 71(c)(2), the
5
principles of Lester still apply to cases to which the latter provision does not.1

18378 T.C.M. (CCH) 191, 1993 T.C.M. (RIA) 99,251.

I-fd. 78 T.C.M. (CCH) at 193, 1993 T.C.M. (RIA) 99,251.
' 85Lawton v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 153, 1999 T.C.M. (RIA) 99,243. Neither will the
"Dissomaster" computer program, which apparently helps family law lawyers compute support
payments based on income and other factors, serve to identify how much of an unallocated family
support payment constitutes child support. See Wells v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1507,
1998 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 98,002.
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Surely this result is right as a matter of positive law, but it probably does not
accord with what the parties expected if they were told simply by their attorneys
that "child support" is excludable/nondeductible. At the least, there remain tremendous traps for the unwary, and the potential for confusion is clear. Furthermore, it does not appear that family law courts are going to abandon their
practice of ordering unallocated family support payments simply because the
federal tax law prefers to have different tax consequences apply to "child support" and "alimony."
A similar problem in distinguishing alimony from child support often arises in
the case of temporary support orders, which quite often take the form of
unallocated "family support." In Heller v. Commissioner,'86 for example, Lawrence
and Madeline Heller divorced in 1986. They divided their community property,
and Madeline took custody of the couple's children. The divorce court entered
three consecutive orders that defined Mr. Heller's payment responsibilities with
respect to Madeline and their children:
1. On February 19, 1986, the court issued a temporary order directing Mr.
Heller to pay support of $3,500 per month and reserving "the option to allocate
[the payments] between spousal and child support."
2. On August 8, 1986, in an order to take effect on July 1, 1986, the court
continued the previous $3,500 amount, but designated $1,000 per month as
child support for July through September 1986.
3. On December 17, 1987, the court directed Mr. Heller to continue to make
monthly child support payments of $1,000 and spousal support payments of
$1,700.187

Is any portion of the payments made under the first order nondeductible
"child support" in view of the designation in later orders that a specified portion
of each payment constituted "child support"? No amount of the payments made
in the first order would be considered "child support" under the Lester Rule. The
entire payment would be considered an unallocated "family support payment"
that would fully qualify as "alimony" (so long as the other alimony requirements
were satisfied). There were no reductions in the amounts payable under this first
order connected with any contingencies relating to the children, which is the
only situation involving "disguised child support" addressed in the 1984 amendments. Does that mean that the entire payment should qualify as alimony? Or
because the later payments indicated that $1,000 of each monthly payment would
be considered child support, should the first $1,000 of each payment made under
the first order be considered child support as well?
The Tax Court concluded the latter, but the Ninth Circuit reversed on the
issue, concluding that, under Lester, the entire payment could potentially qualify
as "alimony." According to the Ninth Circuit: "The designation contained in the

186103 F.3d 138 (Table), 97-1 U.S.T.C. 1 50,193, 78 A.F.T.R.2d 7610 (9th Cir. 1996).
1871d.
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second order was insufficient to fix $1,000 per month as child support during
any time before July 1, 1986. Accordingly, no payment was fixed as child
support for February through June, 1986, of the first order."' 88
The government next argued that Lawrence's obligation to make the payments would not have stopped if Madeline had died prior to July of 1986, and
thus the payments nevertheless failed to qualify as alimony. Under this view, the
payments would be considered an excludable/nondeductible property settlement
by default-clearly on odd conclusion on the facts, but an inevitable result of the
analysis required by the current rules. Again the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding
that the payments would have stopped on.Madeline's death, but the court had to
undertake an examination of state law in order to come to this conclusion.
By its terms, the first court order creates a legal obligation for Mr. Heller to pay
$3,500 a month "spousal support" to his former wife. The order did not specify
that the payments would continue upon the death of Madeline. California law

provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of a party under an order for the support of the other party terminates upon
the death of either party or the remarriage of the other party." ... California
law also provides that in the event a single stated amount covers both alimony
and child support in an order, the courts cannot determine, after a terminating
event, what proportion of the total award is allocable to alimony and to child
support .... Mr. Heller's legal obligation to pay money under the first court
order would therefore terminate upon Madeline's death, and a court would have
no ability to allocate retroactively between spousal and child support. Accordingly, the obligation embodied in the first court order would terminate on the
death of the payee spouse and meets the test for alimony.'8 9

Thus, Ms. Heller had to include the full amount of the unallocated support in her
gross income as tax "alimony.""
In contrast, Ms. Gonzales, in Gonzales v. Commissioner, 9' was held to be
entitled to exclude temporary unallocated family support on virtually identical
facts, because the Tax Court, again after examining state law, concluded that the
1881d.
1891d.
'9The same result occurred in Ambrose v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2429, 1996 T.C.M.
96,128, even though the judge who ordered the unallocated family support payment of
(RIA)
$17,500 said:
Because "family support" is allowed only by stipulation, the court does not inquire if Ms.
Ambrose wishes the $17,500 amount broken down into child support and spousal support.
If she does, I propose that it be broken down to $8,000 child support, $9,500 spousal
support. If both parties are willing, it will stay as family support.
Id. at 2436. Ms. Ambrose included in her gross income only $9,500 of each monthly payment, but
the Tax Court concluded that she had to include the entire $17,500. It rejected, under Lester, any
inference that could be drawn from the judge's precatory language. It also concluded, after examining California state law, that no part of the $17,500 payment obligation would have survived her
death, since at least a portion of that payment constituted "alimony" for state law purposes, and if
any portion of a mixed payment stream constituted state-law alimony, the Tax Court believed that
state law would terminate Mr. Ambrose's payment obligation for the entire amount.
1'78 T.C.M. (CCH) 527, 530, 1999 T.C.M. (RIA) %99,332.
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temporary support payments would not have stopped had Ms. Gonzales died. In
other words, amounts received under a temporary support order were considered, by default, to be a cash property settlement-an obvious error if the facts
themselves could control the inquiry, but the necessary result of the stop-atdeath inquiry.
Mr. and Ms. Gonzales, who had four minor children, were separated in 1992
and divorced in September of 1995. On February 18, 1993, a state court entered
a temporary order awarding custody of the children to Ms. Gonzales and directing Mr. Gonzales to make an unallocated family support payment of $7,500 per
month, as follows:
[Plending the resolution of this matter, [Dr. Gonzales] shall pay $7,500 per
month unallocated, commencing on November 1, 1992 as and for support of
[petitioner] and the infant children of the marriage, from which sum [petitioner]
shall pay all family expenses including the mortgage, children's school expenses and unreimbursed medical expenses and her schooling. 92
In the subsequent tax litigation, the court noted that "[t]he temporary order
failed to indicate how the payments would be treated for tax purposes, whether
the payments would terminate at petitioner's death, or what portion thereof
represented child support."' 93 The final divorce decree, entered on September 21,
1995, provided for alimony payments of $60,000 per year for nine years, reduced by $10,000 after each three-year segment. If Ms. Gonzales died, remarried, or cohabited with another, the payments would terminate. The divorce
decree also provided for child support payments of $40,000 per year for nine
years or until emancipation occurred under the terms of the agreement.
The government argued that Ms. Gonzales was required to include the entire
unallocated family support payments that she received under the temporary support order because no amount was "fixed" for child support, as required by the
Lester Rule, in the temporary order. Ms. Gonzales argued that the payments
nevertheless failed to qualify as alimony because, under state law, her husband's
obligation to make the payments would have survived her death if she had died
during that period. The court concluded that the dispositive issue was whether
the stop-at-death requirement was satisfied and noted that "[i]f the payor is
liable to make even one otherwise qualifying payment after the recipient's death,
none of the related payments required before death will be alimony."' 94 Because
the agreement was silent in this respect, the court had to decipher New Jersey
law. It reviewed the relevant state law cases and made a number of extrapolations to decide the case. According to the court:
Although New Jersey statutes do not say whether unallocated support payments
terminate on the death of the payee spouse, a New Jersey case helps reveal the
unlikelihood of that result's occurring.

1921/d.
93

1 1d.

'94Id. at 528, 1999 T.C.M. (RIA) 199,332.
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In Farmilette v. Farmillette . . . the New Jersey Superior Court addressed
whether unallocated support orders are modifiable. The court held that they are.
The Farmilettes . . . obtained a divorce judgment, and Mr. Farmilette was
ordered to pay $285 a week to support his ex-wife and their two children.
Sometime after one child became emancipated and the other child began living
full time with Mr. Farmilette, the latter sought a reduction of his unallocated
support obligation, retroactive to the time of the emancipation and change of
residency. Before deciding to what extent, if any, the support order should be
modified, the court considered its authority to do so. It pointed to a New Jersey
statute prohibiting retroactive modifications of child support. The court reasoned, however, that it "will not be so presumptuous as to assume the legislators had in mind unallocated support orders which clearly are not included
within the statute." . . . The court then held unallocated support orders modifiable and agreed to review the parties' submissions to determine whether, and to
what extent, a modification is warranted.
Farmilette . . . and the instant case present similar circumstances-albeit the
former rests on a real, and not imaginary, event. In each case, a divorced
husband (or soon-to-be ex-husband) is ordered to pay family support. And in
each case, a terminating event occurred ....
In Fannilette, the court squarely
faced the issue of whether (and, if so, by how much) to vary Mr. Farmilette's
family support payment beyond the terminating event. Significant for our purposes was the court's willingness to take on that task. . . . The State court's
willingness to do so leads to our affirmative response to the question posed
here: Is there good reason to believe that Dr. Gonzales's family support obligation would continue after petitioner's death? We think so. Had petitioner died
before the superior court entered the divorce decree, Dr. Gonzales, as the noncustodial parent of three children, could have remained liable to pay family
support, whether in full or diminished amounts. 95
Thus, the court ruled that Ms. Gonzales could exclude the temporary family
support payments from her gross income because they neither constituted an
amount "fixed" for child support nor qualified as "alimony" for federal tax
purposes. 196 In other words, the temporary support payments were categorized,
by default, as property settlement payments.
On virtually identical facts once again, the payee in Raymond v. Commissioner'97 was required to include the full amount of unallocated family support
payments under Lester, but not because the court concluded that the payments
would have survived the payee's death. Unlike the Heller and Gonzales courtsboth of which recognized that the determinative issue would be whether the
payments would have stopped on the payee's death (even though she did not in
fact die) under state law-the Raymond court completely ignored this issue.
Stephen and Sandra Raymond separated in 1990 and divorced in 1992. The
couple had two children, one of whom was away at college and one of whom

'9 d. at 529, 1999 T.C.M. (RIA) 99,332.
9Id.; see also Miller v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 307, 1999 T.C.M. (RIA) 99,273.
19773 T.C.M. (CCH) 2752, 2755, 1997 T.C.M. (RIA)
97,219.
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was 13 years old and living with Sandra. The final divorce decree provided for
monthly alimony payments to Sandra of $1,000 per month for two years or
Sandra's earlier death or remarriage, as well as child support of $1,600 per
month. The tax consequences of these payments were not in dispute. At issue
were payments made by Raymond to Sandra in 1991 under a temporary support
order entered by a family court in October of 1990, which provided that the
children would reside with Sandra and which required Raymond to pay Sandra
"his net pay less $900.00 every month on the first day every month commencing
November 1, 1990, or thereabouts."' 8 During 1991, Raymond paid to Sandra
$41,455 under the temporary support order. Sandra did not include these payments in gross income, but Raymond deducted them as tax "alimony."
Sandra argued that at least a portion of the payments constituted nondeductible child support since the surrounding context of the temporary support order
reflected that assumption, most of the amounts were in fact spent to support the
children, and the final divorce decree ordered more child support than alimony.
Like the Heller and Gonzales courts, the Raymond court rejected this inference,
relying on Lester:
[Slection 71(c)(1) nonetheless requires us to find that the terms of the temporary order that incorporated the support stipulation do not fix either in terms of
an amount of money or a portion of the 1991 temporary order payments any
part of those payments as a sum that is payable for the support of the children
of Mr. Raymond. See Commissioner v. Lester.... Inferences, intent, or other
nonspecific designations of payments as child support are not sufficient to
override the mandate of section 71(c)(1) .. .except as permitted by section
71(c)(2). Section 71(c)(2) does not apply here because there is no amount
specified in the temporary order that was to be reduced, let alone upon the
occurrence of a contingency specified in that order relating to a child of Mr.
Raymond or at a time that can clearly be associated with that kind of contingency.'"
What one would expect to find next, of course, is the inquiry made in both
Heller and Gonzales regarding whether the payments nevertheless failed to qualify
as tax "alimony" because the payment obligation would not have stopped under
state law had Sandra Raymond died prior to receipt of the payments. Yet, the
opinion is absolutely silent on this issue. Perhaps Ms. Raymond's lawyer did a
bad job of lawyering by failing to raise the issue, but then one would expect the
court to have raised it on its own, as the stop-at-death requirement is a prerequisite requirement of tax "alimony" that the court cannot ignore simply because
the payee party failed to raise it (most likely to the relief of the payor's attorney). Rather, the Tax Court immediately concluded that, since none of the
payment was "fixed" for child support, the entire payment qualified as alimony,
includable by Sandra Raymond and deductible by Stephen. The Tax Court took

198d.7

1991d. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2754, 2755, 1997 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 97,219.
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pains to note that the more than $40,000 paid by Stephen in 1991 "constituted
approximately 72 percent of the net amount of wages that Mr. Raymond received during 1991 (i.e., approximately 72 percent)of his gross wages for that
year reduced by federal and state income taxes and Social Security and Medicare taxes that were withheld). ''20° While such numbers are the kind of numbers
that first impelled the decision to make alimony includable by the payee and
deductible by the payor in 1942, the modem definition takes no account of such
realities. Whether the alimony amount is high or low,'the stop-at-death requirement must be satisfied under the current statute if payments are to fall within the
inclusion/deduction system.
The Heller and Gonzales cases also illustrate how the stop-at-death requirement often requires tax adjudicators to delve into murky state law waters to
determine whether stipulated payments would stop at death-and thus whether
payments constitute tax "alimony." This is one of the most-often litigated issues
in the cases. Is it Wise to require federal tax adjudicators to make such state law
determinations? And does this not involve just the sort of uncertainty and lack of
uniformity from state to state that the 1984 amendments were intended to prevent?
One very common problem with respect to this issue is that family law judges
often order the payor spouse, typically the husband, to pay the payee's attorneys' fees and other costs of the divorce proceedings. The order is typically
silent regarding whether the payor spouse must make this payment if the payee
should die before payment is. made. If the judge adjudicating the resulting tax
controversy becomes convinced that the payor would have had to pay the payee's
attorney fees and costs even if the payee had died in the short interim between
the time that the liability accrued and the payment was made, then the payment
cannot be considered an includable/deductible alimony payment for support. By
default, it would be considered an excludable/nondeductible property settlement.2°' But is it not clear that such a payment does not really constitute a
division of marital assets but rather the payment of a personal consumption
expense of the payee, i.e., an expense of "support"? Yet, the tax status of these
attorneys' fees and costs will hinge on the odd inquiry regarding whether state
law would have stepped in and absolved the payor of paying the amount if the
payee should happen to die in the short period between the divorce and the
payment of the attorneys' fees and costs.
2 2
For example,'in Smith v. Commissioner,
the Georgia Superior Court ordered
Lawrence Smith to pay $25,000 in attorneys' fees and costs inctirred by Connie
Page Smith in connection with their divorce. The order was (not surprisingly)
2
0Id. 73
21

T.C.M. (CCH) at 2753, 1997 T.C.M. (RIA) 97,219.
See, e.g., Preston v. Commissioner, 209 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that exhusband's payment of ex-wife's attorneys' fees under order of state court judge was not "alimony"
because state law would not have absolved husband of payment obligation if ex-wife had died prior
to payment); accord Ribera v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C. 50,260, 81 A.F.T.R.2d 1081 (9th Cir.
1998).
m75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2250, 1998 T.C.M; (RIA) 98,166.
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silent regarding whether Mr. Smith's obligation would disappear should Ms.
Smith die before she received the payment. (What state court judge would think
to address such a remote contingency?) Mr. Smith deducted the payment, but the
Tax Court, after an examination of state law, concluded that Georgia law would
not have absolved Mr. Smith of the payment obligation if Ms. Smith had died
during that interim. °3 The Tax Court stated:
While it seems somewhat peculiar to discuss payment of fees made to a former
spouse's attorneys for services in terms of alimony or separate maintenance
payments, section 71 (b) does not differentiate as to the reasons for the payment.
Petitioner contends . . . that the focus of section 71(b)(1)(D) is whether "the
payment was for a period which could not end after [the spouse's] death,"
rather than whether the liability could survive the death of the spouse. We do
not agree. . . . It may be that under Georgia law, which controls here, the
liability for support or alimony payments would be extinguished by the payee's
death, but the liability here was for attorneys' fees. Petitioner points us to no
authority, and we have discovered none, that such a debt would be extinguished
by the wife's death. 2°4
The Tax Court came to the same conclusion in Ribera v. Commissioner, 5
Zinsmeister v. Commissioner,2°6 and (most recently) Berry v. Commissioner2"7
after examining sometimes murky and ambiguous state law regarding whether
the liability would survive the payee's death.
Other taxpayers have received different treatment with respect to precisely the
2 8
same payment. In Burkes v. Commissioner,
for example, the divorce decree
required Mr. Burkes to pay $60,000 to his ex-wife's attorneys for their work in
connection with the divorce. The provision stated: "[Mr. Burkes] shall pay to...
[Mrs. Burkes] the sum of $60,000.00 as additional alimony toward attorney fees,
for which sum judgment is rendered and execution may issue." 9 Once again,
the document was silent regarding whether the obligation to pay would disappear if Ms. Burkes died in the short period between the entering of the divorce
decree and the payment to the attorneys. Looking to Ohio law, the Tax Court
concluded that the term "alimony" can comprise both support payments and
property settlements. Alimony constituting support payments stop by reason of
the death of the payee; alimony constituting property settlement payments do
not. Therefore, the Tax Court had to determine whether the term "alimony" was
used here in its "support" sense or in its "property settlement" sense under state
law-again, just the kind of inquiry that the 1984 amendments were supposed to

10 3See Human v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1990, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 98,106.
20475 T.C.M. (CCH) 2250, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) 98,166.
20573 T.C.M. (CCH) 1807, 1997 T.C.M. (RIA) 97,038.
280 T.C.M. (CCH) 774, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA)
2000-364.
20780 T.C.M. (CCH) 825, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) 2000-373.
2075 T.C.M. (CCH) 1772, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) 198,061.
20
1d. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1774, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) 98,061.
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end-and it concluded that the $60,000 constituted a support payment, an obligation which would not survive the payee's death. Therefore, the payment of the
attorneys' fees constituted deductible alimony for Mr. Burkes, a result strikingly
inconsistent with those in Smith, Ribera, Zinsmeister, and Berry.
Many other payments that are clearly support payments and not property
divisions in the non-tax senses of those terms suffer the same ambiguity. If a
judge orders, for example, the payor to pay the payee's future medical expenses
or car repair expenses (both of which are not unusual terms in the real world),
and the agreement is silent regarding whether the payor would have to make
these payments if the payee should die after receiving the medical care (or
having the car fixed) but before the payor paid the bill, then whether the amount
is "alimony" or a "property settlement" will turn on the tax adjudicator's determination of whether state law would have nevertheless required the payor to pay
the doctor bills or the auto mechanic bills if the payee had died (even though she
did not die)!
In Preston v. Commissioner,2"' the Eleventh Circuit confronted this set of
facts and held that an ex-husband's payment of his ex-wife's car-repair expenses, under order of a state court judge, was not "alimony" because state law
would not have absolved him of the payment obligation if his ex-wife had died
after the car was repaired but before the bill was paid. This result is atrocious;
the payment of a payee's medical and car expenses is not likely part of a
disguised property settlement! It is a support payment, at least as that term
would be commonly understood by divorcing parties.
In another case, Barrett v. United States,2 ' the couple (Pat and Helen Barrett)
divorced in 1984. The 1984 Mississippi Judgment of Divorce "provided that the
parties had reached a proper settlement of all property rights between them,"2 2
and it required Pat to make the following payments to Helen:
(a) monthly commencing November 15, 1984, the sum of $1,900 until her
death or remarriage; (b) until her death or remarriage, [Pat] should provide a
major medical insurance policy comparable to his present medical insurance for
[Helen]; (c) until her death or remarriage, [Pat] should provide $100,000 life
insurance coverage on his life naming [Helen] as beneficiary.2 '
There was no dispute that these payments qualified as "alimony" for tax purposes.
Because of a change in Helen's income and earnings capacity, Pat's payment
obligation was reduced to $1,400 per month by court order in 1985. In 1988, Pat
petitioned to have the payments terminated because of a material increase in
Helen's income. The parties settled the matter and entered a consent judgment
with the court which provided that Pat must make one $50,000 payment in

210209 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11 th Cir. 2000).
2"74 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1996).
2
" Id. at 663.
2131d.
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September of 1989 and another payment of $50,000 in September of 1990 (with
the second payment carrying an eight percent annual interest rate) and that all
prior payment obligations (which were concededly deductible) were cancelled.
The parties called this payment a "property settlement," even though the first
agreement had stipulated that all property had been divided. No mention was
made whether the payments would be required to be made to Helen's estate
should she die prior to the two payments. Pat sought to deduct these payments as
"alimony."
To determine whether these payments qualified as tax "alimony," the Fifth
Circuit had to delve into Mississippi law, which provided for two kinds of
payment streams. One was "periodic alimony" and one was "lump sum alimony." 2 4 After examining state law, the Fifth Circuit concluded that "[t]he
[Mississippi family] court cannot deprive itself of the power to modify periodic
alimony in the future and cannot extend the payments past the remarriage of the
payee spouse or death of either spouse. As a result, Mississippi's periodic alimony falls within section 215's definition of deductible alimony."2 5 In contrast,
lump sum alimony "is a final settlement, substituting as a division of property,
between a husband and wife that cannot be subsequently modified for any reason except fraud. The death or remarriage of the payee spouse does not affect
the payor spouse's obligation. . . .Due to these limitations, lump sum alimony"216 is not deductible.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether the payments under the
consent agreement qualified as periodic alimony or lump sum alimony. In this
regard, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[t]he Mississippi Supreme Court has repeatedly announced that an alimony decree is presumed to provide for periodic
alimony unless the decree 'by clear and express language' provides for lump
sum alimony. 2" 7 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the consent decree replaced a periodic alimony obligation (deductible) with a lump sum ali28
mony obligation that would survive Helen's death (nondeductible).
A great case to illustrate how divorcing parties themselves, as well as the law
in many states, increasingly recognize that payment streams can contain an
inextricably intertwined combination of alimony and property settlement is Pettet
v. United States,"9 in which the court's mandatory exploration of whether state
law would stop a mixed payment stream on the payee's death was a bit surreal.
In Pettet, Don and Rosa Bullard divorced in 1989. They decided to divide their
property through agreement rather than under the terms of the North Carolina
Equitable Distribution statute. Their "Separation Agreement and Property Settle-

24

While Mississippi had recently created yet a third type of payment stream, called "rehabilitative
periodic alimony," the new law was not applicable to the case at bar, for which I am sure the Fifth
Circuit panel was extremely grateful.
2
'Barrett, 74 F.3d 661, 664-65 (5th Cir. 1996).
216
1d. at 665.
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ment" was incorporated into their divorce decree, part of which provided:
Husband [Don Bullard] shall pay Wife [Rosa Bullard] the sum of $12,500 per
month as alimony, which shall consist in part of the variable first mortgage and
second mortgage monthly payments for the residence located at 813 Inlet View
Drive, as well as the first mortgage monthly payments for the unit located at
Holly Tree Condominiums. It shall be the Wife's responsibility to tender said
monthly mortgage 22payments
for the aforementioned residences from said monthly
0
alimony payment.
The properties were owned solely by Rosa as a result of the divorce. The tax
issue was whether any part of the payment stream mandated by that provision
qualified as "alimony" for tax purposes.
Both state and appellate courts in North Carolina, which had been called upon
to interpret this agreement in unrelated litigation, characterized this payment
stream as "one in which the provisions for alimony and for property settlement
were so interrelated that the payments to Rosa were not subject to court modification by reason of changed circumstances, as would be the case for alimony
payments standing alone."'22' But, as we all know by now, the only characteristic
that really mattered for federal tax purposes was whether the payments would
stop if Rosa died prior to full payment of the mortgages. If they would, then this
mixed payment stream would be characterized as 100% includable/deductible
alimony; if they would not, then it would be characterized as a 100% excludable/nondeductible property settlement. The parties' agreement, as usual, was
silent. As the court observed:
Unfortunately, if the parties fail to expressly specify whether a periodic monthly
payment is intended to terminate upon the death of the payee spouse, a court
must look to state law to determine whether the fourth factor of the [s]ection 71
definition of alimony is satisfied. See [Cunningham v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M.
(CCH) 801, 804-05 (1994)] (noting that a court is returned "to the vagaries of
if state law terminates a payor's
different State law approaches" to determine
222
liability at the death of the payee spouse).
Thus, the North Carolina District Court had to try to determine whether North
Carolina law would terminate these payments on Rosa's death. (As it happened,
Rosa did, in fact, die in an automobile accident just six days before the tax
litigation was originally scheduled to start.) The federal court reviewed North
Carolina family law decisions, the prior family law litigation that characterized
this payment stream as a mixed alimony/property settlement stream, and North
Carolina contract law in concluding that the payment stream would not stop on
Rosa's death. In connection with North Carolina contract law, the issue was
whether the parties intended the payments to stop at death, even though not
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01d

2211d"
222d.

.

at n. 1,80 A.F.T.R.2d at n.1.

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 55, No. 2

SECTION OF TAXATION

explicitly provided for in their agreement. Under North Carolina law, the court
could look to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent with respect to
this issue. The court stated:
Like the final version, an early draft of the parties' Separation Agreement did
not contain a termination at death clause .... However, the draft did contain the
following provision: 'Husband and Wife stipulate and agree that in the event
that Wife cohabits with a member of the opposite sex who is not a relative, the
amount of alimony set forth herein shall be reduced to the exact amount of the
first mortgage and second mortgage payments for the residence located at 813
Inlet View Drive.' . . . This provision was struck by Rosa during the parties
negotiations. The court finds the language of this clause to be meaningful as the
payments would only have been reduced (not terminated) to the amount of the
mortgage payments. This evidences an intent that in negotiating the agreement
the parties intended the mortgage payment obligation to continue despite the
happening of a contingency that Don found undesirable. This provision also
demonstrates that Don, whose attorney drafted the Agreement, knew how to
terminate his obligations ... with a contingency clause that would discharge his
duty to make the alimony payments upon the cohabitation, remarriage, or death
of Rosa. 23
Also interesting is the following passage:
Don ...testified that he was unfamiliar with the federal tax law requirements
of [section] 71(b)(l). His attorney, Mr. Davis, testified that he too was unfamiliar with the requirements of this tax provision including the termination at
death requirement. Don's accountant, Mr. Thomas May, testified that during
the negotiation of the Agreement he advised Rosa and Don of the tax consequences of paying and receiving alimony, i.e., that it was includable as income
for Rosa and deductible for Don. But he testified that he was unfamiliar with
the termination at death requirement of [section] 71(b)(l) and advised the parties on the tax consequences of alimony according to Don's characterization of
the payments as "alimony."
The court finds that use of the term alimony . . . is insufficient to prove the
parties' intentions that the payments terminate at Rosa's death. That Don intended the payments to be "alimony" or even intended them to be deductible
from his income does not demonstrate that both he and Rosa intended the
mortgage portion of the.., payments to terminate upon her death." 4
I have no doubt that other divorcing parties and divorce lawyers not wellversed in tax law do not know that state law (or their agreement) must provide
that payments stop at death to qualify as "alimony" for tax purposes. I would bet
that divorcing parties are informed, much like Don and Rosa were, that alimony
is includable/deductible, but they likely presume that any payment that is called
alimony in their agreement (as in this case), or at least that qualifies as alimony
under state law, would fall within the inclusion/deduction system for federal tax
22 3
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purposes. And they are probably dumbfounded when they find out that a payment stream characterized as "alimony" for purposes of federal bankruptcy law
(and thus not dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings) may not be "alimony"
for purposes of federal tax law.225
As the decision in Pettet indicates, there must be an easier way to determine
which parties' marginal rate brackets will apply to the payments at issue than
requiring federal tax adjudicators to delve into the surrounding circumstances of
the parties' negotiations in order to determine whether, under state law, payments would terminate on the death of the payee. The surreal nature of the
inquiry in Pettet was exacerbated by the knowledge that the payment stream was
intended by the parties, and considered under state law, to be a mixed alimony/
property settlement payment stream.
Cunningham v. Commissioner226 provides yet another example of how the
difficult interrelationship between the stop-at-death requirement and state law
compels tax adjudicators to determine whether payments would qualify as "alimony" under state law-just the kind of inquiry that was supposed to end in
1984. The parties agreed that their divorce agreement should remain a private
contract, not a decree entered by order of the court. Mr. Cunningham did not
wish the court to be able to increase his alimony and support payments, and Ms.
Cunningham did not wish the court to be able to decrease them, as apparently
could occur if they had their agreement formally entered as a court order. The
agreement was silent with respect to whether 142 monthly support payments of
$2,500 made by Mr. Cunningham to Ms. Cunningham would stop at her death.
(Child support was dealt with in a separate provision.) Ms. Cunningham privately received a tax opinion stating that, since the proposed agreement did not
require the payments to stop on her death, she would be entitled to exclude the
payments as "not alimony." She did not include these payments, while Mr.
227
Cunningham sought to deduct them, and both were issued notices of deficiency.
Since the agreement was silent regarding whether the payments would cease
if Ms. Cunningham should die before the end of the 142-month period, the Tax
Court had to examine state law, and this was not an easy task. Under North
Carolina law, only "alimony" payments stop on the death of the payee, but no
payment stream made under a private agreement that is not entered as a court
order can qualify as "alimony." Thus, the court had to construe their private
agreement under North Carolina contract law in order to determine whether the
payments would stop as a matter of contract law. This allowed consideration of
parol evidence, which allowed all of the negotiations and prior drafts of the
agreement to come into evidence. The court eventually concluded that, while the
evidence was ambiguous, the parties did not likely intend the payments to stop
at the payee's death, so the payments did not qualify as tax "alimony." To reach
2

"See Votzmeyer v. United States, 96-2 U.S.T.C. 50,621,78 A.F.T.R.2d 6335 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
22668 T.C.M. (CCH) 801, 1994 T.C.M. (RIA) 94,474.
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On an interesting side point, the case recites that Mr. Cunningham sued his family lawyer for
malpractice, claiming that the lawyer told him that the payments would be deductible as alimony.
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this conclusion, the Tax Court had to digest and cite 15 different North Carolina
case law decisions, as well as several North Carolina statutes. What a mess!
Another fascinating case is Christoph v. United States.228 Under their original
divorce decree, Mr. Dieter Christoph was to pay Ms. Jutta Duse unspecified
periodic payments for the rest of her life, which presumably qualified as includable/deductible alimony. In 1988, Mr. Christoph petitioned the court to terminate his obligations based on Georgia's live-in lover statute. Ms. Duse also sued,
claiming that Mr. Christoph breached certain duties owed to her. The suits were
consolidated, and the presiding judge encouraged a settlement. The settlement
hearing is described as follows:
[The attorney for Mr. Christoph] announced that "Ms. Duse would be paid a
sum that would 'include $250,000 which will be expressly deductible by Mr.
Christoph, and it is a contingency of this agreement that that payment of $250,000
will be alimony, will be deductible by Mr. Christoph, and includable in Ms.
[Duse's] income.' ... In exchange for this amount of money, Ms. Duse agreed
to release Mr. Christoph from future alimony payments....
At the hearing, Ms. Duse testified that she agreed to the terms and conditions of
the settlement agreement .... Ms. Duse conceded that the payment would be
income to her and that she would declare it as income .... With that understanding, the parties concluded that they had reached an agreement settling the
case.
Judge Cheatham subsequently entered an order on June 1, 1989, adopting the
oral settlement agreement as the order of the court . .

.

. Soon after Judge

Cheatham adopted the oral settlement agreement, Mr. Christoph transferred the
agreed-upon $250,000 to Ms. Duse.22 9

The $250,000 figure was described as the present, discounted value of the future
230
stream of payments under the original agreement.
The government disallowed Mr. Christoph's tax deduction for the $250,000

payment. Mr. Christoph paid the deficiency and sued for a refund. The government moved for summary judgment on several grounds, and Mr. Christoph

similarly moved for summary judgment in his favor. Quite surprisingly, there
was no discussion of whether Mr. Christoph's payment obligation would have
disappeared if Ms. Duse had died prior to receipt of the payment, as occurs
routinely in denying alimony status for lump-sum payments of the payee's attorneys' fees and costs relating to the divorce or medical expenses.23 ' Rather, the
court ruled in favor of Mr. Christoph when it found out that Ms. Duse had
(unsurprisingly, in my view) excluded the receipt from her gross income (likely

on the ground that the stop-at-death requirement was not satisfied) and that the
Service had challenged her exclusion as improper. The government settled the
case with Ms. Duse under an agreement that essentially split the difference,

228919 F. Supp. 1576 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
229
1d. at
230
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with Ms. Duse increasing her gross income by $125,000. The court
reasoned:
This information demonstrates to this Court that the [Service] essentially agreed
with Mr. Christoph's position regarding who was supposed to the claim the
$250,000 as taxable income. It is true that the [Service] reached a compromise
settlement and, in so doing, only recovered from Ms. Duse half of what she
owed. The [Service] did this at its own peril. Mr. Christoph232cannot be penalized
simply because the [Service] compromised with Ms. Duse.
What an odd case! I think it likely that, even though the lump-sum payment
was intended to replace a stream of payments that evidently satisfied the tax
definition of "alimony," the lump-sum payment itself failed the stop-at-death
requirement. That is to say, I would bet that if Ms. Duse had died prior to receipt
of the payment, her estate could probably, successfully, have sued to receive the
lump-sum amount. As we have seen, the parties have no power to opt into
alimony treatment under the statute, as they clearly attempted to do here; they
have only the power to opt out of the includable/deductible system under current
law.
This case also illustrates that large, lump-sum payments are not always property settlements, contrary to the Code's presumptions. They often, as here, intend to replace an ongoing relationship, which is required with periodic payments,
with a lump-sum payment that represents the present, discounted value of the
future payment stream. Such a payment can allow the parties to go their separate
ways sooner.
Moreover, even if the court order did specify that the payment obligation
would disappear if Ms. Duse died before receipt, would this not have been
nothing short of a formal "technicality" in the pejorative sense of the term in
view of the fact that Mr. Christoph had to-and did-pay the amount as soon as
the court entered its order? That Ms. Duse might have died in the few days (or
perhaps even hours) between the entering of the court's order and the payment is
so unlikely an event that to turn the answer to the question of who should be
taxed on such lump-sum payments on such an inquiry seems nothing short of
ridiculous.
In short, there is a good chance that this payment did not qualify as tax
alimony, even though it was allowed to stand as tax alimony. I find it ironic that
the bargaining and agreement between the parties recounted in the quotation
above, with the parties themselves deciding who should be responsible for the
tax due on these payments, illustrates just the kind of system that I advocate but
which is not currently available in all instances (this case notwithstanding).
Another case that demonstrates the depth of misunderstanding on the part of
divorcing couples (as well as their family lawyers) is Rosenthal v. Commis-

23
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sioner.233 In Rosenthal, the parties provided in their agreement that the spousal
support payments were intended to be taxable to the wife and deductible by the
husband but that the payments would not terminate if the payee wife should die
during the 48-month payment period. Needless to say, the stipulation that the
payments would not stop if the payee should die prevented these payments from
qualifying as "alimony." The parties apparently believed that they could opt
"into" as well as "out of' includable/deductible alimony treatment by private
agreement. The result, though mandated by the current Code, upset the parties'
original bargain. "If these payments are not taxed in accordance with the original
expectations of the parties .... then, in essence, the terms of the settlement have
been changed. The party who escapes taxation obtains a windfall at the expense
'
of the party who is unexpectedly taxed."234
On a similar note, the Tax Court held that a $10,000 "lump sum alimony"
payment was excludable/nondeductible because the stop-at-death requirement
was not satisfied, even though the divorced spouses "stipulated" to the Tax
Court during the litigation that it should be includable/deductible.3
The stop-at-death rule surely triggered what should have been unnecessary
litigation (in my world) in Ryan v. Commissioner.3 6 A 1989 divorce court order
required Gregory Ryan to pay his ex-wife, Frances Ryan, $700 per month for
January, February, March, and April of 1990 and $250 per week thereafter until
her death or substantial changed circumstances or until a further court order. In
1991, Gregory appealed the alimony order, claiming that the trial court awarded
an amount of alimony in excess of what Frances had requested, since she had
requested alimony for a term of only eight years. The appeals court entered a per
curiam opinion instructing the trial court to change the lifetime alimony award
'
to an award of "$250 a week for eight years."237
Frances treated this amendment
as removing the stop-at-death provision contained in the original judgment and
thus excluded the payments received, while Ryan deducted them, claiming that
the amendment meant only that Frances was entitled to the alimony payments
for eight years or until her earlier death. The court agreed with Ryan: "[W]e find
that the termination upon death provision contained in the Judgment of Divorce
was not modified by the higher court's opinion. The issue raised in the appeal
was the length of the alimony payments, not whether the payments were in fact
alimony. '238 Gregory Ryan asked the Tax Court to force the government to pay
the $15,000 in attorneys' fees and costs that he had to incur to secure his right to
his alimony deduction. The Tax Court directed him to the proper procedural
means for making such a request and thus declined to rule on it.

23370 T.C.M. (CCH) 1614, 1995 T.C.M. (RIA)
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I could go on to describe many other similar cases cited in footnotes 176-77,
but I fear that I am becoming repetitious. I nevertheless felt that it was necessary
to describe a healthy swath of real-world cases, since I think that all too often
academic discussions of how "best" to tax transfers in divorce occur in a vacuum
in which unrealistic assumptions are made regarding what the terms of realworld divorce agreements look like. They do not order payment streams that fit
nicely into the boxes created in section 71. What cases like the ones discussed
here show is that the current rules, which were the result of political compromise
rather than grand theory, were drafted by people who really had no idea of what
real-world divorce agreements and court orders look like. They certainly could
not have envisioned the kind of litigation described here as a natural and proper
consequence of the rules that they drafted. What the cases show, in fact, is that
the rules are broken. Neither divorcing parties nor the government should have
to undertake so much litigation in order to determine who, between two parties,
shoulders the tax burden on cash payments in divorce that will concededly be
taxed to one of them. Divorce, already a stressful and expensive experience,
should not be made more stressful and more expensive by the unanticipated
intrusion of unnecessary federal tax controversies.
In sum, the House Report leading to the 1984 changes to the definition of
alimony complained of the impact of state law on federal tax consequences, the
inability to predict with certainty the tax consequences of transfers in divorce,
and the high degree of administrative difficulties and resulting litigation in this
area involving many individuals (and family law attorneys) who are not wellversed in tax law. As stated by the House Report:
The committee believes that the present law definition of alimony is not sufficiently objective. Differences in State laws create differences in Federal tax
consequences and administrative difficulties for the IRS .... The committee
bill attempts to define alimony in a way that would conform to general notions
of what type of payments constitute alimony as distinguished from property
settlements and to prevent the deduction of large, one-time lump-sum property
settlements.239

The tax landscape has not changed as much as anticipated because the underlying assumptions informing current law were not necessarily accurate. As Professor Berman put it:
The attempts at reform failed because Congress predicated its efforts on false
premises. First, there do not exist "general notions of what type of payments
constitute alimony as distinguished from property settlements." True, a single

lump sum payment of $1,000,000 appears distinguishable from annual payments of $20,000 "for the life of the payee until she remarries." But the bulk of
payments between divorced spouses do not fit into these neat categories. If they
did, much of the reform encompassed in the 1984 Act would have been unnecessary-Tax Court judges could have treated the distinction between alimony

239
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and property settlements the way Justice Stewart treated pornography-they
would know it when they saw it.
Even if there were general notions of the distinction between alimony and
property settlements, state court judges do not rigidly adhere to the distinctions.
Some judges order extended installment payments as a means of giving the
wife an interest in the husband's property which cannot be divided while others
fabricate an interest in a professional degree because alimony laws do not
24
adequately compensate the wife.
2. Discussion and Recommendations
With respect to support payments (as opposed to property settlements), there
are two fundamentally different perspectives one can take, as briefly described
earlier,24' and they provide different starting points (and thus different likely
ending points) for the discussion. One examines each party, the payor and payee,
and queries whether the payment (or receipt) should be deductible (or includable) under traditional notions of what constitutes "income" for tax purposes.
Under this view, each party is considered independently of the other. The recipient would have to include the amounts in income-at least under Glenshaw
Glass notions of the term-since the receipt would constitute an undeniable
accession to wealth of the recipient, clearly realized, over which she has complete dominion. Under this perspective, the payor might also remain taxable on
the amounts paid out to the recipient if one defines nondeductible "personal
consumption" as any outlay not in pursuance of income creation-as is generally the case under current law-rather than an outlay that does, in fact, purchase
personal consumption enjoyed by the payor. This approach, in other words,
could very possibly result in taxation of amounts paid out as alimony or child
support to both parties.
This seems to be the perspective taken by the Finance Committee staff members in 1984 in arguing for nondeductibility of all payments by the payor, since
their argument focused on whether the payor's payment, viewed solely from the
payor's perspective, contributed to earning includable income. As reported by
Ms. Mattei as a result of her telephone interview, "Senate Finance committee
staff counsel Graham questioned the validity of continuing this major exception
to the general rule that only business expenses (in contrast to personal expenses)
are deductible ....
,,242
Although it was not clear whether the Finance Committee

24
Donald H. Berman, The Alimony Deduction: Time to Slaughter a Sacred Cow, 5 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y
24 49, 70-71 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
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Mattei, supra note 42, at 193 n.120; see also Berman, supra note 240 (also advocating repeal of
the alimony deduction, in conjunction with repeal of section 71). One of Berman's chief arguments
is that, since the precipitating event causing enactment of the inclusion/deduction system was the
high marginal rates then in effect, the inclusion/deduction system is no longer needed with the
significantly lower marginal rates in effect today and thus should be repealed. I would respond that
such an argument presumes that the only justification for an inclusion/deduction system is the
presence of high marginal rates of the payor. But it is often true that a provision enacted for one
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staff members also advocated abandoning the alimony inclusion, under their
approach of questioning whether the amounts paid out constitute "income," the
recipient should also be taxed. After all, it would be inconsistent to use the
"what-is-income" approach to this question when considering the taxation of the
payor but abandon that approach when considering the taxation of the payee.
A very different approach, which I advocate, is not to query whether the
amounts paid out constitute "income" to the payor and payee, independently of
each other, but rather to conclude that such payments ought to be taxed only
once within the couple-as they are in an intact marriage-because the payments are directly caused by virtue of that marital relationship. The same would
be true of child support payments outside of marriage. Under this approach, the
only question to consider is to whom should the payment be taxed. The inclusion/deduction mechanism (or exclusion/nondeduction mechanism) simply becomes the tool used to implement the decision regarding who, between the two
parties, ought to be taxed on the payment. Under this perspective, the inclusion
and deduction do not have independent significance under an "income" inquiry.
In other words, the inclusion and deduction are not ends under a "what-isincome" query but only the means used to implement a decision under a "whichparty-should-be-taxed" query. The inclusion and deduction (or vice versa) are
used purely instrumentally, not theoretically. I call this approach the "pragmatic
paradigm."
Since we are not dealing, under this pragmatic paradigm, with something as
theoretically fundamental as the question of "what is income," but rather are
dealing only with a pragmatic decision as to which of two parties should be
taxed on what is concededly income to someone, the main concerns should be
what side effects-good and bad-would result from our decision regarding
whom to tax.
Since all cash payments incident to divorce will be taxed to one or the other
spouse, the federal government is a mere stakeholder regarding the issue of
whether a cash payment is includable/deductible or excludable/nondeductible.
reason can continue to be justified for other reasons even after the conditions originally prompting
enactment are no longer present. For example, section 162(a)(1) explicitly allows a deduction for a
"reasonable" salary.
The provision was originally adopted in 1918 to allow a reasonable salary to be deducted
for purposes of an excess profits tax, even though no salary was actually paid because the
profits were being plowed back into the business. The provision's original purpose was
entirely pro-taxpayer.
Today, it is a provision raised by the Commissioner against taxpayers to disallow deductions for what are in fact disguised dividends or disguised payments for property. The
purpose of the provision has thus evolved over time so that now its purpose is chiefly seen
as protecting the double tax in our classical corporate tax structure.
Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAx REV. 492, 507
(1995) (citing Erwin N. Griswold, New Light on "A Reasonable Allowance" for Services, 59 HARV.
L. REV. 286 (1945); Reg. § 1.162-7). In other words, Berman's argument is persuasive only if there
is no sound justification for the inclusion/deduction system apart from high marginal tax rates. For
the reasons discussed in the text, I believe that there are convincing justifications for allowing the
parties to choose the inclusion/deduction system if they desire.
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Only the rate-bracket differential between the parties (if any) can result in a
revenue loss, and this loss is self-limiting, as the greater the amount paid to the
lower-bracket payee in the includable/deductible system, the higher the tax bracket
that will apply to him or her, until further income-shifting would not produce a
revenue loss. Moreover, in the context of a payor in a significantly higher tax
bracket than the payee in the includable/deductible system-which is the very
context that would appear to result in the most lost revenue-any revenue loss is
more illusory than real because of the loss of the marriage bonus which occurs
on the divorce.
Because little revenue is at stake, the parties should be given full power to
decide who, between them, should be taxed on all cash transfers incident to
divorce. Well-advised taxpayers already have a great deal of power to decide
who is taxed, but that power can be implemented only by choosing the correct
transactional form for the payment stream. Transactional elections are (perhaps)
defensible in the world of, for example, corporate reorganizations, where choosing one form rather than another can dictate whether or not the transaction is a
taxable one, but they are not appropriate in the world of divorce, a common
transaction not engaged in for tax reasons, and often not by people well informed of the effective elections available to them by choosing the correct form.
Rather than hiding the effective elections, the elections should be made explicit,
with simple default rules for those taxpayers who fail to address the issue in
their divorce instrument.
An explicit election is preferable to trying to further distinguish, for federal
tax purposes, among alimony, child support, and property settlements. Without
exception, the difficulties described above in the litigated cases stem from trying
to characterize properly the cash payment as "alimony," "child support," or
"property settlement" for federal income tax purposes (labels which often deviate from state law characterization of the payment) in order to determine whether
they are includable/deductible or excludable/nondeductible. As illustrated by the
litigated cases, however, these payments are nearly impossible to distinguish on
any consistent basis. And history has shown that any new measures adopted to
distinguish among these payments would simply create more transactional forms
for the divorcing parties to learn (and more traps for the unwary).
As indicated by the child support guideline controversy and the continuation
of the Lester Rule in all cases not dealing with a reduction in payments related
to the children, child support can still fairly easily be cast as alimony if the right
form is used. Cash property settlements are also not easy to identify. The underlying assumption of current law is that cash property settlements can, in fact, be
differentiated from support payments on a consistent basis and that the "stop-atdeath" rule, coupled with the recapture rule in the case of front-loaded payments, serves to adequately police that line. Both contentions are dubious, at
best, and reflect outdated notions that family law is increasingly abandoning.
With respect to the recapture rule, for example, property settlements may be
paid over several years in level payments. Only the constraints of the tax law
require the parties to maintain contact for at least three years in order that the
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status of their "alimony" arrangement be respected as such. As one commentator
notes:
It would have been hard to have legislated wisely to limit front-loading. First,
many legitimate, non-tax-avoidance factors, particularly the rehabilitative alimony award, lie behind front-loaded settlements. Second, there is little economic incentive for front-loading because it often costs the husband more in
loss of the use of his money than he saves in taxes. Thus, a reform that limited
the tax avoidance potential of front-loading would have to reach a narrow
group of cases at the cost of significantly interfering with accepted family law
practice.243
Moreover, the "stop-at-death" rule serves only to require judges to delve, once
again, into state law to try to determine whether any part of an unallocated
payment stream might stop automatically if the payee should die, an actuarially
unlikely event that the parties never addressed in their agreements, as described
earlier. This inquiry results in many payments that are clearly not property
settlements-such as the payment of attorney fees, medical expenses, and auto
repair expenses-to be so characterized.
In 1986, Professor Malman persuasively demonstrated how the line between
support payments and property settlements could no longer be policed in any
rational way in view of the trends in family law, where "equitable distribution"
statutes now blend property rights with support payments in an inextricably
mixed payment stream. According to Professor Malman:
Often there is not a clear distinction between alimony awards and property
distributions. As a result of the adoption of equitable distribution principles, the
law in a number of states requires that financial provision for a spouse be made
through a property distribution, and that alimony be awarded only if the property that can be divided is insufficient. Other states provide that both alimony
awards and property distributions may be used for similar purposes-to provide
for support and to provide for an equitable allocation of assets.
The similar criteria used by courts to make both alimony awards and property
distributions illustrate the lack of a clear distinction between the two. In both
situations, courts may consider the parties' ages, needs, and employment skills;
the duration of the marriage; and the presence of children.
In particular, cases where on divorce one spouse, typically the wife, seeks
compensation for financial contributions made toward the other's education or
attainment of a degree or professional license illustrate the blurring of alimony
awards and property distributions. Courts may consider the wife's contributions
to the earning of the degree (or the husband's resulting increased earning capacity) as a factor in determining a property division and/or an award of alimony. Alternatively, the courts may formally identify the degree, license, or
education as an asset subject to equitable distribution. Recently, the New Jersey
courts introduced the concept of reimbursement alimony, which is designed
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specifically to compensate a spouse for financial contributions to the other
spouse's attainments. The choice of a mechanism may affect the amount of
compensation. Nonetheless, the results produced by the various approaches are
similar because each may be said to stem from the vision of marriage as a
partnership or shared enterprise and each compensates a spouse for contributions to the other spouse's career.2
Professor Malman's points have become only more salient in the years since
1986. As just one example, in this dot-com world in which we live, when stock
options increasingly are used to compensate workers, family law courts are now
arguing that stock options awarded after a divorce do not really represent separate "property" of the stock option owner but rather a future "income" stream
that should be factored into the level of support payments.245
Moreover, the difficulties in differentiating support payments from property
settlements should not be attempted to be resolved by adopting the Task Force's
complex "netting" proposal, under which only "hard assets" are taken into account in determining how much of a cash payment is actually a "property settlement" and under which payments are disallowed from entering into the inclusion/
deduction system to the extent that they do not exceed the value of hard assets
transferred to the payor spouse as a result of the divorce. 46 Not only would this
approach ignore state-law trends that increasingly recognize the value of intangible property rights, but it would also impose vast new complexities on every
divorcing couple (requiring "tax-defendable valuation" of all "hard assets" without a market transaction at the time of divorce).247 And these complexities would
be greatly exacerbated by the fact that each spouse's "interest" in the hard assets
would be measured differently in community-property states and common-law
states, not to mention states that vest spouses with property rights at the time of
divorce under certain equitable distribution or apportionment statutes.
For all of these reasons, the statute should not attempt to identify those payments eligible for the inclusion/deduction system by reference to whether or not
they fall into a particular category. Moreover, Congress should also reject treating all cash payments either under a rigid exclusion/nondeduction system or
rigid inclusion/deduction system in the name of simplification. A mandatory
exclusion/nondeduction system for all cash payments is not wise for the following reasons.
First, mandatory exclusion/nondeduction for all cash payments would likely
increase the aggregate tax burden on divorcing couples, since the couple in
different tax brackets (where substantial cash payments are more likely) would
2
'Malman,
245

supra note 5, at 379-80 (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Kerr v. Kerr, , 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 374 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Murray v. Murray, 716
N.E.2d 288 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). See generally Amy Zipkin, Stock Option Splitsville, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug.
246 9, 2000, at CI (describing these and other cases).
See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
247
While at least informal valuation of all property surely occurs in most divorces, these valuations
may not be arrived at by formal appraisals that could be defended in the inevitable tax litigation,
when the payor and payee spouses disagree over the valuations used to arrive at how much of the
cash payment stream is eligible for the inclusion/deduction system.
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lose their marriage bonus at the same time that more of the couple's income
would be taxed at the payor's higher marginal rate under the schedule for single
filers. Divorce is usually accompanied by financial hardship (and it triples the
chances of bankruptcy). Therefore, Congress should avoid adopting what would
amount to a mandatory divorce tax "penalty" in many cases.
Second, a mandatory exclusion/nondeduction rule would also introduce a disparity between less wealthy couples, where support payments must come from
future wages of the payor, and wealthy couples, who could still engage in
significant income-shifting by transferring income-producing assets to the payee
to fund support. It would also be inconsistent with the income-shifting allowed
under section 1041, discussed below in Part III, so there would be a new and
dramatic difference between the two areas, whereas both now contemplate income-shifting.
Third, a rigid exclusion/nondeduction rule would decrease flexibility in settling other matters in the divorce, with the likelihood of increasing the number
of cases that go to full contest in state court.
Fourth (and perhaps most important), when the payor is in a higher tax bracket,
a mandatory exclusion/nondeduction system would erase the current-law bias
that encourages the payor to make larger payments than he or she would otherwise make and that leaves the payee with more after-tax cash than he or she
would otherwise have under an exclusion/nondeduction system.
For example, assume that John and Mary, who have one minor child, age 12,
are divorcing. The child will live primarily with Mary, with generous visitation
to John. Without taking into consideration the following cash transfers, John, if
single, would be in the 36% bracket, and Mary would be in the 15% bracket.
Mary demands $1,000 per month in child support for ten years. John does not
object to the figure but suggests that they call the payment a "family support
payment," with no amount specifically designated as "child support." They agree
that if Mary should die before their child is emancipated (an actuarially unlikely
event), John will gain full custody.
The intent is to structure the payments as includable/deductible "tax alimony."
Economically, it does not matter whether the payment is called "child support"
or "family support" or "alimony." "Alimony" sounds mercenary and "child
support" sounds benevolent, but otherwise there is no difference; the recipient is
typically under no duty to account for how the funds are used.
Mary would reject that offer, since her $1,000 per month would be worth less
to her if she must pay the tax on it. John then offers $1,200 per month. After
Mary's 15% tax ($180), she has $1,020, which is more than she would have
under a rigid exclusion/nondeduction system under which John would agree to
pay no more than $1,000 per month. John is willing to do this only because his
net outlay is reduced from $1,000 to $768 ($1,200 less $432 tax savings) because of the deduction. John and Mary effectively save $180 net24 and share the
248

This figure represents the $360 that John will pay on the $1,000 per month if it is designated
"not alimony," less the $180 that Mary will pay on that $1,200 per month if the definition of alimony
in section 71 is satisfied.
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spoils. (Mary should claim more of the spoils than $20.)
As indicated by this example, which uses current law, flexibility is already
incorporated into the statute, so long as the parties agree that the payments
would end on the payee's death and are not excessively front-loaded. Why not
make the flexibility explicit? Failing to do so simply rewards the well-advised
over the ill-advised. The election is one dependent on knowledgeably structuring
the transaction in a certain manner (increasing attorneys' fees and penalizing the
ill-informed) rather than one that can be simply made explicit in the divorce
agreement.
Moreover, since Mary is in a lower tax bracket than John, it would be reasonable to assume that she is in greater need of the funds than John and that
structuring the tax system so that she could end up with more after-tax cash is
good policy, particularly since payees after divorce do tend to have a lower
standard of living than payors.249 According to one authority:
[W]omen face longer terms of low wealth and consumption when they divorce
because they are less likely to remarry than their former husbands ....
This
lower remarriage rate is exacerbated when the wife has custody of the children.
Part of the reason for this disparity is that a woman's value on the marriage
market tends to depreciate with time, while her husband's tends to appreciate.5 0
That John must be given a deduction to encourage him to provide Mary with
more after-tax cash bothers some commentators who just do not like to see the
Johns of the world reduce their taxes in this manner.25' But such a view reverts
to a different paradigm-asking whether John, viewed independently, should be
able to deduct an amount that is not made in pursuance of income-rather than
the more pragmatic paradigm of deciding simply who should be taxed on these
payments by looking to the side effects of the various possible decisions. I admit
that I like the fact that Mary ends up with more after-tax cash here under the
inclusion/deduction system, and the bald fact is that John would not be willing
to provide her with more after-tax cash if he were not better off as well, i.e., if it
were not for the tax savings that he enjoys from the deduction under his higher
rate bracket. In short, this side effect is one that tends to encourage the higherincome spouse to provide more after-tax income to the lower-income spouse,
which might be a good side effect for society in general, at a cost to the fisc that
is self-limiting.
2491n 1985, Lenore Weitzman published a book that argued that, following divorce, the average
divorced woman's standard of living dropped by 73%, while the average divorced male's standard
of living increased by 42%. See LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 323-56 (1985). Since
then, her numbers have been successfully attacked as severely overstated, and even Ms. Weitzman
herself admitted that a research assistant made an error. See Sanford L. Braver, The Gender Gap in
Standard of Living After Divorce: Vanishing Small?, 88 FAM. L.Q. 111, 115-16 (1999). But only the
degree, and not the direction, of the numbers were challenged. A later study using Ms. Weitzman's
sample and records found a 27% drop in women's standard of living and 10% increase in men's
after divorce, See id.; see also Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for
Walking": Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. J.L. & EcoN. 126, 127-28 (2000).
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Brinig & Allen, supra note 249, at 128 (citations omitted).
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See Berman, supra note 240.
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Finally, John's deduction would encourage him to satisfy his $1,200 per month
payment obligation, rather than renege on his $1,000 per month obligation that
system, an allhe would otherwise agree to under an exclusion/nondeduction
252
too-common occurrence in the real world.
The problem of nonsupport of children by their parents has become a serious
[O]f the 8.8 million mothers with children whose
one for this country ....
fathers were not living in the home in the spring of 1986, 3.4 million, or nearly
40 percent of these mothers, had never been awarded support for their children.
Fewer than one in five mothers who had never been married had been awarded
were due support in 1986, only
support. Of those who had been awarded and
253
half received the full amount they were due.
Why don't I simply advocate that all cash payments fall within the inclusion/
deduction system, with no ability on the part of the parties to agree to exclusion/
nondeduction? I think that such a system would be less optimum than one
preserving the effective flexibility of current law (for the well-advised). First, for
parties who will not be in different tax brackets after divorce-which may be the
case more often with lower- and middle-income taxpayers who are both in the
15% bracket or both in the 28% bracket-it would be defensible to allow them
to decide who should be taxed on these payments simply because no revenue is
at stake. The greater flexibility to designate tax responsibility for cash payments
can grease the wheels of negotiation with respect to many other matters on the
table, such as who gets the car. Parties who are in different tax brackets should,
if well-advised, not wish to opt out of the inclusion/deduction system in most
cases, since both can usually be made better off (after taxes) under that system,
as illustrated in the John/Mary negotiations. But some of these parties may agree
to hard numbers independent of the tax consequences. If John refuses to pay
more than $1,000 per month in any event, then I think that it is good policy to
provide Mary some leverage in the divorce negotiations with respect to other
matters. She may agree to give up the car, in other words, if John agrees that the
firm $1,000 per month will be excludable by her (and thus nondeductible to
him). In other words, if they nevertheless wish to agree to exclusionnondeduction
in a manner that would benefit the Treasury, there is no compelling reason to
prevent them, and providing taxpayers explicit authority to decide for themselves the tax status of these cash payments can help the parties negotiate other
matters that are not directly related to the tax responsibility for cash payments.
Moreover, having the "tax system" interfere as little as possible (by declining to
decide for the parties themselves who is responsible for the tax on the cash
252

See generally Jacqueline Pons-Bunny, Non-Custodial Fathers' Rights: States' Lack of Incen-

tives for the Fatherto Remain in the Child's Life, 19 J.Juv. L. 212, 221 (1998) (noting that 65% of
absent fathers do not pay alimony or child support).
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William A. Klein, Tax Effects of Nonpayment of Child Support, 45 TAx L. REV. 259, 280 (1990)

(quoting S. REP. No. 100-377, at 2776-85 (1988), which accompanied the Family Support Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988)); see also Gerzog Shaller, supra note 7, at 332-35
(collecting additional Federal statutes aimed at increasing compliance with child support obligations).
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payments except in the absence of agreement)-when the Treasury is only a
stakeholder-should increase respect for the tax system, which I also perceive as
a good side effect.
The flexibility allowed to the parties to decide to whom cash payments should
be taxed is not the cause of confusion under current law. Rather, as illustrated by
the cases discussed above, the confusion under current law arises because the
flexibility provided to the parties is dependent on them knowing and understanding the various transactional forms and requirements available to them. It is not
necessary to eliminate the flexibility available to the parties under current law in
the name of simplification; rather, it is necessary only to allow the parties to
exercise their flexibility explicitly, rather than indirectly, by allowing them to
designate for themselves the extent to which some or all cash payments incident
to divorce should be includable/deductible or excludable/nondeductible.
In such a system, the only remaining issue is which default rule should govern
in case of silence or a failure to reach agreement. The default rule should ideally
provide the outcome that the parties might have agreed to if they had thought
about it, i.e., the default should not be counterintuitive or surprising. I believe
that the payee likely would not be surprised to find out that cash that he or she
receives and controls and spends is includable. But if the payor pays a child's
tuition or summer camp fees directly to a third party, with no control by or direct
consumption by the payee, the payee might likely be surprised to find that such
a payment is includable (absent a designation otherwise). Thus, I recommend
that the default rule should be inclusion/deduction unless the payment is made to
a third party on behalf of a child. Such payments should be relatively easy to
distinguish. This default rule would step in, however, only in cases in which the
parties fail to stipulate how their cash payments should be treated for tax purposes. For example, if the parties so choose, they can agree that payments to a
third party on a behalf of a child are includable/deductible payments.
At bottom, the appropriate reform analogy is the 1984 reform to the dependency exemption pertaining to the minor children of divorced spouses. Recall
that, prior to 1984, the spouses often had to engage in protracted litigation to
determine who provided the greater amount of support for the children in order
to determine who was entitled to the dependency exemptions." 4 While such an
approach was surely theoretically defensible, it was impractical when applied to
the real world, and it resulted in an overabundance of costly litigation for both
the divorced parties and the government, while little, if any, federal revenue was
at stake. The 1984 reform simply assigned a default rule that the custodial parent
gets the exemption, in the absence of an agreement by the parties that the noncustodial parent should get it. Thus, the parties could negotiate out of the default
rule by explicitly agreeing on who would get the dependency exemption. This
resolution might not be theoretically pure, but it was an absolutely defensible
simplification that should provide the ready touchstone for simplification of the

54

See supra notes 94-95 and 131-32 and accompanying text.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 55, No. 2

RATIONALIZING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW

tax consequences of cash transfers in divorce.
I therefore recommend that the title of section 71 should be changed from
"alimony and separate maintenance payments" to "payments pertaining to children and former spouses." Subsections (c) (dealing with "child support" payments) and (f) (dealing with recapture of front-loaded payments) should be
repealed entirely. Subsections (a) through (c) should be amended as follows:
Sec. 71.

PAYMENTS PERTAINING TO CHILDREN AND FORMER SPOUSES.

(a) GENERAL RULE.-Payments pertaining to children and former spouses,
whether those payments constitute alimony, child support, property settlement,

or an equitable distribution or apportionment under state law, shall be includable in the gross income of the payee under this section and deductible by the
payor under section 215, or excludable from the gross income of the payee
under this section and nondeductible by the payor under section 215, as designated by the parties in a divorce or separation instrument or support instrument.
The divorce or separation instrument or support instrument may designate some
payments or portions of payments as includable in the gross income of the
payee and deductible by the payor and other payments or portions of payments
as excludable by the payee and not deductible by the payor.
(b) DEFAULT RULE.-Payments pertaining to children and former spouses that
the parties fail to designate in the divorce or separation instrument or support
instrument as either includable or excludable by the payee shall be includable
in the gross income of the payee under this section and deductible by the payor
under section 215 unless the payment is made to a third party on behalf of a
child of the payor, in which case the payment shall be excludable from the
gross income of the payee under this section and not deductible by the payor
under section 215.
(C) PAYMENTS PERTAINING TO CHILDREN AND FORMER SPOUSEs DEFINED.-For

pur-

poses of this section(1) INGENERAL.-The term "payments pertaining to children and former
spouses" means any payment in cash if(A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse under a
divorce or separation instrument or by a parent under a support instrument, 25 5 and
(B) the payee and the payor are not members of the same household
at the time such payment is made. 56
25

By these words, this section would also apply to a support decree that orders a biological father
to make
cash payments to the child's mother, whom he never married.
256
1n section 71, the requirement that the payor and payee not live in the same household is
required only in the case of "an individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance." I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(C). That is to say, this requirement does not
apply to individuals who simply enter into their own, private agreement, without supervision or
approval of a court, when they separate for a time in the hopes of eventually reconciling. The
thought is that requiring such individuals to cease living together in order to gain the advantages of

the inclusion/deduction system would discourage reconciliation. See generally Paul C. Feinbert &
Toni Robinson, A Household Is Not a Home: "'NotMembers of the Same Household" in the Tax
Treatment of Alimony Payments, 6 VA. TAX REV. 377 (1986) (generally discussing this requirement).
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(2) DIVORCE OR SEPARATION INSTRUMENT OR SUPPORT INSTRUMENT.-The term
"divorce or separation instrument" or "support instrument" means(A) a decree of divorce or written instrument incident to such a decree,
(B) a written separation agreement,

(C) a decree (not described in subparagraph (A)) requiring the payor
to make payments to the payee for the payee's benefit and/or the
2 7
benefit of the children of the payee and payor.

B. In-Kind Property Transfers
The rule enacted in section 1041 (a), that in-kind property transfers should be
nonrecognition events if the transfer is incident to divorce, turned out, in my
view, to be an overwhelming success. Moreover, I believe that it was the right
decision to resist the Task Force's tentative proposal that the nonrecognition rule
be made elective." 8 I believe that the valuation headaches that would arise if
non-marketplace transfers in divorce were deemed to be realization events more
than justifies a flat nonrecognition rule for such in-kind transfers. Valuation
litigation would no doubt explode if parties were given this option, with transferors
claiming low value for built-in gain property for purposes of measuring their
gain and transferees claiming high value for purposes of their fair-market-value
basis. Even if the parties were required to stipulate jointly to a single value in
order to elect out of nonrecognition treatment, the government might wish to
argue that the stipulated value is deflated (to generate less gain or a greater loss),
particularly if the transferee does not plan on selling the property and thus would
be willing to stipulate to a low value (and thus basis). In my view, this aspect of

I believe that under a system in which parties will be entitled to designate all cash payments as
includable/deductible payments, without limit, this flexibility must be sacrificed in order to prevent
happy couples who have no intention of actually separating from attempting to take advantage of the
inclusion/deduction system on a wholesale basis while continuing to live together, filing separate
returns. Subsection (e) of section 71 already prevents couples filing a joint return from taking
advantage of the inclusion/deduction system. This is the one area where the abuse potential could be
great. For this reason, I believe that couples should have to live apart to take advantage of the
inclusion/deduction system. That would mean that couples who continue to live in the same household, even in separate bedrooms, would not be entitled to take advantage of the inclusion/deduction
system for any payments made pursuant to a private agreement that they undertake together, but I
believe that such a restriction is nevertheless justified in view of the larger potential for abuse. The
justification for income-shifting is much less pungent in the case of a still-married couple, living in
the same household. The payments made from one spouse to another would still be taxed only once;
the only consequence of this rule would be that it would always be the payor that is taxed, with no
ability to choose to tax the payee instead. These temporary separations should, in any event, be selflimiting in time (assuming the couple reconciles or divorces within a year or two).
257
Conforming amendments would be required to be made to sections 61(a)(8) and 215, as well as
section 682, so that payments satisfied by the creation of a trust would effectively receive the same
treatment as would apply to direct payments under section 7 1. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Jr.,
Tax Aspects of Divorce and Separation, 32 FAM. L.Q. 221, 243-44 (1998) (describing alimony and

child
25 support trusts).

1See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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"private ordering" must give way to easy-to-administer rules in a transaction
like divorce, which affects so many individuals. And after all, the reduction in
flexibility is not terribly severe; if the transferor wishes recognition, he or she
may sell the property to a third party, which would provide a marketplace
transaction that resolves the valuation question, and then transfer the cash to the
transferee spouse.
While section 1041 has generally been a success, two serious issues nevertheless have arisen under it, both of which are addressed in the next section. The
first is whether the common-law, assignment-of-income doctrine trumps this
nonrecognition rule. The second is how stock redemptions in closely held corporations incident to divorce should be analyzed.
III. ISSUES UNDER SECTION 1041
A. The Assignment-of-Income Doctrine and Section 1041
Under the assignment-of-income doctrine,259 developed in such hoary cases as
Lucas v. Earl,2" Poe v. Seaborn,261 Commissioner v. Horst,262 Blair v. Commissioner,2 63 Harrison v. Schaffner,2" Commissioner v. Clifford,2 65 Commissioner v.
Eubank,"6 and others, the Supreme Court developed a common-law doctrine
that prevents the shifting of income for tax purposes from one taxpayer to
another in many circumstances-at least, in the absence of a nonrecognition
provision that would otherwise apply. Taken together, the cases might be summarized (if somewhat simplified) to mean that an assignor cannot shift the tax
burden with respect to income produced by a mechanism over which she retains
control. Because services income is created by one's body, it is just about
impossible to shift services income to another, since one cannot effectively give
up control over one's own body; the assignor can turn the income spigot on and
off at will by performing services or not. Thus, services income is essentially
always taxed to the person or entity who provided the services that earned the
income, whether the services income attempted to be assigned is already earned
or to be earned in the future.
For example, in Commissioner v. Earl,2 67 the Supreme Court held that a contract entered into between a married couple that required the husband, who was
the sole income earner, to share one-half of his earnings with his wife did not
operate to shift the tax burden of those earnings to his wife. This case was
decided at a time when all individuals, including married couples, were required
259

The description in the next two paragraphs was taken from Geier, Some Meandering Thoughts,
supra note 26, at 536-37.
260281 U.S. 111 (1930).
261282 U.S. 101 (1930).
262311 U.S. 112 (1940).
263300

U.S. 5 (1937).

26312 U.S. 579 (1941).
265309

U.S. 331 (1940).

266311 U.S. 122 (1940).
267281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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to file individual tax returns. If the Court had held otherwise, the resulting
income-splitting would have allowed the married couple to use the lowest marginal rate brackets twice, instead of once, thus lowering the couple's aggregate
tax liability.
During the same term, however, the Court also decided Poe v. Seaborn,265
which similarly dealt with a husband who was the sole breadwinner who attempted to split his income with his wife for tax-reporting purposes. Because the
state's community-property laws in that case considered the husband's earnings
to have been earned by the marital community, rather than solely by the husband, the court blessed the income-splitting in this context. Since the marital
community earned the income under state law, the marital community properly
reported it. Indeed, the differing treatment between married couples who could
not split their income under state law and those who could eventually prompted
the enactment of the joint-return option to, in essence, extend the advantages of
income-splitting to those not living in community-property states.269
The Poe v. Seaborn Court also held that the couple's return on investment
assets owned as community property should be split between them for purposes
of tax reporting.27 That is to say, just as services income is typically taxed to the
person or entity that earned it, income earned with respect to property is generally taxed to the person who owns the property (though the titleholder under
state law might not be considered the owner for tax purposes). Unlike one's own
body, the property owner can give up control over property producing income.
Thus, assignments of income from property can be successful for tax purposes if
the assignor gives up sufficient control over the property producing the income
to the assignee. The disputes in this area typically center around the issue of
whether sufficient control over the property producing the income was surrendered to the assignee.
The possible interrelationship between the assignment-of-income doctrine and
"
' The issue typically arises when a propsection 1041 has produced confusion.27
erty interest is transferred in divorce, and then cash, producing an ordinary
income inclusion, is subsequently received with respect to that interest by the
new owner. It also arises when compensation income already earned by one
spouse but not yet received or taxed is assigned in the divorce to the other
spouse. The question, as with alimony and child support, is which party must
include the income, i.e., which party's marginal rate bracket will control. For the
reasons described in Part II, very little revenue (if any) is at issue here, since the
government is once again merely a stakeholder.
If a property right is transferred and the income earned on that property is
considered as having been earned after the property transfer, the new owner

U.S. 101 (1930).
See generally Zelenak, supra note 11, at 344-48 (reviewing the history of the joint return).
270Poe, 282 U.S. at 112-13.
27
See generally Geier, Form, Substance and Section 1041, supra note 63 (generally discussing
this problem).
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must include the income under the assignment-of-income doctrine, as owner of
the property interest. This is an uncontroversial application of the doctrine originally created in Poe v. Seaborn. For example, in Kenflield v. United States,2 72 H
was a 50% partner in a partnership engaged in land sales, and the divorce decree
provided that W was entitled to one-half of H's partnership interest (i.e., a 25%
interest in the partnership). Because valuation was difficult, the court awarded
W 50% of all "future net proceeds received" by H with respect to his original
partnership interest. H duly paid over the amounts every year. The issue was
whether H must include the full 50% of the partnership's income on his own
return or whether H need include only 25%, with W including the remaining
25%, because of the court order vesting one-half of H's partnership interest
in W.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the transfer gave W ownership of one-half
of H's partnership interest, and thus W must include in her gross income the
income attributable to that property that accrued after the transfer. "After the
settlement, Kenfield did not own the asset that produced his ex-wife's share of
the 1977 post-divorce income, i.e., his ex-wife's half of the partnership income.
Kenfield thus also is not taxable on the partnership income earned by that
'
asset."273
If the court had concluded as a factual matter that W did not really
receive an interest in the partnership, but rather was merely compensated for her
marital interest in the partnership, then the results would likely have been different, as they would have been analyzed under sections 71 and 215. H would have
had to include the full 50% share of the partnership's profits on his own return,
and the installment payments received by W would (under current law, at least)
have been excludable by her and nondeductible by H, if H's obligation to make
the stream of payments would not terminate on W's death.274 (Under the proposals advanced in Part II, which obliterate the distinction between cash "alimony,"
"child support," and "property settlements," the parties would be free to designate whether cash payments incident to divorce are includable/deductible or
excludable/nondeductible.)
But what if a property interest is transferred but the income subsequently
received by the new property owner accrued prior to the transfer? Or what if
accrued-but-not-yet-taxed compensation income is assigned to the other spouse?
If the income is considered as accruing prior to the property transfer, and particularly if the income is attributable to the personal services of the transferor,

272783
273

F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1986).

1d. at 968; see also Schulze v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 143, 1983 T.C.M. (RIA) 1
83,263. (holding that W was taxable on one-half of the amounts collected on a claim arising from
W's
one-half interest in husband's law partnership received by W in divorce).
274
See, e.g., P.L.R. 1991-23-053 (Mar. 13, 1991) (concluding that, because the divorce instrument
did not give W a 50% interest in H's business, but rather only required H to make cash payments to
compensate W for her interest in his business, the payments were excludable by W and nondeductible by H, since W's payment rights would not terminate on her death). Accord P.L.R. 1991-43-050
(July 26, 1991) (concluding that W did not receive an interest in certain patent lawsuits that H was
prosecuting at the time of their divorce but rather only cash payments representing an excludable
cash property settlement since her payment rights would not terminate on death).
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then the government sometimes argues that the income, even though received
and consumed by the transferee spouse, must be included by the transferor
spouse under the assignment-of-income doctrine, notwithstanding section 1041,
a practice excoriated by Professor Michael Asimow in his definitive article on
the topic." 5 Professor Asimow calls these "sensitive assets," and they include
accounts receivable of an unincorporated, cash-basis, service business; an interest in a partnership that holds unrealized receivables or contracts to render
personal services in the future; rights to royalties; and investment assets with
276
accrued but not-yet-recognized income.
277
For example, in Kochansky v. Commissioner,
the government argued, and
both the Tax Court and Ninth Circuit agreed, that Mr. Kochansky, a lawyer,
must include in gross income the portion of a contingent fee in a medical
malpractice action that was pending at the time of the divorce and that the
divorce decree required to be paid to his ex-wife, because the income was
earned by the personal services of Mr. Kochansky.
Probably the most common type of accrued income subject to assignment-ofincome arguments is deferred compensation income, such as retirement savings,
that is not subject to a "qualified domestic relations order" (QDRO). There is no
question about who gets taxed on pension benefits that are covered by a valid
QDRO, which was created in section 414(p) as part of the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984.278 Prior to creation of the QDRO, it was possible to split pension
assets in a divorce, but the court order was directed at the spouse with the
pension, rather than at the pension plan itself. For example, H might have been
ordered by the court to pay one-half of his monthly pension payments to W
when he began to receive them-perhaps 20 years in the future. If H died before
retirement, W received nothing. Under section 414(p), in contrast, the pension
plan administrator is the subject of the court order, and W receives vested rights.
The administrator is ordered to treat W in our scenario just as if she were a plan
participant. While the primary purpose of the QDRO was to recognize these
pension assignments27 9 and to protect W's interest in the plan, even if H should
pre-decease W, the provisions also ensure that W, as the "alternate payee" under
a QDRO, is taxed on the payments when ultimately paid by the pension, not
280
H.
QDRO's can apply only to defined benefit and defined contribution plans
such as 401(k) and profit-sharing plans. They cannot apply to individual retirement accounts (IRAs) or other kinds of deferred compensation arrangements,

275Michael Asimow, The Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and Assignment of Income,
6 44 TAX L. REV. 65 (1988).
27See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 1987-112, 1987-2 C.B. 207 (holding that accrued interest on U.S. savings
bonds was taxed to the transferor notwithstanding section 1041).
27792 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1996), affg 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2665, 1994 T.C.M. (RIA) T 94,160.
17'Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-397, § 204, 98 Stat. 1445 (1984).
279See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
2
S°See, e.g., P.L.R. 1988-37-013 (June 7, 1988). See generally Notice 1997-11, 1997-2 I.R.B. 30
(sample QDRO text and detailed instructions and explanations of the use of QDROs).
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though section 408(d)(6) provides similar treatment for IRA transfers in divorce.
It is with respect to other, so-called nonqualified arrangements that the government has argued, albeit inconsistently, that transfers of rights to receive income
(or surrenders of community property interests in such income) cannot shift the
burden of including the income that has already accrued. That is to say, in our
situation in which H transfers to W rights to future payments that represent H's
accrued interest in deferred compensation that cannot qualify for a QDRO (considered owned solely by him in a common-law state), the government might
argue that, even though W receives the cash, H is taxed when W receives the
cash years later.
28
For example, in Darby v. Commissioner,
' a case pre-dating adoption of the
QDRO, the divorce court ordered Mr. Darby to assign to his ex-wife a $75,000
portion of his vested interest in a qualified plan that could today qualify for a
QDRO, a profit-sharing fund of his employer. The $75,000 amount was one-half
of the estimated value of Mr. Darby's interest in the plan at the time of the
divorce. The court ordered that the $75,000 payment should be made as follows:
$60 per week until Mr. Darby died or retired, the balance due paid in a lump
sum at that time. The decree also provided that Mr. Darby "shall notify said
Fund of the above Assignment, and the Assignment, or this Judgment in lieu
thereof, may be recorded in the County Register of Deeds or appropriate office,
'
wherein the Fund is located so as to give notice of the same."282
Mr. Darby
complied by submitting a document to the plan informing the plan administrators of the court-ordered assignment and attaching a copy of the court's order.
Mr. Darby paid a total of $22,030 in installments toward the $75,000 total
before he retired, and the profit-sharing plan paid him a lump sum of more than
$182,000 at that time. A few days later, he wrote a check to Ms. Darby for the
$52,970 that represented her remaining interest in the plan.
While Mr. Darby did not deduct the prior $60 weekly payments as "alimony,"
he did not include $75,000 of the lump-sum distribution that he received upon
his retirement, arguing that the divorce decree and court order resulted in a legal
transfer of $75,000 of his interest in the profit-sharing plan to his ex-wife. The
government made both a statutory argument and an argument under the common-law assignment-of-income doctrine in concluding that Mr. Darby was not
entitled to exclude $75,000. The statutory argument was that only Mr. Darby
could qualify as a "distributee" within the meaning of section 402(a)(1), who is
the person required to include in gross income amounts deferred under a qualified pension plan. The government further argued that, even if the plan had paid
the $75,000 directly to Ms. Darby, "the payment was compensation for services
rendered by petitioner and, as such, is taxable to him under the assignment of
income doctrine. '283 The Tax Court agreed on both counts.

28

97 T.C. 51 (1991).
1d. at 54.
2
11ld. at 57.
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1
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Another instance in which the government raised the assignment-of-income
doctrine, but this time eventually lost before the Tax Court, began as a private
letter ruling request in 1987.284 W's marriage was dissolved in a communityproperty state in December of 1981. At that time, the Supreme Court's ruling in
McCarty v. McCarty285 was in effect, which held that a military spouse's retirement benefit was that spouse's separate property in community-property states
and thus not subject to division as part of the community property. Pursuant to
the McCarty decision, the divorce decree stated that H's military retirement plan
was the separate property of H. The McCarty decision was subsequently overruled by statute in the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act.286 W
moved to modify the divorce decree to recognize her interest in H's military
retirement plan and then agreed to relinquish her claim in exchange for three
payments by H: $15,000 in 1986, $14,000 in 1987, and $13,000 in 1988. W
requested a ruling that the payments were nontaxable transfers under section
1041 (since they would fail to satisfy the stop-at-death requirement for includable "alimony").
The ruling concluded that, because the interest surrendered by W was a right
to future income already earned under the community-property laws, the surrender constituted an impermissible assignment of income by her. The payments
from H to W were thus includable in W's gross income in the year received,
notwithstanding that they failed to qualify as tax "alimony" under section 71.
The ruling stated that "[W] cannot escape the taxation of ordinary income by
recharacterizing her assignment of the income as a nontaxable transfer of property under section 1041(a)."287 The government argued, in essence, that one
could never surrender the tax consequences of a community-property interest in
deferred compensation. It argued that whatever one received in exchange for the
interest was taxable at that time, whether or not the receipt qualified as "alimony."
The taxpayer then went to the Tax Court, which ruled in her favor in Balding
v. Commissioner.88 The Tax Court concluded that the cash payments to W were
"property" within the meaning of section 1041, and thus excludable, notwithstanding the argument made by the government that the assignment-of-income
doctrine required taxation of the three payments made to W. In a footnote, the
Tax Court expressly declined to rule on whether W would be taxable under the
assignment-of-income doctrine in future years when actual payments were made
under the plan to H, but it cited Professor Asimow's article "[ffor an argument
that petitioner is not required, under the Assignment of Income Doctrine, to take
into income any portion of the retirement benefits .
289

2

P.L.R. 1988-13-023 (Dec. 29, 1987).

8See

285453
286

U.S. 210 (1981).

Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982).
P.L.R. 1988-13-023 (Dec. 29, 1987).
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T.C. 368 (1992).

1d. at 373 n.8.
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The government's inconsistency in this arena can be explored by examining
another private letter ruling,2 90 which also involved a couple who lived in a
community-property state and which was issued in 1989. This ruling was issued
after the ruling that was litigated in Balding but before the Balding case itself
was decided. The couple owned two IRAs: one for the sole benefit of H and one
for the sole benefit of W. In a transaction not related to a divorce, they executed
a written agreement that transmuted the IRAs from community property to separate property, under which W transmuted her community-property interest in
H's IRA to the separate property of H, and H transmuted his community-property interest in W's IRA, as well as some additional assets to even up the deal, to
the separate property of W. The government concluded that section 1041 applied
and prevented the recognition of any gain by either party, even though each
received valuable property for their community-property interests in deferred
compensation that they each surrendered. The ruling quoted the legislative history of section 1041 that emphasized that the section extends literally to all
transfers between spouses. There was no mention of the assignment-of-income
doctrine.
Not only is this ruling inconsistent with the government's position in the prior
ruling that led to Balding, where it argued that whatever value is received for a
surrender of a community-property interest in deferred compensation is taxable,
notwithstanding section 1041, it was also inconsistent with the position taken in
a yet another ruling issued just the year before in 1988.291 In that ruling, H
proposed to transfer an undivided one-half interest in an IRA to the IRA of his
spouse, W. As in the 1989 ruling described above, the transfer was not in
contemplation of divorce. No mention was made regarding whether the state in
which H and W resided was a community-property state. H requested a ruling
that the transfer would not be considered a taxable distribution from his IRA
subject to inclusion in H's gross income under section 408(d)(1).
Section 408(d)(6) provides that a transfer of an individual's interest in an IRA
to a spouse or former spouse under a divorce or separation instrument is not to
be considered a taxable transfer, notwithstanding any other provision, and that
the transferred interest is to be considered owned by the transferee. That provision was originally introduced as part of ERISA in 1974, a time when Davis
made many such transfers taxable. The section was not repealed when section
1041 was introduced in 1984; in fact, a technical correction was made to it in the
same act to delete a reference to the obsolete "qualified retirement bonds" repealed by the 1984 Act.
The government interpreted section 408(d)(6) as limiting nonrecognition for
interspousal transfers of IRAs to the divorce context. It did so by citing the rule
of statutory construction that a specific rule (section 408(d)(6)) controls over a
general one (section 1041(a)) and by citing the decision by Congress to retain

2

90P.L.R. 1989-29-046 (Apr. 25, 1989).
P.L.R. 1988-20-086 (Feb. 25, 1988).
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section 408(d)(6) when it enacted section 1041(a) as evidence that Congress
intended that section 408(d)(6) nonrecognition be limited to the divorce context.
The negative implication, it argued, was that transfers during marriage are not
subject to nonrecognition treatment. Thus, the government ruled against H.
How can these two rulings, only a year apart, be reconciled? There are several
possibilities: (1) The government changed its position between the two rulings
regarding whether nonrecognition can apply to IRA transfers only in divorce;
(2) the authors of the two rulings did not communicate; 29 2 or (3) the government
believes that the two situations are substantively different because the one in
which it ruled the transfer to be taxable involved the transfer of record title while
the one in which it ruled the transfer not to be taxable involved only the surrender of a community-property interest to the record titleholder. That last view is
the most troubling, as it reintroduces the distinction between community-property states and states with laws "similar to community property" on the one
hand, and other states on the other hand-a distinction that Congress clearly
intended to obliterate with the enactment of section 1041. Furthermore, the view
lends inordinate distinction to whether there is a transfer of record title instead of
merely a surrender of an interest in community property. Perhaps more to the
point, the government does not always heed that distinction, as we saw in Balding, since it argued there that the mere surrender by W of her communityproperty interest in exchange for cash payments resulted in taxation to W of
those cash payments.
The confusion deepens further when we return to reconsider the Kochansky
decision with this discussion of the impact of community-property law in mind.
Recall that Kochansky was the case in which the Tax Court and Ninth Circuit
held that the lawyer husband's contingent fee in a medical malpractice case,
which was pending at the time of the divorce proceedings, was taxable entirely
to the husband, even though the divorce decree required that he pay one-half of
the fee to his ex-wife when received. As Ms. Sarah Dods noted,293 the taxpayers
in Kochansky lived in Idaho, a community-property state, where even earned
income is permissibly split by a married couple for tax purposes under Poe v.
Seaborn.294 How could Mr. Kochansky possibly be considered to have impermissibly shifted income to his ex-wife that, by definition, would have been
required to be included by her under Poe v. Seaborn? In Johnson v. United
States, 295 for example, W had a vested right to one-half of her husband's income
under community-property law that was earned prior to their divorce. In the
divorce settlement, she assigned her community-property interest in this accrued
292

The author of Private Letter Ruling 1988-20-086 (Feb. 25, 1988) was Allen Katz, Chief, Employee Plans, Ruling Branch, while the author of Private Letter Ruling 1989-29-046 (Apr. 25, 1989)
was William A. Galanko, Assistant Chief Counsel (Income Tax and Accounting), Acting Chief,
Branch 6.
293
See Sarah Dods, Note & Comment, Kochansky v. Commissioner: The Assignment of Income
Doctrine, Community Property Law, and I.R.C. § 1041, 72 WASH. L. REV. 873 (1997).
294
See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
295135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943); see Dods, supra note 293, at 881.
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income to H. When H collected the accrued fees after their divorce, the Johnson
court held that W was taxable on one-half of them under Poe v. Seaborn. The
Kochansky case is also consistent with the government's own conclusion in the
private letter ruling described earlier, eventually litigated in Balding,296 in which
the government argued that any cash received in exchange for relinquishing a
community property interest is includable by the recipient, in this case, Mrs.
Kochansky. So how could Kochansky come out differently?
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the medical malpractice case generating the fee was not settled until after the divorce, so that the income could be
considered as accruing at least partly, if not entirely, after the divorce, which
would mean that the earned income was the separate property of the husband,
not the community property of the marital unit.297 Under that scenario, Mr.
Kochansky would have to include the full amount, but then the cash payment to
Ms. Kochansky should be analyzed under the income-shifting system of sections
71 and 215, but it was not. If (under current law) the payment obligation would
not have disappeared if Ms. Kochansky had died prior to settlement of the suit
and payment to her of her portion of the contingent fee, i.e., if we assume that
her estate would have had the right to sue for payment if she had pre-deceased
the payment, then the payment would not qualify as alimony under current law.
Therefore the cash receipt by Ms. Kochansky would be excludable by her and
not deductible by Mr. Kochansky (and thus taxable to him) in any event. But
this was not the analysis undertaken by the Kochansky court.
In other words, the assignment-of-income doctrine should not have been raised
in any event. If, on the one hand, the income was considered earned prior to the
divorce, Ms. Kochansky would properly have been taxed on her one-half interest under Poe and Johnson, since she would have been considered to have
earned that one-half under community-property law. If, on the other hand, the
income was considered earned after the divorce, so that it was the separate
property of Mr. Kochansky, then it would have been a plain-vanilla cash payment of post-divorce earnings that should have been analyzed under sections 71
and 215, where income-shifting is clearly permissible and contemplated, so long
as the requirements for tax "alimony" are satisfied. Recall that the "labels"
applied to such cash payments for state law purposes (whether "alimony" or
"property settlement") are irrelevant for purposes of the federal income tax
analysis applicable to such cash payments.
But even if this analysis is correct, this reasoning once again reintroduces the
very distinction between community-property states and common-law states that
was clearly intended to be obliterated by the 1984 amendments, since the outcome under community-property law if the income is considered as accruing
prior to the divorce can be different, under assignment-of-income norms, than
under noncommunity-property law. Moreover, it would require, in community-

2
"See
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supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
See Dods, supra note 293, at 880 n.49.
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property states, an analysis in situations like that in Kochansky of how much of
the contingent fee was earned prior to the divorce (and thus was community
property taxable in part to Mrs. Kochansky) and how much was earned after
(and thus was the separate property of Mr. Kochansky). This would undermine
the purpose of Congress's actions in the 1984 Act, as Ms. Dods observed:
When Congress expressed a desire to make the tax laws "as unintrusive as
possible with respect to relations between spouses" [quoting the 1984 legislative history accompanying enactment of section 1041], it had in mind a broad,
simple rule under which spouses could easily determine, by the structure of
their property settlement, who would bear the latent tax burdens of the marital
assets distributed at divorce, regardless of variations in state property law.298
Finally, Ms. Dods noted that the Kochansky decision, accepting the
government's argument that the assignment-of-income doctrine trumps section
1041, is inconsistent with other Tax Court decisions, such as Balding, rejecting
it.299 She also argued that the doctrine is inconsistent with the purposes underlying section 1041.30 She is right.
The latest foray by the Service into this morass is found in a Field Service
Advice3°' that deals with the transfer of nonqualified stock options in divorce.
Although the ruling provided no numbers, let me use some simple ones for
illustration. Assume that the corporation for which H works transfers to him, as
part of his compensation package, stock options at no charge. Assume further
that H is not taxed on the receipt of the options under section 83, because the
options do not have a "readily ascertainable fair market value" at that time. 02 H
thus takes a zero basis in the options. If H were to exercise the options for a
strike price that is less than the fair market value of the stock, he would include,
as ordinary compensation income, the spread. For example, if H were able to
exercise the options for $100 at a time when the stock had a fair market value of
$150, H would include $50 of ordinary compensation income at that time under
section 83(a). °3 If H were instead to sell the options for cash in an arm's-length
transaction, the difference between H's zero basis in the options and the sales
price would produce ordinary compensation income for H, and he would realize

298
1d.
2

at 898.
91d. at 889. For example, she described the Tax Court decision in Schulze v. Commissioner,46
T.C.M. (CCH) 143, 1983 T.C.M. (RIA) 83,263, in which a couple agreed to split any proceeds
resulting from a pending legal claim of the husband. The Tax Court held that the husband was not
taxable on the portion of the proceeds received with respect to the claim that were paid to his ex-wife
pursuant to the divorce agreement. See also id. at 888-89 (discussing other inconsistent Tax Court
opinions).
3
001d. at 896-98.
301
F.S.A. 2000-05-006 (Feb. 4, 2000).
3 2
° Few stock options are taxed on receipt, as the standards for determining whether stock options
have a "readily ascertainable fair market value" are quite stringent. Options that are not actively
traded on an established market are deemed not to have a "readily ascertainable fair market value"
on receipt "unless its fair market value can otherwise be measured with reasonable accuracy." Reg.

§ 1.83-7(b)(2).
3 3

See Reg. § 1.83-7(a).
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no further tax consequences when the option buyer exercised the option." n Thus,
for example, if H sold the options in an arm's-length transaction for $50 (because the strike price was $100 and the fair market value of the stock was $150),
he would similarly include $50 of ordinary compensation income at the time of
sale. He would realize no further tax consequences if the buyer were able to
exercise the option for $100 at a time when the stock had a fair market value of,
say, $175.
What happens if H and W divorce and their divorce decree requires H to
transfer these unexercised stock options to W at a time when the strike price is
$100 and the fair market value of the stock is $150? In the field service advice,
the Service concluded that H realizes $50 of consideration on the transfer under
the Davis approach of assuming that the release of marital rights by W has a
value to H equal to the value of the options transferred to W. The ruling concludes that the $50 of cash deemed received by H results in $50 of ordinary
income to H under section 83 at the time of the transfer. W would take a $50
basis in the options. If she were to exercise the options for $100, she would take
a $150 basis in the stock, and H would realize no tax consequences at the time
of exercise. In other words, the Service determined that the same rules that
would apply to H if he were to sell the options to an unrelated third party for $50
cash apply when H transfers the options to W pursuant to a divorce decree.
The Service rejected the argument that section 1041 prevents this result by
once again asserting that the assignment-of-income doctrine trumps section 1041.
Moreover, in support of this position, it cited the private letter ruling discussed
earlier that concluded that when W surrenders her community-property interest
in a pension plan in exchange for cash payments, the cash payments received
from H are includable in her gross income, notwithstanding section 1041.305 The
Service neglected to mention that the taxpayer who requested the ruling and
received an unfavorable result then went to the Tax Court, which in Balding v.
Commissioner agreed with her that the transaction was, indeed, a nontaxable one
under section 1041 ! According to the Service:
Although private letter rulings may not be cited as precedent, [P.L.R. 1988-13023], involving a military pension[,] again illustrates [the] Service position. In
this ruling a divorce originally awarded the pension entirely to H because the
Supreme Court had held in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981)[,] that
military pensions could not be treated as community property. After Congress
overruled McCarty, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982), the state enacted a statute providing for the reopening of divorce decrees so that military pensions could be
treated as community property. H then purchased W's community property
interest in the pension by agreeing to pay her cash in three annual installments.
The ruling held that W must include the cash in income at the time she receives
it. . . . [Tihe Service declared W [had] in effect assigned to H her right to
receive payments over H's lifetime in exchange for payments from H over
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Reg. § 1.83-7(a).
See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 55, No. 2

SECTION OF TAXATION

three years. W could not escape the taxation of ordinary income by
recharacterizing her assignment of income as a nontaxable transfer of property
under section 1041 .36
There is simply no mention of the subsequent Balding litigation, in which the
Service's position was rejected. In other words, the Service cited, in effect, its
litigating position in a case that it lost in support of its conclusion in the field
service advice! The Service also cited another private letter ruling, 07 which it
asserted "contains broad dictum stating that assignment-of-income principles
override section 1041 ."38
All of this inconsistency and confusion is completely unwarranted and unnecessary. First, the assignment-of-income doctrine did not grow up in contexts
involving statutory nonrecognition rules. Which should control in cases of overlap, if indeed there is considered to be an overlap? In no other nonrecognition
context-except section 1041, and even there we have seen that the record is
quite inconsistent-has the assignment-of-income doctrine been held to trump a
specific nonrecognition rule created by Congress. The argument has been raised
in at least one other nonrecognition context, but the Third Circuit held that the
nonrecognition rule should take precedence.
In Hempt Brothers, Inc. v. United States,3" a partnership using the cash method
of accounting transferred all of its business assets, including its accounts receivables and payables, to a newly formed corporation in exchange for all of its
stock. Each of the requirements of section 351 were satisfied on the transfer,
which meant that none of the built-in gain or loss in the transferred assets,
including the difference between the fair market value of the receivables and
their zero basis, was recognized on the transfer. The issue was whether, notwithstanding the nonrecognition rule in section 351, the partnership should be taxed
on the ordinary income collected by the corporation with respect to the transferred accounts receivables under the assignment-of-income doctrine. The Third
Circuit rejected that argument, concluding that the policies underlying the nonrecognition rule in section 351 would be frustrated if the assignment-of-income
doctrine were applied.
If the assignment-of-income doctrine is thought to be inconsistent with the
nonrecognition rule in section 351, it should surely be held to be inconsistent
with the nonrecognition rule in section 1041, since Congress evidenced an intent
that the nonrecognition rule in the latter have even greater depth than thought
appropriate in other nonrecognition contexts. In transfers under section 351, for
example, the nonrecognition rule does not apply to the extent that the property
that is transferred is subject to a debt in excess of the property's basis or was
encumbered with debt on the eve of the transfer in an attempt to cash out the

3

06F.S.A.

307
P.L.R.
30

2000-05-006 (Feb. 4, 2000).

1988-42-072 (July 29, 1988).
F.S.A. 2000-05-006 (Feb. 4, 2000).
3-490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1974).
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property's value while shifting the obligation to repay the loan to the transferee.310 The 1984 House Report accompanying enactment of section 1041 explicitly recognized that such exceptions should not apply in the context of transfers
under section 1041. "This nonrecognition rule applies whether the transfer is for
the relinquishment of marital rights, for cash or other property, for the assumption of liabilities in excess of basis, or for other consideration and is intended to
apply to any indebtedness which is discharged."' This intent shows the depth
of section 1041 compared even to other nonrecognition provisions.
Second, the assignment-of-income doctrine is an anti-avoidance tool intended
to ferret out and prevent inappropriate "income-shifting." Income-shifting that
would be considered a mortal sin elsewhere in the tax realm, however, simply
should not be considered improper in the context of divorce, for the reasons
elaborated upon throughout this article, and specifically should not be considered improper under section 1041. After divorce, a couple is no longer a unit,
where the person who earned the services income or owned the property that
accrued investment income can retain effective control and enjoyment of the
income while having it taxed at a lower rate. Furthermore, there will be no
revenue loss unless the person who receives and enjoys the income is in a lower
bracket than the transferor. Finally, and most importantly, section 1041 (as well
as sections 71 and 215, for that matter) contemplates and condones incomeshifting on its face. It was the Davis rule, under which built-in gain that accrued
prior to the divorce had to be recognized by the property transferor rather than
being shifted to the transferee, that prevented shifting. Under the nonrecognition
rule of section 1041, in contrast, any built-in gain that accrued prior to the
transfer is not recognized by the transferor but rather is shifted to the transferee,
to be recognized by her when realized. The shifting of ordinary income accompanying property in this context is not different in kind from the shifting of
built-in gain. Indeed, the shifting of ordinary income not accompanying property
is clearly contemplated and condoned in sections 71 and 215, and there can be
no logical reason to impose a different rule with respect to an ordinary income
interest accompanying a property interest-especiallysince any built-in gain or
loss in the property itself is explicitly shifted to the transferee under section
1041. In short, the assignment-of-income doctrine should be viewed as being
fundamentally inconsistent with section 1041, not trumping it. Certainty should
attach to the form the parties negotiate between themselves, a form that they
understandably believe will dictate the tax consequences. Therefore, I recommend that a new Treasury Regulation be issued to confirm that the assignmentof-income doctrine does not trump section 1041.
Would such a new regulation be invalid as inconsistent with Congressional
intent, as evidenced by the enactment of the QDRO option in one context in

31
See
3t1

1.R.C. § 357(b), (c).
H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1492 (1984). Cf Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2 (providing that the excess of
liability relief over liability assumed in a like-kind exchange of property otherwise qualifying for
nonrecognition under section 1031 will be considered "boot" that triggers gain recognition).
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which the assignment-of-income doctrine has otherwise been raised, as evidenced in Darby?312 In other words, do the QDRO amendments carry with them
the negative implication that the assignment-of-income doctrine continues to
apply as the background rule in divorce, since it was overturned only in the
context of a QDRO in connection with qualified plan assignments?
This problem of the "negative implication" in statutory interpretation is a
common one. When Congress amends the law in one specific context, many
argue that Congress must have intended just the opposite rule with respect to all
other contexts not covered by the legislation. Might it not be just as reasonable,
however, to argue that such shifting was permissible in other contexts prior to
the adoption of the statutory mechanism and that Congress merely had to clarify
the mechanism by which the shifting was to occur in the context of qualified
pension plans because of the specific statutory language at issue defining the
"distributee"? This argument is particularly persuasive because the QDRO involves only qualified pension plans, which were subject to anti-alienation rules
imposed by ERISA in 1974-the so-called spendthrift provisions-that prevented plan participants from assigning away their interests in the plan to other
parties, as Mr. Darby attempted to do. This handicap does not apply to other
kinds of income assignments, so Congress did not need to clear away any
obstacles in any other context-only in the context of qualified plan assignments. To accomplish the income-shifting in the qualified plan context that
arguably was already permissible in other contexts under section 1041, Congress
had to amend the law in order to provide that alienation in divorce was permissible, notwithstanding the ERISA spendthrift provisions, and that the transferee
should be provided all of the protections provided to the original plan participant. This seemed to be the primary purpose of the QDRO legislation, as indicated by its legislative history:
IN GENERAL
The bill clarifies the spendthrift provisions by providing new rules for the
treatment of certain domestic relations orders. In addition, the bill creates an
exception to the ERISA preemption provisions with respect to these orders. The
bill also provides procedures to be followed by a plan administrator (including
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)) and an alternate payee (a
child, spouse, former spouse, or other dependent of a participant) with respect
to domestic relations orders.
Under the bill, if a domestic relations order requires the distribution of all or a
part of a participant's plan benefits under a qualified plan to an alternate payee,
then the creation, recognition, or assignment of the alternate payee's right to the
benefits is not considered an assignment or alienation of benefits under the plan
if and only if the order is a qualified domestic relations order ....

3 2

t See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
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PRESENT LAW
Generally, under present law, benefits under a pension, profit-sharing, or stock
bonus plan (pension plan) are subject to prohibitions against assignment or
alienation (spendthrift provisions) .

. .

. A plan that does not include these

required spendthrift provisions is not a qualified plan under the Code, and State
law permitting such an assignment or alienation is generally preempted by
ERISA.
Several cases have arisen in which courts have been required to determine
whether the ERISA preemption and spendthrift provisions apply to family support obligations (e.g., alimony, separate maintenance, and child support obligations). In some of these cases, the courts have held that ERISA was not intended
to preempt State domestic relations law permitting the attachment of vested
benefits for the purpose of meeting these obligations. Some courts have held
that the ERISA preemption provision does not prevent application of State law
permitting attachment of nonvested benefits for the purpose of meeting family
support obligations. There is a divergence of opinion among the courts as to
whether ERISA preempts state community property laws insofar as they relate
to the rights of a married couple to benefits under a pension, etc., plan.
The [Service] has rules that the spendthrift provisions are not violated when a
plan trustee complies with a court order requiring the distribution of benefits of
a participant in pay status to the participant's spouse or children in order to
meet the participant's alimony or child support obligations. The [Service] has
not taken any position with respect to this issue in cases in which the participant's
benefits are not in pay status.
REASONS FOR CHANGE
The committee believes that the spendthrift rules should be clarified by creating
a limited exception that permits benefits under a pension, etc., plan to be
divided under certain circumstances. In order to provide rational rules for plan
administrators, the committee believes it is necessary to establish guidelines for
determining whether the exception to the spendthrift rules applies. In addition,
the committee believes that conforming changes to the ERISA preemption
provision are necessary to ensure that only those orders that are excepted from
313
the spendthrift provisions are not preempted by ERISA.
This legislative history makes it clear that the reason why Congress had to act
was because the plans involved were qualified pension plans subject to ERISA's
spendthrift and preemption provisions. The amendments were necessary in order
to carve out assignments in divorce from the statutory restrictions that otherwise
prohibited such assignments. In other words, the statute itself, not the assignment-of-income doctrine, prevented the transferees from gaining a property interest in the transferor's qualified pension plan interest, since the statute defined
the "distributee" who must include qualified plan distributions in gross income
to be the service provider who earned the income. In short, the statutory amend-

13s.

REP. No. 98-575, at 18-19, reprinted in 1984-2 C.B. 447, 456.
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ments creating the QDRO (so that the Mr. Darbys of the world can now avoid
taxation on qualified plan distributions to their ex-spouses under a QDRO) do
not mean that the assignment-of-income doctrine otherwise should be considered to trump section 1041 in contexts not involving qualified pension plans. If
anything, the QDRO legislation implies that Congress felt it necessary to act to
bring assignments of qualified plan interests into conformity with assignments
of other kinds of accrued income interests that presumably succeeded in shifting
the tax obligation to the transferee under section 1041.
In short, I believe that Treasury has the power to issue the regulation proposed
below even without any statutory amendment to section 1041. All it takes is the
political will. Nevertheless, I recommend that Congress enact new section 1041(0
to provide that "the assignment-of-income doctrine developed at common law
shall not apply to transfers of income rights incident to divorce" in order to
ensure that Treasury issues the required guidance. I want to make clear, however, that statutory amendment is not, in my view, a necessary prerequisite for
issuance of the proposed regulation.
The regulation might look something like this:
§ 1.1041-x. The Assignment-of-Income Doctrine and Section 1041.-(a) In
General. The assignment-of-income doctrine developed at common law by the
courts, which generally provides that compensation income is taxed to the
service provider, and that property income is taxed to the property owner, even
if the rights to receive the services or property income are assigned to another,
shall not apply to transfers of such income rights incident to divorce. The
assignment-of-income doctrine can apply to transfers between spouses that are
314
not incident to divorce, unaffected by section 1041.

34
The assignment-of-income doctrine should continue to apply to transfers between spouses who
are not in the process of divorce but who nevertheless file separate tax returns under section 1(d).
The proposed regulation assumes that section 1041 will continue to apply both to transfers during
marriage, as well as transfers incident to divorce. An equally justifiable approach, however, would
be to amend section 1041 to repeal its applicability to transfers during marriage that are not incident
to divorce. If that were done, this second sentence of the proposed regulation would not be necessary.
Amending section 1041 in this manner would make sense for two reasons. First, nonrecognition of
gain is not justifiable in the case of sales for valuable consideration. For example, assume that John
owns a business that supplies other businesses with office supplies. Mary, his wife, opens a new
business as a sole proprietor and purchases office supplies from her husband's business. There is no
good reason why John's gain on the sale of office supplies to Mary should garner nonrecognition
treatment, but it does under current section 1041. Spouses attempting to recognize built-in losses
without selling the property to a third party, but rather to each other, would be prevented from doing
so by section 267. Second, other transfers between spouses, i.e., gifts, do not need section 1041 to
gamer nonrecognition treatment, because gifts are not generally realization events. Indeed, having
section 1041 apply to transfers that are gifts injects a discontinuity between spousal gifts and gifts
among others, because the basis rules are different if the gifted property has a built-in loss. Under
section 1041, the transferee spouse takes a carryover basis in all cases, even when the gifted property
has a built-in loss at the time of the gift. Gifts of loss property between others, in contrast, are
saddled with the basis rule in section 1015(a), which provides that the transferee, for purposes of
calculating later gain or loss on a transfer of the gifted property, uses the lower of carryover basis or
the fair market value at the time of the gift. This lower-of-basis-or-value rule prevents the shifting of
built-in losses to someone (presumably a family member) who is in a higher tax bracket and can thus
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(b) Examples. The following examples illustrate this paragraph.
Example 1. H is a lawyer who uses the cash method of accounting and
who is owed $50,000 under a contingent-fee contract for services already rendered. H and W divorce, and their divorce settlement requires that one-half of
any money recovered under H's contingent-fee contract be paid to W. H receives the $50,000 owed to him under the contract and pays $25,000 to W. The
assignment-of-income doctrine does not require that H must include the entire
$50,000 in gross income. H must include $25,000 in gross income, and W must
include $25,000 in gross income.
Example 2. W, who uses the cash method of accounting, enters into a
nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement with her employer, such as a
so-called rabbi trust arrangement. At the time of her divorce with H, $50,000 of
compensation income has been earned under the arrangement but has not yet
been received by or included by W in her gross income. Under the terms of the
divorce decree, W must pay one-half of the compensation accrued at the time
of the divorce, or $25,000, to H when her right to distribution under the arrangement ripens. Several years later, W receives $100,000 under the terms of
the rabbi trust and pays $25,000 to H. The assignment-of-income doctrine does
not require that W must include the entire $100,000 in gross income. W must
include $75,000 in gross income, and H must include $25,000 in gross income.
See section 414(p) regarding assignments of interests in qualified plans.
Example 3. W, who uses the cash method of accounting, enters into a
nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement with her employer, such as a
so-called rabbi trust arrangement. At the time of her divorce with H, $50,000 of
compensation income has been earned under the arrangement but has not yet
been received by or included by W in her gross income. Under the communityproperty laws in the state in which H and W live, H would have a right to onehalf of the compensation accrued at the time of their divorce, or $25,000, when
the money is distributed to W several years later. Under the terms of their
divorce decree, W pays H $10,000 immediately at the time of the divorce in
exchange for his agreement to forego his rights under state law to collect in the
future any amount with respect to W's deferred compensation arrangement.
The assignment-of-income doctrine does not require that H include the $10,000
received in gross income. Rather, H's $10,000 receipt will be analyzed under
sections 71 and 215.
Example 4. H receives from his employer nonqualified stock options that
do not have a readily ascertainable fair market value and thus are not includable
in his gross income as compensation at the time of receipt. Under the terms of
their divorce decree, H transfers these options to W at a time when the strike
price is $100 and the fair market value of the stock is $150. Neither the assignment-of-income doctrine nor section 83 requires that H must include $50 in his

enjoy more value from the loss deduction. Allowing spouses to take a carryover basis in all cases,
even with loss property, allows just such a shifting for spouses who file separate returns. Thus, it
would make sense to consider amending section 1041 so that it applies only to transfers incident to
divorce. See Gabinet, supra note 80, at 43-46. This issue is, however, generally beyond the scope of
this paper, which focuses on simplifying the tax consequences of transfers in divorce.
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gross income at the time of the transfer. W takes a zero basis in the options. If
W exercises the options for $100 at a time when the fair market value of the
stock is $150, W must recognize $50 of ordinary income under section 83, H
realizes no tax consequences, and W takes a $150 basis in the stock.
B. Divorce Redemptions of Stock in Closely Held Corporations
The issue of how to treat redemptions of stock in closely held corporations
that occur pursuant to the terms of a divorce settlement or decree has given
courts some pause since the enactment of section 1041. 3 1 To put the issue in
perspective, I shall first describe the normal "background rules" governing the
tax treatment of stock redemptions in closely held corporations outside the divorce context. I shall then turn to the issue within the context of divorce.
Assume, for example, that Ann and John, who are siblings, each own 50% of
the stock in a corporation through which they operate the family business begun
by their father and handed down to them. Further assume that the corporation
has $50,000 in cash as well as $50,000 in operating assets when Ann retires, and
the corporation redeems Ann's stock (which has a basis to her of $10,000) by
distributing to her the $50,000 in cash in exchange for all of her stock in the
corporation. The redemption leaves sole ownership of the corporation, now worth
$50,000 (instead of $100,000) in John's hands. Thus, while his ownership interest increases from 50% to 100% because of the redemption, the value of his
interest remains unchanged at $50,000, since prior to the redemption he owned
50% of the stock of a corporation worth $100,000, and after the redemption he
owns 100% of the stock of a corporation worth $50,000.
While the sale of appreciated stock held by nondealers normally triggers
capital gain (after the tax-free recovery of basis), Congress enacted section 302
in order to ensure that this treatment will apply when shareholders sell their
stock back to the corporation itself only if the transaction sufficiently resembles
a sale to a third party and is not a ruse to extract earnings from the corporation
without dividend treatment. If a redemption results in little or no diminution in
the redeemed shareholder's interest in the corporation, then the transaction will
not be respected as a sale but rather will be treated as the distribution of a cash
dividend-ordinary income to the recipient with no tax-free basis recovery.316
Since Ann's stock is completely redeemed in our hypothetical, she has clearly
reduced her interest in the corporation, and thus her sale will be respected as a
true sale rather than a disguised dividend distribution." 7 She thus will realize a

3
'See, e.g., Craven v. United States, 215 F.3d 1201 (1Ilth Cir. 2000); Ames v. United States, 981
F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992); Read v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 14 (2000); Ames v. Commissioner, 102
T.C. 522 (1994); Blatt v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 77 (1994); Hayes v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 593
(1993).
316
See I.R.C. § 302(d).
37
MSee I.R.C. § 302(b)(3), (a). While section 302(c) provides that the attribution rules of section
318 apply in determining the extent to which a shareholder's interest has actually decreased, the
family attribution rules do not operate to attribute John's stock to Ann. See I.R.C. §.318(a)(1)
(failing to mention sibling attribution).
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$40,000 capital gain ($50,000 amount realized less her $10,000 stock basis).
John might also realize tax consequences on Ann's redemption. Even though
the value of his economic interest in the corporation remains unchanged before
and after the redemption, John would nevertheless be treated as realizing a
dividend of $50,000 if he had actually had the "primary and unconditional
obligation" to purchase Ann's stock upon her retirement, and, the corporation
satisfied that obligation in his stead."' The transaction would be treated, in that
case, as if John had received a $50,000 cash distribution (a dividend to him319),
which he then used to purchase Ann's stock interest (resulting in $40,000 of
capital gain for her, as before). If John did not have the primary and unconditional obligation to purchase Ann's interest, then he would realize no tax consequences on Ann's stock redemption. Notice that Ann's tax treatment is not
affected by John's tax treatment. She realizes $40,000 of capital gain, whether
she is deemed to transfer the stock to the corporation or to John.
John's tax treatment, deriving from whether he had the "primary and unconditional obligation" to purchase Ann's stock at the time of the redemption, was
developed in a series of litigated cases32 that resulted in the issuance of Revenue
Ruling 69-608, which summarized the case law and provided guidance regarding the tax consequences of common buyback agreements among shareholders
when a closely held corporation redeems its stock. The ruling makes clear that
form will govern in this context. If, for example, John and Ann had entered into
an agreement under which either would purchase the stock of the other upon the
other's death or retirement, and that agreement remained outstanding at the time
of Ann's retirement and redemption of her stock by the corporation, then John
"
would realize a dividend.32
' If, in contrast, John and Ann had amended such an
agreement prior to her retirement to provide that the corporation would assume
the obligation to redeem her stock upon her retirement, then John would avoid
dividend treatment, so long as the amendment did, indeed, occur prior to Ann's
retirement (when John's obligation would have ripened).322 If the buyback agreement between John and Ann provided that the corporation would have the primary obligation to redeem the stock interest of each upon death or retirement,
with a secondary obligation imposed on the remaining shareholder to purchase
the stock if the corporation were unable to fulfill its obligation, then John would
avoid dividend
treatment, since his obligation would not be "primary" but only
'
"secondary."323
Because form controls in this context, the parties are given absolute power to determine what the tax consequences will be through their choice

31
See,
3

e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 43.
'This assumes that the corporation has sufficient earnings and profits so that the entire cash
distribution qualifies as a dividend. See I.R.C. §§ 301(a), (c), 316.
32
°See, e.g., Sullivan v. United States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966); Holsey v. Commissioner, 258
F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958); Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947); S.K. Ames, Inc. v.
Commissioner,
46 B.T.A. 1020 (1942); Kobacker v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 882 (1962).
32
'See Rev.,Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 43 (discussing Situations I & 2).
32
11d. (discussing Situations 6 & 7).
323
1d. (discussing Situation 5).
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of form.
It is not my purpose to analyze whether this form-sensitive approach makes
sense as the general background rule. Rather, my goal is to note that it has been
well accepted for more than three decades and to consider how it ought to affect
the tax treatment of redemptions in divorce.
Now assume the same facts as above, except that Ann and John are married,
and Ann's 50% stock interest in the corporation is required to be redeemed for
$50,000 in their divorce agreement. Suppose instead that the divorce decree
actually required John, not the corporation, to purchase Ann's stock, but the
corporation nevertheless redeems the stock. How should Ann and John be treated
for tax purposes in these situations?
There are two possibilities. Ann's stock transfer could be respected as a direct
transfer to the corporation. Under this view, Ann would realize a $40,000 capital
gain when she receives the $50,000 cash payment, and John would have no tax
consequences. In the second situation, in particular, however, John may be considered to have had the "primary and unconditional obligation" to purchase
Ann's stock but instead caused the corporation to redeem it. Should we deem the
$50,000 cash payment to have gone first to John (dividend to John), and then to
Ann as consideration for John's purchase of the stock, as we do outside the
divorce context? Or, to put the steps in a different order (though it makes no
difference in end result), should we deem Ann to have transferred to John her
stock since he was, in fact, required to purchase it, which was then redeemed
(dividend to John32 4), followed by the payment by John to Ann of the redemption proceeds? Ann's deemed transfer to John in that case would be nontaxable
under section 1041. This would be the one big difference in tax consequences,
as compared to the same transaction occurring outside the divorce context, where
Ann would realize capital gain in any event (either on the transfer to the corporation or on the transfer to her fellow shareholder), since no nonrecognition
provision would be available for the redeemed shareholder outside the divorce
context.325
Is that the proper approach? Would it make sense to deviate from the current
practice outside the divorce context (i.e., essentially allowing the parties to
designate to whom the corporate distribution should be taxed by their choice of
form) if the redemption happens to occur pursuant to divorce? Might not the
divorce context actually provide the more persuasive context for maximum flexibility for the parties to decide to whom the distribution should be taxed? Before
addressing these questions, consider another possibility.

24

' See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970) (holding that when one person owns 100% of
the stock of a corporation, actually or constructively, any redemption distribution is taxable as
dividend
unless the transaction qualifies as a partial liquidation under section 302(e)).
325
Ann's receipt of the cash, which would then be deemed to come from John instead of the
corporation, would be tax-free to her as well as "not alimony" (under current law, at least), except in
the extremely unlikely event that her estate's right to receive the cash would disappear if Ann died
prior to receipt. Under the proposals advanced in Part 11,John and Ann could decide whether the
cash transfer from John to Ann would be includable/deductible or excludable/nondeductible.
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A common fact pattern in divorce is that only one spouse, say John, actually
owns 100% of the couple's interest in the corporation, but Ann is entitled to a
$50,000 cash payment representing her marital property interest in the stock. In
the simplest case, John can pay Ann cash directly from other resources, and the
tax consequences of that cash payment would be analyzed under section 71, as
described in Part II. But suppose John has his wholly owned corporation redeem
one-half of his stock for $50,000, which he then transfers to Ann? Because the
redemption would not reduce his percentage interest in the corporation (since
John would own 100% both before and after the redemption), John would be
treated as receiving a $50,000 dividend.326 The cash transfer to Ann would again
be analyzed under section 71.
Finally, suppose that John actually transfers 50% of his stock (with a $10,000
basis) to Ann under the divorce decree, which then requires that the corporation
redeem Ann's 50% interest for $50,000. If the form of the transaction were
respected, i.e., if Ann's perhaps momentary ownership of the shares were respected, then John's transfer of stock would be a nonrecognition event under
section 1041(a). Ann would exclude the value of the stock under section
1041(b)(1), take John's basis in the stock under section 1041(b)(2), and recognize $40,000 of capital gain on the redemption.
The government's ruling and litigating position in these contexts is that form
governs the tax consequences. The government argues that actual transfers of
stock between the spouses should succeed in shifting the tax consequences when
the stock is transferred to the third party (the corporation), even if the stock so
transferred is held for only a moment before redemption.3 27 Moreover, it argues
that a direct redemption of stock without an actual transfer between the spouses
should also be respected as a direct redemption, with no implicit transfer between spouses prior to the redemption, absent facts ensuring that the nonredeemed
spouse knew of and directed such a deemed stock transfer prior to the redemption.3 28 This approach not only happens to accord with the law that applies
outside the divorce context in the case of such stock redemptions but also is
clearly consistent with section 1041 itself.
For example, in one private letter ruling,3 29 H owned 90% of the stock in a
family corporation. (The remaining stock was owned by H's brother and son.)
The corporation's bylaws and articles of incorporation required shareholders to
offer to sell stock to the corporation and fellow shareholders before a sale of
stock to a third party. Pursuant to a divorce decree, H made an actual transfer of
stock (amounting to 39% of the outstanding stock of the corporation) to W
without first offering it to the corporation or other shareholders. The stock was
then immediately redeemed under the terms of the divorce decree. The corpora-

326
See
327

Davis, 397 U.S. at 313.
See, e.g., T.A.M. 1990-46-004 (July 20, 1990); P.L.R. 1988-42-072 (July 29, 1988).
32
1See infra notes 336-37 and accompanying text (describing the government's litigating position
in 329
Ames).
See T.A.M. 1990-46-004 (July 20, 1990).
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tion issued a promissory note to W, guaranteed by H, as payment for the stock.
The ruling reasoned that, absent section 1041 (a), this transaction would be viewed
as a redemption of stock owned by H, followed by a transfer of the note from H
to W, who would be considered a mere conduit. The ruling concluded, however,
that the transfer to W should be respected for tax purposes, shifting the tax
burden of the redemption to W, because section 1041 was intended by Congress
to allow the parties to decide who between themselves should be taxed on the
built-in gain in property, including stock, when it is transferred outside the
marital unit. According to the Service:
The spouses are thus free to negotiate between themselves whether the "owner"
spouse will first sell the asset, recognize the gain or loss, and then transfer to
the transferee spouse the proceeds from that sale, or whether the owner spouse
will first transfer the asset to the transferee spouse who will then recognize gain
or loss upon its subsequent sale.330

That argument is persuasive. In light of the actual stock transfer from H to W,
the parties agreed that W should be the one to dispose of the stock outside of the
marital unit, with the tax consequences of that disposal falling on her, and they
structured the transaction accordingly. We should assume that the amount of
stock transferred, as well as other terms of the divorce decree, took into account
that the tax liability accompanying the built-in gain should be W's responsibility, and to rule otherwise would upset the economic terms of their settlement. To
have the negotiated arrangement disrupted with a "substance-over-form" argument undermines one of the animating purposes behind section 1041-that the
parties be given the power to decide between themselves who should carry the
tax consequences regarding property dispositions-and radically changes, after
the fact, the nature of the "deal" made by the parties.
But the government's position as reflected in Temporary Regulation section
1.1041-IT is arguably more ambiguous and has resulted in some courts, when
implored to do so by one of the divorcing spouses, deciding that form will not be
respected, undermining both the government's litigating position and the certainty of the law for divorcing taxpayers. In its entirety, Treasury Regulation
section 1.1041-IT(c), Q&A 9, provides:
(c) Transfers on behalf of a spouse.

Q-9. May transfers of property to third parties on behalf of a spouse (or
former spouse) qualify under section 1041?
A-9. Yes. There are three situations in which a transfer of property to a
third party on behalf of a spouse (or former spouse) will qualify under section
1041, provided all other requirements of the section are satisfied. The first

situation is where the transfer to the third party is required by a divorce or
separation instrument. The second situation is where the transfer to the third
party is pursuant to the written request of the other spouse (or former spouse).
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The third situation is where the transferor receives from the other spouse (or
former spouse) a written consent or ratification of the transfer to the third party.
Such consent or ratification must state that the parties intend the transfer to be
treated as a transfer to the nontransferring spouse (or former spouse) subject to
the rules of section 1041 and must be received by the transferor prior to the
date of filing of the transferor's first return of tax for the taxable year in which
the transfer was made. In the three situations described above, the transferor of
property will be treated as made directly to the nontransferring spouse (or
former spouse) and the nontransferring spouse will be treated as immediately
transferring the property to third party. The deemed transfer from the
nontransferring spouse (or former spouse) to the third party is not a transaction
that qualifies for nonrecognition of gain under section 1041.

Focus for a moment on the third situation described above, which refers to a
consent or ratification explicitly mentioning section 1041 and explicitly stating
that the property transferred directly from one spouse to a third party outside the
marital unit should be considered first as going to the nontransferring spouse
(before going to the third party). This rule has a built-in safeguard to ensure that
the parties understand the consequences of their agreement. An example of
situation three would be one in which John transfers property directly to Bill
only after receiving a consent signed by Ann that explicitly says that she should
be considered as having received the property first under section 1041 and then
transferring the property to Bill directly. In light of their explicit agreement, Ann
should have little cause to complain when any built-in gain in the property that
is realized on the transfer to Bill is held to be her tax responsibility. This portion
of the regulation has prompted no litigation-for good reason, I think. The
parties have necessarily had a meeting of the minds regarding who should be
taxed, and thus there is no room for each to point at the other party later and
claim that the other is responsible for the tax liability arising on the transfer to
the third party. I believe this is a good rule that should be continued in any
revamped version of this regulation, though I would add that this meeting of the
minds could be evidenced by a statement in the divorce agreement itself providing that the property should be considered transferred by Ann, rather than John,
to the third party.
Why does John not simply transfer the property to Ann first, to ensure that
there can be no misunderstanding, as in the ruling described earlier?"' One
reason might be cost. Transferring title for state law purposes, even if it involves
no more than drawing up an agreement, takes time and usually requires at least
some money. It might actually cost quite a bit of money if the property at issue
is real estate and the state in which John and Ann live imposes a real estate
transfer tax. Transferring title twice (once from John to Ann and then again from
Ann to Bill) can be much more expensive than a single transfer from John to
Bill (on behalf of Ann). This portion of the regulation therefore can be seen as
consistent with the overall goal of allowing the parties to decide for themselves
33
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who should be responsible for the tax consequences of built-in gain (or loss)
when property leaves the marital unit (Ann, in this case), while at the same time
allowing the parties to reduce the costs that might attend an explicit transfer to
Ann that would ensure that result. Situation three, in other words, explicitly
provides the parties with the flexibility knowingly to shift the tax responsibility
to Ann without having to incur the burden of, say, two real estate transfer taxes.
But now focus on the regulation, language describing the first situation. It
seems to provide that any transfer of property from one of the spouses to a third
party should be considered instead to a be a transfer first to the other spouse, and
then a transfer from that spouse to the third party, so long as "the transfer to the
'
third party is required by a divorce or separation instrument."332
Notice that it
does not provide that the divorce decree stipulate that the transfer should be
considered as made first to the other spouse under section 1041 before leaving
the marital unit. It says only that the transfer outside the marital unit itself must
be required in the divorce decree. That potentially includes every single property
transfer (including, but not limited to, stock redemptions333) required to be made
to a third party outside the. marital unit by a divorce decree. In other words, it
appears to say that every time a divorce decree requires a transfer of property to
someone outside the marital unit, such as with a stock redemption, the property
should be considered as going to the other spouse first as a matter of course,
shifting the tax consequences of the disposition to the other spouse in every
case, regardless of the intention of the parties. Unlike in situation three, where
the parties must clearly indicate their intent that a transfer between the spouses
be deemed to occur, this rigid reading of the language describing situation one
implies that property (and its attendant tax liabilities) should be deemed to have
been shifted between spouses prior to the taxable transfer outside the marital
unit when the spouses themselves did not knowingly intend that result. If this is
33 4
the right way to read that language, it is a huge trap for the unwary.
Such a reading is inconsistent with the government's rulings and litigating
position, i.e., that section 1041 allows the parties to decide for themselves who,
between them, should be responsible for the built-in gain or loss with respect to
property transferred outside the marital unit. It also is inconsistent with the
overall flavor of Regulation section 1.1041-IT(c), Q&A 9 itself, taken as a
whole, which seems intended primarily to provide some flexibility to the parties
to have a direct transfer outside the marital unit be considered as first going to
the other spouse and then outside the marital unit, without incurring the associated costs attending an actual transfer to the other spouse. As stated by the

332
Temp.
333

Reg. § 1.1041-1T(c), Q&A 9.
See, e.g., Berger v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2160, 1996 T.C.M. (RIA)
96,076
(discussing these issues within the context of a transfer of an unincorporated cemetery business
directly from one spouse to a third party outside the marital unit, as required by a divorce decree).
"'it also makes situations two and three entirely redundant. If every single transfer made to an
outside party under a divorce instrument is deemed to be first transferred to the other spouse, it
seems to me that there could be no situation where the consent of the other party would be necessary
to shift the tax liability.
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government in a Technical Advice Memorandum: "Q&A 9 is based on the
premise that the transferee spouse [Ann, in our John-directly-to-Bill transfer
posed above], by directing that the property be transferred to a thirdparty, has
exercised sufficient ownership over the property to be considered a transferee
'
for purposes of section 1041 of the Code."335
Ann's direction is assumed to be
present. Such an assumption is not warranted, however, simply because the
transfer is required to be made by the divorce decree, with no showing that the
transfer is actually made on Ann's behalf, as would occur with the documentation described in situation three.
In other words, the overall flavor of Q&A 9 is pro-taxpayer, to provide the
divorcing parties with the flexibility to achieve their desired ends through more
efficient means. Situation three clearly assumes that the deemed transfer will be
a knowing one, i.e., that the spouse who is deemed to have received the property
from the other spouse (and thereafter transferred it outside the marital unit)
directed the transfer to the third party on her behalf. A rigid reading of the
language describing situation one, to the effect that any transfer to a third party
under a divorce decree first involves a deemed transfer to the other spouse, lifts
those words out of context and imbues them with a meaning that does not sit
well within the larger framework. But that reading has nevertheless essentially
been seized upon by some courts. At the least, the language has caused confusion.
In Ames v. United States,33 6 for example, Joann and John Ames each owned
one-half of the stock of Moriah, a corporation formed to operate a McDonald's
franchise. The couple agreed to divorce in 1987, and the settlement agreement
required that Joann's stock be redeemed for $450,000, since McDonald's informed John Ames that it required 100% ownership of the equity and profits to
be owned by the owner/operator and that their joint ownership must terminate
on the divorce. Joann surrendered her 2,500 shares to the corporation in exchange for cash and other consideration, and the corporation shortly thereafter
issued an additional 2,500 shares to John.
The divorce settlement agreement did not state that Joann's stock, which she
transferred directly to the corporation, should first be viewed as going to John
under section 1041. The decree required only that the redemption occur so that
Joann would no longer be involved with the corporation, pursuant to McDonald's
franchise requirements. Joann nevertheless took the position, first at the District
Court level and then before the Ninth Circuit, that she should be considered to
have first transferred the stock to John, which was then redeemed by the corporation, because she argued that the redemption was made "on behalf of' John
within the meaning of Regulation section 1.1041-IT(c), Q&A 9.
In other words, Joann seized upon the inartful language in the regulation to
argue that John should shoulder the tax consequences of the redemption (even
though Joann received the cash)-regardlessof whether there was a meeting of
335
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the minds that Joann should be deemed to have transferred the stock to John
before the redemption occurred. Joann, in short, used the regulation offensively
as a tool, as though the regulation were intended to encapsulate a normative
decision that John ought to be taxed in these situations (regardless of what the
parties intended), rather than merely to provide flexibility to parties to agree
between themselves to shift the tax burden of the transfer to the other spouse
without having to undertake an actual property transfer to the other spouse first.
Under this approach, Joann's deemed stock transfer to John would be considered a tax-free transfer to Joann under section 1041. Joann's actual receipt of the
cash that is then deemed to have come from John would also be tax-free, since
her right to these receipts would presumably not terminate on her death. The
cash payments would thus be tax-neutral payments outside the inclusion/deduction system of sections 71 and 215. Under this view, Joann implicitly argued
that John (who was not a party to the litigation) should be deemed to have
transferred the stock to Moriah, producing a constructive dividend for John.
The government disagreed, arguing that the form of the transaction as a redemption of Joann's stock directly by the corporation should be respected in the
divorce context, resulting in the tax consequences of the redemption falling on
Joann, not John. She would be entitled to exchange treatment under sections
302(a) and (b)(3). Thus, the difference between the consideration that Joann
received and her basis in the surrendered stock would produce capital gain or
loss for her.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Joann, interpreting Regulation section 1.1041IT(c), Q&A 9, to mean that the transfer made directly by Joann to the corporation should be deemed to have been made to John instead, since the transfer
outside the marital unit was required by their settlement agreement. The court
reasoned that the transfer by Joann to Moriah was made "on behalf of' John
because the redemption was mandated by an agreement that was executed in
settlement of any community property claims that Joann might otherwise have
been able to assert against John. Since virtually any property transfer mandated
by a divorce decree or settlement is part of an agreement that, by its nature,
settles all claims between the parties that each can otherwise possibly assert
against the other under state law, such an approach essentially means that any
transfer of property that the divorce decree or agreement requires to be made to
a third party outside the marital unit (for any reason, including franchise contract
requirements) should first be deemed made to the other spouse before leaving
the marital unit, regardless of whether the parties are aware of or intend such a
deemed transfer at the time.
The bizarre uncertainty and unintended tax surprises that such an approach
creates for divorcing parties was made clear when Mr. Ames, in a separate Tax
Court case brought by the government against him after it lost the case against
Joann, argued that the form of the transaction should be upheld, with the tax
consequences of the redemption falling on Joann.337 The Tax Court agreed-a
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position that I think to be correct-with the result that neither party was held
responsible for the tax consequences of the redemption.338
The Tax Court also originally held that the law outside the divorce context
that can impose a constructive dividend on the nonredeemed spouse339 should
inform when transfers are made "on behalf of' the other spouse within the
meaning of Regulation section 1.1041-1T(c), Q&A 9. In Hayes v. Commissioner,3 4° for example, H was required to purchase W's stock under the terms of
their divorce settlement. Instead, however, the corporation redeemed W's stock.
Because H had the "primary and unconditional obligation" to purchase the stock
under the divorce settlement at the time of the redemption, the Tax Court concluded that H should, as in the non-divorce context, be deemed to have received
a constructive dividend under the cases summarized in Revenue Ruling 69-608.
In other words, W was deemed to have transferred her stock to H, since H had a
legal obligation to purchase it, before it was redeemed by the corporation. W's
transfer would be a nonrecognition event under section 1041, H's deemed redemption would trigger a constructive dividend for him, and the deemed transfer
of the redemption proceeds from H to W would likely not fall within the inclusion/deduction scheme of sections 71 and 215.
I think that Hayes was rightly decided. I cannot see that H should have been
surprised by the conclusion that he was responsible for the tax consequences of
the stock disposition outside the marital unit, since the divorce agreement actually required him to purchase the stock from W. The tax results should have
come as no surprise in view of the form chosen by the parties, unlike in Ames,
where H did not have a legal obligation to purchase W's stock and yet was held
(by the Ninth Circuit) to have been the object of a deemed transfer of the stock
from W, which was then redeemed, with the redemption proceeds then deemed
transferred from H to W. (Lots of deemed transfers!)
In February of 2000, the full Tax Court, in a lengthy reviewed decision, with
one concurring and four dissenting opinions, revisited its approach in this respect in Read v. Commissioner34" ' and essentially abandoned the approach of
Hayes, which looked for guidance regarding the meaning of the terms "on
behalf of' by looking to the law outside divorce. In Read, Carol Read owned
about 48% and William Read owned about 52% of all of the stock of Mulberry
Motor Parts, Inc., when they decided to divorce. Under the terms of their divorce agreement, William Read was required either to purchase Carol's stock or
to cause Mulberry Motor Parts to redeem the stock. If he chose the latter, which
he did, he would guarantee the payment and would become secondarily liable
for the payment under state law. Carol Read did not include any capital gain
regarding the stock redemption, and William Read did not include any construc-
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See id.; see also Blatt v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 77 (1994) (also respecting the form of a
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and taxing W on a direct redemption of her stock).
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tive dividend equal to the consideration received by Carol. The issue, of course,
was whether the direct redemption should be respected for tax purposes or
whether Ms. Read should be considered as having transferred the stock to the
corporation "on behalf of' Mr. Read, thus shifting the tax consequences of the
redemption to him. To protect its interest as stakeholder, the government issued
notices of deficiency to both parties. The opinion relates: "[The government's]
role here is that of a stakeholder. Nonetheless, [the government] has indicated
that 'Ms. Read has the better argument that she should not recognize any gain
from the sale of her stock pursuant to [section] 1041.'"342
It is fairly clear that William did not have a "primary and unconditional
obligation" to purchase Carol's stock at the time of the redemption, since the
divorce settlement required either William or the corporation to purchase Carol's
stock. This is similar, though not precisely on point, to Situation 5 in Revenue
Ruling 69-608, where the Service concluded that the nonredeemed shareholder
did not realize a dividend when he was only secondarily obligated to purchase
the shares if the corporation failed to redeem them.343
But all of that is irrelevant under the Tax Court's decision, because the Tax
Court majority concluded that the standard developed outside the divorce context for measuring when a nonredeemed shareholder should be considered to
have received a constructive dividend-i.e., the "primary and unconditional obligation" standard-should not be considered commensurate with the standard
determining whether a property transfer is made "on behalf of' the nontransferring
spouse within the meaning of Regulation section 1.1041-IT(c), Q&A 9. A quick
reading of the case might first imply that the case stands for the proposition that
satisfaction of the primary-and-unconditional-obligation test is but one means by
which a transfer will be considered "on behalf of' the other spouse but that the
latter language can go much further as well. But the court explicitly disclaimed
any relevance of the primary-and-unconditional-obligation standard to stock redemptions in divorce. According to the court:
We hold that the primary-and-unconditional-obligation standard is not an appropriate standard to apply in the instant cases in order to determine whether
Ms. Read's transfer of her . . . stock to [the corporation] was a transfer of
property by the transferring spouse (Ms. Read) to a third party ([the corporation]) on behalf of the nontransferring spouse (Mr. Read) within the meaning of
Q&A-9. We further hold that the primary-and-unconditional-obligation standard is not an appropriate standard to apply in any case involving a corporate
redemption in a divorce setting in order to determine whether the transfer of
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46 B.T.A. 1020 (1942). In that case the nonredeemed shareholder entered into a contract under
which he had the obligation "to purchase or cause to be purchased" the shares of the redeemed
shareholder. Under this language, the nonredeemed shareholder was held not to have had the "primary and unconditional obligation" to purchase the shares that were instead redeemed.
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property by the transferring spouse to a third party is on behalf of the
nontransferring spouse within the meaning of Q&A-9.34
In short, the meaning of "on behalf of' in Q&A 9 should be determined afresh,
without regard to the primary-and-unconditional-obligation test that is applied
outside of the divorce context.
The Tax Court concluded that, although the stock redemption did not satisfy a
legal obligation of Mr. Read, the stock transfer was nevertheless made "on
behalf of' him under the "common, ordinary meaning" of those words.345 Parsing the language "on behalf of' as though it appeared in the statute itself, rather
than in a regulation that apparently attempted simply to provide some planning
flexibility to the parties, the Tax Court majority quoted Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1990) and concluded that "on behalf of' meant "in the
interest of' or "as a representative of. 3 46 Applying those standards, the Tax
Court held:
Ms. Read was acting as Mr. Read's representative in transferring her.., stock
to [the corporation], and Ms. Read was acting in the interest of Mr. Read in
making that transfer to [the corporation], in that she was following and implementing Mr. Read's direction as reflected in his election under the divorce
judgment that she transfer her ... stock to [the corporation]. 34
The Tax Court further concluded that the transfer came within Situation 1 of the
Q&A 9 regulation, since the transfer was made pursuant to the divorce decree.
The most recent case addressing this issue is Craven v. United States,3 4 in
which the Eleventh Circuit confirmed that any transfer made directly to a third
party pursuant to a divorce decree should be deemed to be made "on behalf of'
the other spouse, regardless of whether the parties knowingly intend that result.
Billy Joe and Linda Craven started and subsequently incorporated a pottery
business, with 51% of the stock owned by Billy Joe, 47% owned by Linda, and
the remaining 2% owned by their two children, 1% each. Under the terms of
their 1991 divorce agreement, Linda was obligated to sell her stock to the
corporation for a promissory note of $4.8 million, guaranteed by Billy Joe, who
acknowledged that the terms of the arrangement were of "direct interest, benefit
and advantage" to him. Linda argued "that the transfer of stock to the corporation was done pursuant to her divorce agreement and therefore was on behalf of

'"Read, 114 T.C. at 14.
345d. at 37.
3Jd. at 36. The phrase "on behalf of' is not in the statute, though the court parses that language as
though it were. The phrase is in a regulation that attempts to further the purpose of the statute by
giving effect to the parties' agreement that a deemed transfer between spouses, prior to the transfer
outside the marital unit, should be respected when the parties' intent is clear. The court's approach,
by excising those words and analyzing them independently of the entire context of Q&A 9, as well
as section 1041 as a whole, may result in a holding that a deemed transfer occurred, even if neither of
the parties intended or bargainedfor such a transfer, if the court believes that the transfer by one
spouse
347 was nevertheless made "as a representative of' the other.
Read v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 14, 36-37 (2000).
-89215 F.3d 1201 (11 th Cir. 2000).
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her former spouse within the language and purposes of the temporary regula'
tions."349
The government argued that the form of the transaction should be
respected and that Linda be taxed on the redemption.
Both the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit held in favor of Linda, in
opinions that confirmed the scope of the Q&A 9 language to include virtually all
transfers of property outside the marital unit to third parties, without regard to
the parties' apparent or actual intent, so long as the transfers are required by the
divorce decree. The District Court held that the transfers were made "on behalf
of" Billy Joe "because the redemption came as a result of Billy Joe's obligation
under Georgia law to equitably divide all marital assets."35 You cannot get any
broader than that. Virtually all such transfers are made as part of the parties'
property settlement. The Eleventh Circuit recounted with approval the Tax Court
majority's opinion in Read, including its reading of the terms "on behalf of' to
mean "in the interest of' or "as a representative of."35' The Eleventh Circuit then
cited three factors as supporting Linda's position: (1) that the redemption was
mandated by the divorce decree, (2) that Billy Joe guaranteed the redemption
note issued by the corporation, and (3) that he acknowledged that the terms were
of "direct interest, benefit and advantage to him. '352 But, and this is critical, the
court made it clear that, even if the second and third factors were entirely
absent, Linda would win simply because the redemption was mandated by the
divorce decree.353
This myopic reading of the "first situation" in Q&A 9 (that any transfer to a
third party required by a divorce decree should be considered as made by the
other spouse), lifted from its surrounding context, is just the sort of reading that
not merely drains the pro-taxpayer regulation of the very ability to specify who
should be responsible for the tax consequences of a third-party transfer but
actually mandates a "one-size-fits-all" approach that can require precisely the
opposite result that the parties intended. There is no reason to believe that
simply because a divorce decree requires one of the spouses to transfer property
outside the marital unit that the parties will understand that to mean that the
transferring spouse should first be deemed to have transferred it to the other
spouse, shifting the tax responsibility to her. Indeed, if a divorce decree explicitly requires John to transfer property that he owns to someone outside the
marital unit, the natural assumption on the part of the divorcing couple would
quite likely be just the opposite-that John is responsible for that gain-since he
owned the property, and the decree could have just as easily required John to
transfer it to Mary first but did not.

3491d.
35
Id.
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at 1203 (citing Craven v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 1999)).
1d. at 1207.
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nonrecognition under section 1041. The other two factors simply add strength to this conclusion. Id.
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It should be fairly obvious that the primary-and-unconditional-obligation test
cannot provide the outer reaches of the standard regarding when a transfer is
made "on behalf of" a spouse, if for no other reason than that the Q&A 9
regulation applies to transfers of all kinds of property to all kinds of third
parties-not simply stock transfers to corporations. Nevertheless, I think it should
be clear that whenever H is required by a divorce settlement to purchase W's
stock, but instead the corporation redeems W's stock, W should be considered as
transferring the stock to H first. This would result in the tax consequences of the
redemption falling on H, consistent with the parties' apparent agreement that H
should take ownership of the stock, so that when it is transferred to the corporation, he should be deemed to have made that transfer. This tax treatment also
happens to be the same tax treatment that would arise outside the divorce context under the primary-and-unconditional-obligation test. In other words, I think
it should be clear that satisfaction of the primary-and-unconditional-obligation
test should also satisfy the standards of the on-behalf-of test in the stock-redemption context, since the on-behalf-of test under section 1041 ultimately turns
on the parties' intent, and when the nonredeemed spouse is legally obligated to
purchase stock that is instead redeemed, the parties intent that he should take
title before the stock leaves the marital unit is sufficiently clear.
But if W and H state in their divorce settlement that Blackacre is required to
be transferred by W directly to a third party, and further state that it should be
considered first as going to H, thus shifting the tax liability to H (even though
the transfer is made directly to the third party for the sake of expediency), that
agreement should be respected-even if H did not have a scintilla of legal
obligation to purchase Blackacre from W at the time she made the transfer, let
alone a "primary and unconditional obligation."
In short, the overarching consideration that should inform interpretation of
section 1041 is that the parties' bargain should be respected; their agreement
regarding who should bear the burden of taxation on a transfer of property
outside the marital unit should be respected. This value should be respected even
if the nontransferring spouse does not have a legal obligation to purchase property from the other spouse but nevertheless agrees that the tax obligation attending the transfer of the property outside the marital unit should be his. This
allows the parties to bargain for a fair and equitable division of marital property
by taking into account the tax consequences that will attend disposition of property outside the marital unit. Protecting the "deal" made by the parties is a value
in the divorce context that should be paramount.
The agreements in Read and Craven were not, unfortunately, crystal clear,
and it is on this issue that the discussion should center regarding how the regulations should be amended to fix these ambiguities. How clearly should the regulations require the parties' intent to be stated regarding deemed transfers between
the spouses prior to a transfer outside the marital unit before that intent is given
effect? The agreement in Read did not-as it should have, in my opinionexplicitly provide that the stock should be considered as being transferred to Mr.
Read first, even though that formal step was omitted in the interest of expediTax Lawyer, Vol. 55, No. 2
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ency, with a direct transfer from Ms. Read to the corporation, instead. Should
we nevertheless try to extract the parties' intent as best we can in such ambiguous circumstances? Or should we require a higher degree of proof before we
consider deemed transfers to occur, since, after all, the parties could have gone
to the bother of actually transferring the property to the other spouse first? If
they want the luxury of dispensing with that intermediate step, but nevertheless
have it deemed to have occurred, perhaps they should have the burden of making that intent sufficiently clear. Regulation section 1.1041-1T(c) was apparently
intended to provide pro-taxpayer flexibility, not a straightjacket. On the other
hand, the regulation should not provide standards that are so vague that it will
continue to require courts to struggle in gleaning the parties' unclear intent.
This is all the more true because of one more important point that needs to be
made. The lack of clarity in the current regulations is in dire need of a fix, not
only to provide clear guidance to divorcing couples, but also to eliminate the
good chance of whipsaw that the Treasury can experience. As was the case in
the confusion under Davis before section 1041 was enacted,354 each party can
take advantage of this ambiguity by taking reporting positions that the other is
responsible for the tax consequences of the transfer outside the marital unit.
Moreover, unlike under sections 71 and 215, there is no information-reporting
requirement under section 1041 that can decrease the chance of such a whipsaw
that goes unnoticed by the government.
This concern for whipsaw, as well as a desire to decrease the chances for
litigation, leads me to recommend completely rewriting Regulation section 1.1041IT(c), Q&A 9, so as to both create bright-line, understandable rules that should
accord with common presuppositions of divorcing parties and reinforce the notion that was likely intended by that regulation, i.e., that the parties can explicitly agree to shift the tax responsibility attending property owned by one spouse
to the other spouse (without actually having to transfer the property to that other
spouse prior to the transfer outside the marital unit) so long as the parties make
their intention sufficiently clear that an implicit transfer should be deemed to
occur (in order to shift the tax responsibility) prior to the transfer to the third
party. The bottom line is that there should be as little chance for surprises and
uncertainty as possible, while at the same time there should be the maximum
flexibility possible for the parties to decide who, between them, will be responsible for the built-in gain or loss with respect to property transferred outside the
marital unit. With that in mind, I would advocate that any doubt from the face of
the divorce documents about whether the parties intended a deemed transfer
between the spouses to precede the transfer outside the marital unit should be
resolved in favor of not deeming such a transfer to have occurred-which is
precisely opposite to the presumption that the Read and Craven courts derived
from Situation 1 of the temporary regulations-since the parties usually have the
freedom to arrange an actual transfer between them prior to the transfer to the
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third party if they so desire.
The revised regulation might look something like this:
§ 1.1041-x. Transfers to Third Parties.-(a) In General. Transfers of property by one or both spouses to a third party outside the marital unit are not
entitled to nonrecognition treatment under section 1041, regardless of whether
the transfer is incident to divorce. If, for example, H transfers property with a
basis of $10,000 to a third party for $50,000, as required under a divorce
decree, H's $40,000 realized gain is not entitled to nonrecognition under section 1041, absent application of one of the exceptions noted below. If H makes
an actual transfer of the property to W, who then transfers the property to a
third party for $50,000, H's $40,000 realized gain is not recognized under
section 1041(a), W excludes the $50,000 value of the property under section
1041(b)(1), W takes H's $10,000 basis in the property under section 1041(b)(2),
and W realizes and recognizes the $40,000 gain on the subsequent transfer to
the third party for $50,000, even if the transfer to the third party is contemplated at the time of the transfer to W. In the three limited circumstances
described below, property transferred directly by one spouse to a third party
will be deemed to have first been first transferred to the other spouse, thus
shifting the tax consequences of the transfer outside the marital unit to the other
spouse, without an actual prior transfer to that other spouse. Such an implicit
transfer between the spouses preceding the transfer to the third party will be
deemed to occur only if: (1) the parties explicitly agree in the divorce or
separation instrument or in a later separate agreement that such a transfer to the
other spouse should be deemed to occur under section 1041, (2) the other
spouse had a primary and unconditional obligation to purchase the property that
was instead directly transferred to the third party, or (3) the transfer directly to
the third party satisfied a debt or other obligation owed by the other spouse to
the third party.
(b) Examples. The following examples illustrate this paragraph.
Example 1. H owns Blackacre, with a basis of $10,000 and fair market
value of $50,000. The divorce settlement between H and W requires H to sell
Blackacre and divide the proceeds equally between H and W. In order to
equitably divide the value in all the marital property, after taking into account
the tax consequences of the disposition, H and W agree that W should be
responsible for recognizing the $40,000 gain with respect to Blackacre for tax
purposes. The divorce settlement therefore also provides that the property transferred directly from H to the third party should be considered first as having
been transferred from H to W. H transfers the property directly to the third
party for $50,000 and transfers $25,000 to W. Even though H transfers the
property directly to the third party, he will be considered for tax purposes as
having first transferred the property to W, and W will be considered as haying
transferred the property to the third party and subsequently transferring onehalf of the sales proceeds to H. H's $40,000 realized gain is not recognized
under section 1041(a), W excludes the $50,000 value of the property under
section 1041(b)(1), W takes H's $10,000 basis in the property under section
1041(b)(2), and W realizes and recognizes the $40,000 gain on the transfer to
the third party for $50,000. W's deemed $25,000 cash payment to H is ana-
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lyzed under sections 71 and 215.
Example 2. H owes $50,000 to a third party. Pursuant to the terms of their
divorce decree, W transfers Blackacre, which has a basis of $10,000 and a fair
market value of $50,000, directly to the third party in satisfaction of H's debt.
The property transferred directly to the third party will be deemed to have been
first transferred to H. W's $40,000 realized gain is not recognized under section
1041 (a), H excludes the $50,000 value of the property under section 1041 (b)(1),
H takes W's $10,000 basis in the property under section 1041(b)(2), and H
realizes and recognizes the $40,000 gain on the transfer of the property to the
third party in satisfaction of his debt.
Example 3. H and W each own 50% of the stock in a corporation through
which they operate the family business. The terms of their divorce settlement
require W to transfer her stock, which has a basis of $10,000 and a fair market
value of $50,000, to the corporation in exchange for $50,000. The corporation
redeems W's stock in exchange for $50,000. W's $40,000 realized gain is not
entitled to nonrecognition under section 1041, and W's tax consequences on the
redemption will be governed by section 302. H realizes no tax consequences on
the redemption.
Example 4. H and W each own 50% of the stock in the corporation
through which they operate the family business. The terms of their divorce
settlement require H to purchase W's stock, which has a basis of $10,000 and a
fair market value of $50,000. H does not purchase W's stock, but the stock is
instead redeemed for $50,000 by the corporation. Because H had the primary
and unconditional obligation to purchase W's stock, the stock transferred directly to the corporation will be deemed to have been first transferred to H. W's
$40,000 realized gain is not recognized under section 1041(a), H excludes the
$50,000 value of the stock under section 1041(b)(1), H takes W's $10,000 basis
in the stock under section 104 1(b)(2), and H's tax consequences on the redemption will be governed by section 302.
Example 5. H and W each own 50% of the stock in the corporation
through which they operate the family business. The terms of their divorce
settlement require H to purchase W's stock or, at H's election, to have W's
stock redeemed by the corporation. W's stock has a basis of $10,000 and a fair
market value of $50,000. H does not purchase W's stock, but the stock is
instead redeemed for $50,000 by the corporation. Because H did not have the
primary and unconditional obligation to purchase W's stock, the stock transferred directly to the corporation will not be deemed to have been first transferred to H. W's $40,000 realized gain is not entitled to nonrecognition under
section 1041, and W's tax consequences on the redemption will be governed by
section 302. H realizes no tax consequences on the redemption.
There is an alternative solution that would overturn the approach of the Tax
Court and Eleventh Circuit in Read and Craven, respectively, that every single
transfer of property outside the marital unit should first be considered as involving a deemed transfer to the other spouse, so long as the divorce instrument
requires the transfer. The alternative is to provide that no deemed transfers are
ever implied, i.e., that the actual transferor of the property outside the marital
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unit is always the taxed party. I reject this alternative because I think that it
contains a serious trap for the unwary.
Consider, for example, Mary and John. Mary owns 40% of the stock (worth
$40,000) of the corporation containing the family business, and John owns the
remaining 60%. Since John and Mary are divorcing, John wants Mary to sell her
stock and completely disassociate herself from the business, thus consolidating
ownership in John. Mary is agreeable to the proposition, but she is unwilling to
have her stock redeemed directly by the corporation, for then she would be taxed
on the transfer. She knows that section 1041 provides that if she transfers her
stock to John, instead, which would accomplish the same consolidation of ownership in John as would a redemption of her stock, the transfer would not be
recognition event for her. She would not be taxed on the receipt of cash, and
John would take a carryover basis in the stock that he would be obligated to
purchase.
John is not agreeable to this, because he knows that if he then causes the
corporation to redeem the stock purchased from Mary, the $40,000 that he
receives from the corporation would be taxed as a distribution to him under
section 301. He therefore insists in the divorce negotiations that Mary agree to
have her stock redeemed directly. When she resists because of the resulting tax
bill, John offers to agree to her demands and purchase the stock from her if she
agrees to reduce her demands for support payments from $1,000 per month to
$700 per month for five years. She agrees that this is a fair tradeoff, and thus the
divorce instrument provides that John must buy Mary's stock, and John must
pay Mary $700 per month for five years in support payments.
Since John controls the corporation, however, he causes the corporation to
redeem Mary's stock directly for $40,000. Mary receives the same $40,000 that
she was supposed to receive from John, but now the Service tells her that she is
taxed on the transfer, that there can be no deemed transfer to John, even though
he had the legal obligation to buy the stock under the divorce instrument and she
gave up $300 per month in additional support payments to induce John to agree
to the provision requiring him to purchase the stock instead of the corporation.
Imagine Mary's surprise when the Service tells her that the clause that she
negotiated so long and hard over and for which she gave up other valuable
consideration-that John buy the stock instead of the corporation-is completely
meaningless for tax purposes. So long as John was able to force a redemption
because of his control of the corporation, Mary is taxed, regardless of whether
or not the parties had agreed that John had the obligation to purchase, not the
corporation. The Service would tell Mary, in effect, that all of her negotiations
were meaningless, and that it did not matter that she agreed to give up $300 per
month in support payments in order to ensure that she would not be taxed on the
transfer of her stock. Understandably, Mary would be furious. Since John had
the legal obligation to purchase the property, I believe he should be deemed to
have purchased the property, relieving Mary of any tax liability on the transfer
of the property.
If Treasury nevertheless decides that a rule providing that no deemed transfers
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should generally be considered to occur prior to a transfer outside the marital
unit, I would at the least urge that this rule not apply-and an implicit transfer
be deemed to occur-if the parties explicitly agree to such a deemed transfer in
the divorce instrument or subsequent instrument. This is certainly a second-best
approach, in my view, to my preferred solution, since it works only for welladvised divorcing couples. If Mary, in the hypothetical above, is not advised by
an attorney, I would think that it would never occur to her that she should insert
in her divorce agreement a clause providing that if John fails to buy her stock,
and arranges instead for the corporation to buy it, there should nevertheless be
considered to have been a deemed transfer to John first so that Mary is not
taxed. if Mary expects John to honor his obligation to buy the stock, why would
she think to insert such a clause? In any event, it would at least help welladvised taxpayers to protect their interests.
In short, I believe that my preferred solution provides fewer surprises to illadvised taxpayers, since I think that John could hardly claim surprise in finding
out that he is deemed to have bought Mary's stock when he was under a legal
obligation in the divorce instrument to purchase it. Nevertheless, a rule that no
deemed transfers can occur under section 1041 is clearly better than what we
have now: a rule that every transfer outside the marital unit first involves a
deemed transfer to the other spouse. Current law clearly needs to be changed.
IV. CONCLUSION
I am of the opinion that the law pertaining to transfers of cash and property
incident to divorce was substantially improved in 1984, particularly with respect
to the enactment of section 1041 to overturn the Davis result involving in-kind
property transfers. But problems remain, and much too much litigation continues
to plague this area, an area that ensnares ordinary citizens in all walks of life and
income levels. These transactions are not multinational corporate reorganizations involving sophisticated counsel and planning. Divorce is a common, personal transaction, not engaged in for tax reasons, which results in significant
non-tax events, such as the parties separating their households. In most respects,
the problems arise not as the necessary and right consequences of a coherent
theory but because of history and political compromise or the blind application
of doctrines that grew up in other contexts that are not appropriate or well suited
to the unique context of divorce. Moreover, though enactment of section 1041
should be applauded, it has raised new issues that need particular redress now.
The current mechanisms that must be applied to determine which party will
be taxed on a cash receipt or on a stock redemption are not only ambiguous in
many respects but also resolve the question in ways that often make no sense
(e.g., characterizing as "property settlements" the payment of attorneys' fees,
medical expenses, or unallocated support payments). The resolution also often
requires federal tax adjudicators to delve into murky state law in order to determine the answers to these ambiguities, a practice that was heavily criticized
before 1984 and was supposed to end with the 1984 legislation.
As I have argued throughout this article, little revenue is at stake in our
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system of how to tax cash transfers incident to divorce. Similarly, the answers to
whether transfers of accrued income rights ought to be taxed to the transferee or
transferor, and whether stock redemptions incident to divorce ought to be taxed
to the shareholder whose stock is redeemed or the other spouse, pose minimal
revenue concerns. In each and every possible scenario posed, one of the spouses
will be taxed; the only question is which spouse's marginal rate bracket will
apply. The government is a mere stakeholder. Unlike other areas of tax, the
question is not merely whether a deduction will be allowed or whether a receipt
should escape taxation. In the context of divorce, every deduction is necessarily
accompanied by a corresponding inclusion, so that the only revenue at stake is
measured by the difference in rate brackets (if any) between the payor and
payee. Similarly, there is no question that assigned income rights and stock
redemptions are taxable, even though incident to divorce. The only question is
which spouse will realize those tax consequences.
As I have argued throughout this article, the parties' agreement regarding
who, between them, should be taxed on income items, whether income accrued
prior to the divorce but paid after, or income earned after, should be respected.
With no significant revenue streams at stake, there is no compelling reason why
the law ought to be otherwise. The parties reach agreement on how to equitably
divide their assets and income streams by (if well advised) taking the resulting
tax consequences into account. When the government steps in and upsets these
expectations after the fact, it upsets the bargain reached between the parties,
often for no net revenue gain and often at substantial litigation expense for both
the government and the divorced couple.
In many respects, sections 71, 215, and 1041 already recognize and intentionally implement this bedrock value. The time has come to finally abandon the
remaining remnants of our futile attempt to differentiate "alimony" from "child
support" from cash "property settlements," distinctions increasingly abandoned
under state law in this era in which an equitable and fair apportionment of all
undifferentiated income and property rights is the goal. The parties should be
permitted to designate whether any cash payment should be includable by the
recipient and deductible by the payor, on the one hand, or excludable and nondeductible, on the other, with the default rule (in the case of silence) being that
such payments are includable by the recipient and deducible by the payor, unless
the payment is to a third party on behalf of a child. Treasury should also make it
clear by issuing a new regulation (perhaps pursuant to a new Congressional
directive in section 1041, though I do not believe that statutory amendment is
absolutely necessary) that the assignment-of-income doctrine, which is fundamentally inconsistent with the premises underlying section 1041, does not trump
the nonrecognition rule of section 1041 in the context of divorce. Finally, Treasury ought to issue a new regulation to replace Regulation section 1.1041 -1 T(c),
Q&A 9, to specify clearly when property transferred directly from one spouse to
a third party outside the marital unit will be considered as having been transferred first to the other spouse before the transfer outside the marital unit, thus
shifting the tax consequences to that other spouse.
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ADDENDUM
On August 3, 2001, after this article was completed for the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, the Treasury published proposed regulations under section 1041 pertaining to the taxation of stock redemptions incident to divorce.
See 66 Fed. Reg. 40659 (Aug. 3, 2001). The excerpt quoted below, from formal
comments that I submitted to the Treasury Department concerning those regulations, both describe the approach taken by the proposed regulations and indicate
my points of agreement and disagreement with that approach.
The preamble to your notice of proposed rulemaking notes that one of the
serious problems that stems from the current ambiguity of the "on behalf of'
language in Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(c), Q&A 9, is whipsaw, with each spouse
claiming that the other is responsible for the tax consequences of the redemption. To clarify the law so that parties can no longer each have a colorable
claim that the other party is the responsible party, you propose that the standards that apply outside the divorce context in determining whether the
nonredeemed spouse has realized a constructive distribution should equally
apply in the divorce context in determining whether a transfer of the stock
between the spouses under section 1041 should be deemed to occur prior to the
redemption. In particular, you import the standards found in Revenue Ruling
69-608, which essentially provide that the nonredeemed spouse will be deemed
to have received the stock from the other spouse prior to the redemption (and
thus will be responsible for the tax consequences of the redemption) if that
nonredeemed spouse actually had the "primary and unconditional obligation"
to purchase the stock from the other spouse, but the stock was instead redeemed.
Because whipsaw can be avoided by clear rules of any sort, it does not necessarily follow that the rules that apply outside the divorce context should control
the question of whether a transfer of property (including stock) should be

deemed to occur between the spouses prior to a transfer to a third party in the
divorce context. The ambiguity that creates the possibility for whipsaw can be
equally killed with a clear rule that no transfers between the spouses should be

deemed to occur prior to the redemption, with the consequences of the redemption thus always falling on the redeemed spouse. It therefore becomes necessary to articulate why your proposed solution to the problem of whipsaw-creating
ambiguity is the preferred solution.
I suppose that a desire for consistency between the divorce and non-divorce

contexts supports your approach, but I do not see a desire for consistency to be
a strong reason. If the context of divorce justifies a departure from the "usual
rules," I would advocate a departure (as I do, for example, when it comes to
applying the assignment-of-income doctrine to transfers in divorce). Nevertheless, I, too, recommend that the "primary-and-unconditional-obligation test" be
imported into the divorce context, because I believe that it is consistent with the
chief purpose of the "on-behalf-of" test that has created these problems in the

first place.
I believe that the guiding goal should be to allow the maximum flexibility to

the divorcing parties to decide for themselves who, between them, should be
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responsible for the tax consequences attending a disposition of property to a
third party incident to a divorce. Indeed, the overall content of their divorce
settlement may often take into account who will be responsible for these tax
consequences, and these expectations should not be upset "after the fact," if at
all possible. I believe that the original (and laudable) intention behind the "onbehalf-of" language in Q&A 9 was to allow divorcing parties to avoid the
additional transaction costs (and sometimes time, if we are talking about a
transfer of real estate title) that can arise on an actual transfer between the
spouses prior to the transfer to a third party, while nevertheless providing them
the flexibility to decide for themselves that the tax consequences of the transfer
should, in fact, fall on the nontransferring party, as though the property were
first transferred to that party before the transfer to the outsider.
I support the importation of the "primary-and-unconditional-obligation test" in
the divorce context, because I believe that the nontransferring spouse (call him
H) should not be surprised to learn that he is taxed on a transfer from W
directly to a third party if H agreed, in the divorce settlement, to purchase that
property from W. In other words, since H had the obligation to purchase, it
should not surprise him to learn that he is deemed to have taken title to the
property and sold it to the outsider, with the tax consequences of that sale
falling on him.
Similarly, if H did not have the primary and unconditional obligation to purchase the property, H should not be taxed on the transfer by W to the outsider,
even if the transfer is mandated by the divorce decree and H can be said to
benefit in some way by the transfer. Shifting the tax consequences to H simply
because the divorce decree mandated that W sell the property to a third party,
with no more, would likely cause unadvised parties to be quite surprised. Indeed, the natural assumption on the part of unadvised parties in that context
would likely be that W is taxed, since she owned the property and did not
transfer it to H in the divorce for him to sell it to the outsider.
If, however, this approach makes sense, then it makes sense across the board
for transfers of all kinds of property, not simply stock. In other words, if the
primary goal is to draft a regulation that likely embodies the expectations of the
parties regarding which, between them, should shoulder the tax consequences
of a property sale to an outsider when they fail to make those expectations
clear, then the same rule should apply to a sale of, say, real estate that is
mandated by a divorce decree. The primary context in which this problem has
arisen has been in sales of stock to a corporation, but the same analysis should
control with respect to any property. See, e.g., Berger v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2160 (1996) (discussing these issues within the context of a transfer of
an unincorporated cemetery business directly from one spouse to a third party
outside the marital unit, as required by a divorce decree). Once the underlying
value is seen as trying to draft a regulation that provides clear rules that allow
the parties, with minimum transaction costs and maximum time savings, to
decide for themselves which, between them, should shoulder the tax consequences of a transfer to an outsider-and not as simple consistency with a rule
that applies only to stock redemptions outside the divorce context-then there
is no reason not to apply this rule to transfers of other property, as well.
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(Similarly, there is no reason to limit these rules, as you do in subsection (d) of
your proposed regulations, to instances in which the nontransferor spouse owns,
either immediately before or immediately after, stock in the redeeming corporation.) I do not think it wise to maintain the ambiguous "on behalf of' language
in Q&A 9 for all property transfers except stock redemptions, as you do. I
recommend that Q&A 9 be completely repealed and replaced with a new regulation that applies to all property transfers to third parties, whether that property
is stock, real estate, or other property. The underlying issue is the same in all
cases: intent of the parties.
Once this animating value is made explicit, it should become apparent that the
rules should also explicitly confirm, as my shot at proposed regulations do, that
an actual transfer between the spouses prior to a transfer to an outsider will be
respected, even if the second spouse owns the property only momentarily and
the transfer is one that could be ripe for attack under the step-transaction doctrine outside the divorce context. An actual transfer between the spouses prior
to the outsider transfer is simply one more method that unadvised taxpayers
might use in order to ensure that the tax consequences of the outsider transfer
attach to the second spouse, and these expectations should not be upset. See,
e.g., PLR 9046004 (July 20, 1990) (concluding that the policy underlying I.R.C.
§ 1041 supported respecting a momentary transfer between the spouses prior to
an outsider transfer, even though the transfer might not have been respected
outside the divorce context). In order to allow divorcing spouses to keep transaction costs low and time delays to a minimum, however, I do not recommend
that all spouses must make an actual transfer of the property between themselves if they wish to shift tax consequences. Deemed transfers in this context
are economically efficient, so long as the regulations are very clear (as the "onbehalf-of' language is not) regarding when such deemed transfers will be inferred.
Finally, each of these positions (that an actual inter-spousal transfer prior to an
outsider transfer will be respected and that a deemed inter-spousal transfer will
be inferred if the non-transferring spouse had the "primary-and-unconditional
obligation" to purchase the property from the other spouse) should be seen as
void-filling rules. That is to say, the primary rule should be that the parties can
always specify in their divorce agreement who should shoulder the tax consequences of a transfer of property to an outsider. It is only in the case of silence
on the part of the parties that these rules should step in to fill the silence in a
way that most likely embodies their unspoken expectations.
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